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CHAPTER 1 
~· 
WHAT IS A "SHAREHOLDER AG REET,:ENT"? 
As its name SURgests, a share-
holder agreement is an agreement entered into by shareholders of a 
compP.ny . Spelling this out in the lengthier form may appear to be 
merely stating the obvious - as indeed it does; it does however, 
highlight an important aspect that perhaps becomes neglected in a 
detailed investigation into shareholder arreements - that they a re 
" 1 contracts, and as such " governed by the general law of contract. 
The "agreement" aspect owes its primary allegiance to the law of 
contract. This asnect of the agreement is obviously crucial, initially, 
to any consideration of the topic: when all is said 2..nd done , a share-
holder a.p;reernent must pass muster as a valid contract. The fact that 
few problems are raised by the shareholder af'reement as a contract 
does suggest that fulfilment of this recuirement is not nn onerous 
one . In contrast to this tranouility, the operation of the share -
holder agreement in compony lav,r , floning frorn its " shareholder" in-
f'redient , does raise some major pro~le~s ; likewise , it is in this 
field of the law that the shareholder agreer·ent stands to make its 
richest contribution. 
Nevertheless , the shareholder a~reement can be regarded as 
simply another contract entered into by parties dealing v:i th their 
pronerty . The contract is peculiHr , ho,·•ever, in th2t it involves 
parties v,ho are shareholders , dealine ·;i th a s -:iecial type of ·property . 
- company sh2.res . This provides the nexu""' , t·.cn 1 bet\1een t his 
contr"'ct and co· p2.ny 12,·1 : it is this link , hich brinf's onto the scene 
a JrCPE:nce tL.,..,t ultimately dominates the discussion - true rinci'Jles 
of company 1[1..r/ . The clefini tions of shcireholdcr ap,rccmcnts , in reflec -
tirg this duality of cortrnct and C01, "'DY 12 1• C 'JUld be re{"ar ed r 8 
slif'htl:r micle dinf' bec::iuce in reality, it is throur-h its i volvement 
in the corporate v:orld , rather than in its contrrctv.PJ r:ispectf" , -th"t 
the share.r1older ap-ree. ,ent is most importr:i,nt . Beinp· n c0ntrr'ct, nd 
conseC'ueLtl. ( in t::.e ~·:1r-lo sa~:on conte:,rt) enj oyinE; t e be~ efi t. of 
freedorr. of contract has one other consec;uence - nrunely tt.at no two 
1 ~i0kerine; - "Shareholders ' Votint· Ri~hts"; 1r65 u 1 lc1·:· r,:11arterly 
Revie\' 255-6 
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shareholder agreements 2re identical: there is no such thing as a 
I 'st8ndard shareholder agreement • To the extent that these contraciB 
all involve to sor:1e degree, parties whose status is identical (in 
that they all involve, by definition, shareholders) and the property 
involved is likewise similar in nature - the shares O\'med by the par-
ties, are similar. This, hov.rever , is v11here the sir.1ila.rity ends, 
renderin~ a meaningful description of shareholder a{;reements, of 
necessity, general in nature. The definitions offered correspondingly 
reflect this level of generality . 
In deference to their unparalleled involvement in shareholder 
agreements , a recent American interpretation is offered first.In 
Blount v Taff2 , Judge Clark described the shareholder agreement as 
"a contract bet·ween shareholders which may apply broadly to the rights 
of the shareholders in conducting the business of the corpor2tion, so 
long as their purposes are legal and not contrary to public policy'~ 3 
The distinction between this contract and any other contract lies 
in the participation of shareholders dealing with a special type of 
property - their shares. As will be seen later in the paoer , r.1ost 
shareholder agreements con be further divided into recognisable sub-
categories;this descript ion merely describes the basic structure 
upon which any shareholder agreement is based . 
Finn t~:es as his starting point the so.me level of e;enerali ty 
but ~roceeds to give a little more precision tothe context and nur-
pose of such agreements: 
"At its crudest, a share:1older f"{':ree:ment is si:.ulc o controct 
executcf b? r-or.:e or .-,11 of the r~.e1..bcrs of "' company , at the tire of 
its furmi~ion·, rcouirinc thot t_ey vote their shares in a part iculnr 
wny on certain defined matters ond re"'olutionc . Tl ecc matters ~ay , 
for exru,1ple, encompass appointrne;nt"' to the bo2rd , t' .c dividend policy 
of the comp3ny or t:1e conditions subject to whic1 the cor pany ' s under-
2 225 S.E.R. 2d 583 ( 1076 ) 
3 Ibid n 586 
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taking may be sold. r·ore sophisticated types of agreements can go 
far beyond a simnle voting apreement and may regulate in some detail 
the rights ofthe individual members. They may, for exomple, provide 
for the compulsory buying out of meMbers in certain events; they may 
prohibit members from participating in other businesses v:hich compete 
directly or indirectly with that of the company; they may oblige 
particular members to sell or lease property to the company so as to 
/I 4 enable it to begin business operations . 
As this description indicates the subject matters covered by 
shareholder agreements, and the means by which this is achieved
1
may 
vary considerably. The simplest agreements fix on the voting power 
of the parties ' shares as the vehicle by which the purposes of the 
agreement are carried into effect : they are conseauently labelled 
"voting agreements" . These types of aereements are the most common , 
and themselves can reach sophisticated levels in their regulation 
of the company's affairs . The agreement considered by the court in 
Re A & BC Chev,ing Gum5 provides an ·example of the 1·:-1n{"e of corporate 
activities and the degree of particularity that may be achieved in 
v,hat essentially remains a voting agreement . The agreement bound the 
only shareholders of the company to use their voting power to control 
the composition and remuneration of the board, the distribution of at 
least 60% of the net profits after tax as dividends , and bound them 
to ensure by their voting rights that the company would not make 
decisions 01<1 any of the follov1in{" matters without the unanimous con-
sent of all the shareholders,including: 
" 
i) the issue by the comnany of any shares, debentures or loan capit -
al or the creation by the company of any mort["apes, liens or 
charges (includinf' a floatinf' charge) u non or in respect of the 
business or underta:ing or assets or any part thereof or the 
grant of any share or stock ootions. 
4 I . Fi:ri..n "Sh2,reholde r Ac;reements"; Avstr...,lian Bu""incss Law Review 1978 
Vol 6 [rr olt] c 1 For ~n ex2_ 'Jlc of the v2riety of subject matters that 
m2.~r be covered in a sh,..,reholdcr 2,-:"ree, .. ent, see the precedent suggested 
l>y ~~ .. ube in "E tate anc1. Tax lan!1i:1g" (1978) p 308 
5 (1S75) 1 ',ILR 578 
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ii) the lending or borrowing of money , the giving of any guarantee 
or entering into any contract for indemnity or suretyship or 
for services or agency or any contract for hire or rent or hire 
purchase or purchase by way of credit sale where the individual 
amount involved exceeds s~,000 
v) the sale otherwise than in the normal course of trading of any 
property of the company or the purchase otherwise than in the 
normal course of business of any property by the company; 
vii) allocation to reserves; 
viii)payment or recommendations of dividends or any other distribution 
of capital or profits; 
ix) amounts to be vrri tten off assets or against nrofi ts in respect 
of bad debts redundant obsolete or slow moving stock, v:ear and 
tear and depreciation. 
x) the writing up or revaluation of any assets or change in the 
method of valuing stock; 
xii) the liquidation of the company; 
xiii)matter~ of policy affecting sales; 
xvii) the grant of any licences in respect of knor: how or under any 
letters patent trade mark or similar monopoly riehts for the 
tir.ie being O\'Tied or controlled by or licensed to the COT'1Pany or 
the acceptance termination or renewal of any such license . 
6 
xviii) the initiation or abandon.rnent of eny litigation or arbitration ." 
As the shareholder agreement r,-rov.rs r.iore. sophisticated , creatine 
"in some detail the rie:ht s of the indi vidw:l members" , it m2.y supersede, 
in reality, the cor.ipany ' s Articles of A~socintion , becoming the foun-
dation of the mer:1bers ' rights - at least those parties to the agreement . 
6 Ibid 582 
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As he points out, a shareholder ae;-reement may be created by "some or 
all of the members " of a compc.ny : there is no definitional , nor 
necessarily a practical reouirement that all the shareholders be party 
to the agreement :-a shareholder agreement may be , and often is entered 
into by two shareholders , or one shareholder contracting with an out-
sider . Furthermore, for definitional purposes , it is clear that a 
shareholder agre ement need not necessarily be limited to shareholders 
only - the minimum requirement would appear to be that at least one 
shareholder be a contractine party . The other parties may be non-
shareholders - either other member s of the company, the company itself 
or outsiders. 7 
The second point raised by Finn's description relates to the 
timing of when such an agreement is entered into : thoue;h there may be 
very go od practical reasons why it should be executed " at the time of 
its formation", this c annot l>e c.:orrnic1ereu ti. uefinitional 
prereouisite . Clearly a shareholder agreement may be entered into at 
any stage during the currency of the company ' s life - by definition , 
wherever there are ' shareholders ' in existence . Thus the reference 
"at the tine of its formation" may be a little misleading . In this 
context, it is clear that an agreement entered into by parties in 
contemplation of becoming shareholders in an enterprise yet to be 
incorporated - regulating their future votin~ pattern for instance -
remains for definitional purposes , a " pre-incorporation contract" or 
a " promoters' contract 11 8 : it cannot be considered strictly speakine 
a "shareholder agreement" , for the simple re ason that no shareholders , 
at present, exist . After the company has been incornorated , such an 
agreement , beinc equally binding on its parties as one entered into 
after incorporation , has the sa~e effect as the latter thoroughbred 
variety . Like\·:ise , for the ce,:-.1e rea"'Onf', on • cree1:-ient entered into by 
parties in contemnlation of becoming shareholders in an existing 
company is excluded from the definition of sh2reholder agr eements . In 
the absence of statutory reeu.lation of "shareholder agreements" these 
7 In Co.nodo' the inulusion of non- f;haroholders is p)·t1Villecl fo r by 
statute : Section 11 ( 2) of the Crmada Businer-s Coroorntions 11.ct 1 °75 
defines a urn:mi ... ous shareholder ,.., rrre e:1ent .., s ".'.i.n otherv1i se 12,;,ful 
ar:rceoent arnonrr c.11 the shareholder,.. of a corporation or among all the 
shareholders o.nd a person v,ho is no.t a charcholder ." 
P o •:Ieal initi".lly distinguishes betr:een " nre-incorpor:-ition contracts" 
or '1Jronoters contr cts" and "shareholder ap-reeoents" but almost immed-
i ,..,tely 2bandons t~e distinction - o •:Teal Close Corporations 2nd Ed. 
(1 °7 1) 5 . 03 , n6 . 
- 6 -
distinctions in real t erms are unimpor tant . I f , howe ver , the c on-
tract purports to bind the company , the distinction bec omes obviously 
fundamental : it is established that a pre- incorporation c ontra ct c annot 
bind a c ompany subsequently incorporated . 9 
Where t he shareholder sells all the shar es he o~ms in a c ompany , 
this sale is not regarded as a shareholde r agreement for the simple 
reason that upon the sale , the seller c eases to be a shar eholder. 
Kruger , hov1ever , maintains : 
" If the seller parts with rome of his shares , the r e is a shoreholder-
agreement to the extent that the contract betvveen the part ii;s r elat e s 
to both purchaser and seller as shareholde r s' ' 10 
The prec ise classification of this agreement , once it is recog-
nised as being binding , however described , is not too important . Within 
the definitional realm , hor:ever , Kruger ' s interprete.tion of this acree-
ment is open to the objection that while the transaction may be labell ed 
a shareholder agreement because it is a contract between parties who 
ultimately both are shareholders , it is not accurate to describe the 
purchaser , till the contract is executed , as a shareholder . This 'f'Ould 
not necessarily detract from its classification as a shareholder 2gree-
ment because as we have seen such acreements nay be entered into with 
" outsiders ;' and this is v.rhat the purch2ser is till the contract is com-
pleted and the fori:ial renuirer.1.ents of becomine- a chareholder 8Te ful -
filled .11 I~ is , therefore , a shareholder af-reement but not , it v:ould 
appear , on the grounds advonc ed by 1;:ru.c-er . In relation to the sh2..re s 
sold, the seller cc:innot obviously be rere.rded as a shareholder apart 
from the sh2.res ret2ined . It could be crrucd that the b2.sis of classifi-
cation , in order to attribute a meo.ninp; to the transaction under scrutiny 
should fix solely on the property involved in that transaction , bec ause 
that is r;hat is beinrr classified . The most that can be said for Kruger' s 
approach is that it is flexible . 
9 Kelner v Baxter (1°66) LR 2 CP 174 
10 "Poolinp- A{"reer.:ents Under Enp-lish Company Law" - 94 Law Quarterly Revie~ (1c78) 557 Footnote 6 
11 Greenh,..,lc;h v L2.ll2rd ( 1043) 2 Au.··m ·234 illustr2tes f'uch an ap-reement entered into by t .e TJresent c!ic.re} olders of a corrna.ny with an out -sider in contemplation of the latter beco""lin,r; a shareholder - and director : see post p 29 for a discussion of this case . 
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A further description 0f these ae-reements recognises that the 
various types have resulted in a variety of subcategories within 
which any agreement may be slotted: the "shareholder agreement" in 
itself is relatively meaningless when divorced from these various sub-
categories. Conseauently, it may be more meanin~ful to describe what 
a shareholder agreement is in terms of the particular subcategory into 
which it fits. It is to this level of categorisation that we now turn 
to. 
THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF SHAREHOLDER AGREEbENTS 
The shareholder agree-
ment is in many respects the generic term used to described a variety 
of means by which shareholders bind themselves by contract in respect 
of the range of corporate activity pennitted to them. The meru1s by 
which this influence is exerted, and the areas of corporate activity 
influenced by them vary considerably : b;v ancl_ l:. 1·t e , clt1ssi.fication of 
shareholder agreements has traditionally not been based on either one 
of these factors, or even a combination of them . Hornstein concedes 
the influence that a minority shareholding may play in determining the 
nature of the agreement entered into, but certainly does not accept 
proportion of shareholding covered within the ae-reement as a necessary 
determinant of its type; likewise the means employed to exert influence 
in the company, and the areas of corporate activity, do not serve as 
the basis of distinction: 
"The first of these groups , the "Clark-Dodge" type involves a 
iPOtity .,..h2reholder r:ho \'/ants :protection in the form of a 'veto power' 
apain~ t conduct v,hich he thinks may prejudice him . The other, the 
'Long Park Type• involves one or several shc:treholders v,ho v,ant assurance 
that they will be able to control the enterprise either for a period of 
years or for the life of the cornor0tion. They may ovm any amount of 
stock, yet regardless of how the stock O\'mership may vary at the time 
or in the future, they want control vested in themselves". 12 
12 "Stockholders Apreenents in the Closely Held Corporation" 
(1°50) 5S Yale La·.v Journal 1041 
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Kruger subdivides the types of shareholders in the following 
manner . 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
v) 
revocable and irrevocable proxy agreements 
voting trust at:reements 
agreements limiting transferability of shar es 
pooling agreements 
aereements for corporate dissolution13 
There appears from these divisions no logical or symmetric2.l basis 
of distinction 2.part from the popular labels that h2ve co1i1e to be 
attributed to thoin, Clearly a " voting trust agreement " or a " pooling 
agreement " is so labelled in recognition of the means employed by whi ch 
the will of the shareholders is brought to bear on corporc1te policy ; 
eaually clearly , the means by vrhich this is achieved is submerged in 
(iv) and ( v ), their classification bein~ a product of the areas of 
corporate policy contemplated by the agreement . There appears little 
logic to the divisions which have ernereed . It \'lould appear auite 
possible , for exc:unnle, to set up an agreement that was at the same time 
both a pooling agreement and an acreement for corporate dissolution . 
Reeulation of the parties votine power would not appear to be the 
CO!Ylr!:on thread running through them all as (iii) clearly is independent 
of this pov:e r . In terns of underlyine- rationale , these dic-tinctions are 
no distinctions at all : they are, therefore, merely descri~tive . And 
yet the api:,.roach adopted by Kruger is invariably th2..t taken by most 
r,Titers interested in the subject . o·:~eal , though runnin , ther:1 together 
a ljttle ~ore, nevertheless mo,intains the broad divisi0ns set up hy 
K!U[:e r . 
": shareholder oc;reement 1 .ay toJ::e a nmnbcr of f orr:i.c·. It ::1.oy )e 
a simple ,ioint votinr contro.ct (so!":etir'le"' colled a " poolir.rr eri-recmcr.t") 
providin~ that the contracting shnreholders will vo~e their shares P3 
a unit in elections of directors ~nd perhaps on other matters . Under 
such an arrenc;ericnt, each shareholder retc>ins title to his shares and 
13 Supra Note 10 
0 
./ 
and the right to vote them, he merely binds himself contractually 
to vote in accordance with a pre-arrane;ed plan. The ae;reement, how-
everJ may be something more than a mere voting agreement, it may 
attempt to create irrevocable proxies 11vhich take away the ovmer' s 
power to vote their shares and transfer this power to other persons. 
Finall?, the apreement may establish a trust or a voting trust, the 
shareholders transferring the legal title to their share to trustees, 
who vote the shares in accordance with the terms of the trust1114 
The thread running through this progression is the decreasing 
autonomy which the shareholder exercises over his shares as expressed in 
the increasing areas of corporate activity in which the manner he will 
vote is prescribe.a) till finally, in the voting trust, the shareholder 
has abdicated that power to vote, and indeed, legal title to the share 
is transferred to the trustee. This decreasing autonomy of action as 
a shareholder does serve as a coherent basis of distinction between 
the various types of agreements in which this occurs. It does not, 
however, touch on agreements that do not involve the votin~ power of 
the shareholders - for ex~nDle, one restricting the transferability 
of the partieJ shares, or one commi~ing a shareholder to lease land 
or buildings to the company. It does, however, provide an underlying 
rationa}- on vrhich voting agreements (which are by far the most common) 
nay be distinguished. 
The t~~ptation, in light of the apparent inconsistency that pre-
vails in distinguishin£; between the various types of agreements vrould 
be to rest content with the single lD.bel of shareholder 2,ereement as 
referring to any contract e~tered into by shareholders affecting their 
involvement in the con )any r:i thout attempt in[: a more precise definition 
of its type. o•neal vmrns against this : 
"These various devices may be used to achieve the so.me or similar 
objectives, but concentually and technically they are different - not 
that the courts alvmys recognise the differences. In passing on the 
1 4 O ':re al op c it 
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validity of a pooling agreement, for instance, a court sometimes 
discusses decisions dealing with voting trusts or irrevocable proxies 
with no apparent realisation that the different concepts involved 
might point to differences in result . 1115 
Given this conceptional and technical difference , it would appear 
that some division is required if the full potential of these agree -
ments is to be appreciated . Consequently , it is proposed to divide 
such agreements into the following categories , giving individuF1.l atten-
tion to each one . They are shareholder votin{'" a,e-reement s, ( excluding the 
'recocable and irrcvoc c.ble proxy), the poolinp- ar-reement aid the· voting 
trust. Thus, the broad division established is betv1een the sh8rcholder 
voting apreement as such and tl1e. vo Ling trust , the latter clistinguished 
by the legal tita l of the shareholder having passed to the trustees . 
VOTIITG AGREK :ENTS IF GEI;ERAL 
Finn draws a distinction between the 
type of shareholder 3.f'"reement which reouires the shareholder to vote 
in a particular way on certain defined matters and reeolutions, for 
example, appointoents to the board , the dividend policy of the company 
or the circumstances under vrhich the company ' s underta..1cine- may be sold 
- v:hich he labels a "simple voting ap;reement" ond those more sophis-
ticated agreements \'ihich "regulate in sor1e detail the rights of the 
individual members 11 • 16 These may provide for exn.'Tlple , the com":lulsory 
buying out ·of membe rs in certain event~, prohibitinp me1~bers from par-
ticipating in other businesses ,·.rhich co::ipete vii th the company or oblige 
particular meubers to sell or le2,se property to the comoo.ny in order 
that it may corr.nence business oper2.tions . The distinction betv:cen the 
tv/0 categories anpears to be both one of object and oeans - the voting 
agreements naturally enoue-h are orientated directly toward the direct 
interests and o·oerotion of the co.npany - for exn.'Tiple its dividend 
policy 17 ; naturally enoup-h, the means by v:hich such a directly corpor-
ate interest is catered for is linked with the shareholders most direct 
15 Ibid p 6 
16 Finn OD cit p97 
17 I ormally this is detcr;1ined under he Articles of the Coi:tpeny , by 
the directors: on the conseouencds of such a division between dir-
ector and shEreholder , see later discussion at p Ltg 
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means of partici1mtion in the e.ffairs of the company - his vote . 
The agreements entered into in the l atter category p.iff.er from the vot-
ing aereenent in thnt the rights and oblipations created attach 
on the shareholders much more in a "private" capacity rather than 
in their capacity as members of a company , or in its inner workings . 
Significantly , the rights and obligations created by agreements in 
the latter category are not inextricably or necessarily linked to 
the most characteristic shoreholder act - voting : a prohibition 
against a member fron entering into a comnetine; business may stand 
quite independently of that shareholder ' s vote . A distinction 
between the two types of agreements exists , in both types , the party 
is contracting as a shareholder , but whereas in the former that 
capacity is fundamental and necessary to the agreement because it 
regulates an act that con only be performed by a shareholder i . e . 
voting , in the latter types , due to the different nature of the rights 
or obligations created , ~h capacity is not a fundrunental pre- requisite 
of that party ' s fulfilment of the obligation : an agreement to lease 
land to the company , for example , c ould be and is entered into eaually 
by a non- shareholder . 
O' Neal proceeds from one basic assumption, namely , that the 
ultimate purpose of a shareholder agreement is the control or at least 
influence intre management of the corporation, either the board of 
directors or management (and preferably both) and perhaps , it is 
impl ied , the only method by v,hich the shareholder 2.e;reement will em-
brace real yower . Certainly it appears to be 2.ssumed that this is 
the typical form of a shareholder cp-reement:as he points out , the 
motives of the minority shareholder in entering into such 8n 8,f"reement 
are "to obt e.in membership on the board of directors, so,1e voice in 
r.'lan2.gement of the corporation"; 18 lit.:ev,rif.'e, r~aj ori ty shareholders 
"~2y enter ir_to c.n a[;reement a"1ong therr.selvcs to c ssure their continu-. t t .1.. th . ' . t d . . 11 1 G .., tl ing o ac uoge er in ffi['(lng cor9ora c ecisions . Gor.scquen y , 
the areas covered by such 8.{:reerr:e-r..ts tend to be gen.r 8d tor:erc!. the 
mc.nage~c~t sDhcre 1 bindinc its nnrties to vote in the el2ction of 
directors, for exa;;1ple, er of::icers of the corpor2.tio:. er prov.:.ding a 
I A O ' :i e al Op C it 
19 I• id 
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method of resolving cor~orate disputes - such as an arbitration pro-
vision or some cethod for dissolvin the corporation . It is signifi-
ca_Dt that in describin the areas generally covered by shareholder 
a,cree:-::ents , 0 •:~eal auto .. aticall ravi tates tov:ards tr_e management 
sphere , because this latter control appears to endor· the 2r-ree .. ent 
entered into by shareholders r:i th the cost ef::ecti ve neans of control . 
It is 2.n agreement entered into b· the parties in their capacities of 
sh2.reholders , but the :-;:, rincipal concern o:: sucn 2.n 8.[Tee:-::.ent anpears 
to be orientated to ··ard control , or at least influence of the :-12nae-e -
r::ent structure - either directl in stipulatinc- r:ho the directors or 
officers \"ill be , or ir..directly in pre scri binc a nolic r on a :::onar-e-
ner..t :-::.atter for exa~ple , the dividend policy . o•: eal does concede : 
11 Shareholder agree=ents often cont2in provisions on non- ~an2£ement 
!T'.atters . Perhaps the :-:",ost i::-.:.'Jo rtant i terns of the non- ::anage:-:1.ent :ind 
t :9ically included in shareholder ap-ree:nents are restrictions on the 
trans::er of shares 8-Dd buy out arranr-ements . Another co~~on undertaking 
a:::oyig sharer,_olders is to refrain fror.1 cnga["in in a co .. peti!':f' business" 20 
It is sig:i:ic2.r..t - certainly to a..."ly overview of c~c.reholder a ree-
~-ent s, 2nd ecual~y to 2.n asse ss::::e:nt of their strat e ic role in the 
cor_Jorate sche ... e of thi:r.gs , t_.2.t this co~":;ent is relc ,ated to 
:ootnote . Cert inly the i::.--.:9ression created is tl.at ... :.e - l ~ c :: , .. o:::, t 
s:.c.re:._o_der ~ -;ree::nent s i:--i tl:e United States , is iYl t:.c direct::.0:1 o:: 
coyitro:::_ 2.t the level o:: r::an2 e":'!ent . 21 Tv:o broad t~·pes of cla 1ses 
emer-e :ro= this" .al•sis - those that allo~ the ~hareho:der to exercise 
control over the ~2n3£c=cYlt of t .e compc:m , either directlL or indirect-
1 ( .:"' ef''"'ect tr,.,.,.., s+'or--i . .,.,,... --- -- .J.. <;.......... .... • _.;.. ,Lf h.i. erh2 ')S into an infor:nal director) ,.., d 
.::cose t:.ct, because of .;he r. tl re of t:'le ip;hts 2.nd oblir-ations created 
le2.ve t~e contrc..ctin pa.rte fund8..'::entally still a sha.rc'.'.'.older without 
e.~erin
0 
the do~ain of ~ ,.,~a e~ent . 
The discussion so far has p roceeded on the ,..,ssu.~ption that all 
sh2reholder agree:::ents biYld the parties by contractual :orce to a 
21 Ibid p 5 
2, ·n_..:..·:e :?..Yl .,e ·; Zeo.l2r.cl, :-10:::;t c-tates in :-Derica give directors a stat -
"tor· po, .. cr to .2 .. ,.., -e t:.e corpor at ion under the relev2.nt corporation 
1,..,... ':::_.e co. "'e ue!'lces of this dif:erence bet·;,·een ;.:.:erica and Tew 
Zec..2.a!:d. are· exar1ine at p 11 
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particular course of action or policy - indeed the obligation sealed 
by contract emerges as the most characteristi c feature of the share-
holder agreement. Even the existence of this contractual obligation, 
however, cannot strictly be regarded as the lowest common denominator 
to which all shareholder agreements must subscribe : another type of 
shareholder agreement, not based on a contractual obligation,exists. 
The agreement in these cases is not backed by contractual force but 
rather by an "understanding" - normally that the votes will be voted 
in a particular way . The best example of such an agreement is to be 
found in Greenhaltrh v Ardene Cinemas Ltd 22 in which one of the 
nominee directors 11 \':as asked in the course of his evidence whether he 
was ever instructed how to vote in respect of these shares, to which 
he replied "No, there were only three directors. I knew perfectly well 
what they desired done and I did it." 23 
Clearly such an "understanding" could also exist betv,een share-
holders who are not also directors. Though such an agreement lacks 
the force of a contractual obligation, and may be dissolved at will , 
it is nevertheless an agreement, and ·while acted upon , results in the 
same conseouences as one sealed by contract. Though the overwhelming 
majority of shareholder agreements involve a contractual obliEation,for 
that, in many respects constitutes the essence of the ap;recr":ent ' f.' 
security , and hence , it is those ae;reements that this paper j 
principally concerned rrith - one should also bear in mind the existence 
of thescuunderstandings • 
.1. OOLH.G AGREJ~ .~NTS 
In order to Qppreciate the structure of o sh2re -
holder votinp agreement , it is proposed to examine a particular type 
of ae-reement - the pooliwr agreement , which, by way of contrast. will 
give an indication of the nature of other types exist inn: . 
Pennington accepts that the· pooliue- o,ereemen~ is valid under English 
22 (1950) 2 All ER 1120 
2, Ibid p 11 25 
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law by analogy with the proxy agreement : 
"A member may validly contract to Eive a permanent and irre-
vocable authority to exercise the members ' votine; rights and it 
therefore seems certain that a member may enter into a valid agree-
ment with other members to pool their votin[" rights and to vote on all 
their shares as the majority of them from time to time decide". 
As O'Neal points out, a pooling agreement is in many respects 
the simplest type of shareholder agreement: 
"It may be a simple joint voting contract (sometimes called a 
pooling agreement) providing that the contracting shareholder will 
vote their shares as a unit in elections of directors and perhaps on 
other matters . 1125 
This type of shareholder agreement has been ·widely recognised by 
statute in various states of America. Section 620 (a) of tl:e New York 
Business Corporations Law provides: 
"An agreement between two or nore shorcholders , if in v.rri tin[" 
and si~ed by the parties thereto, may provide that in exercising any 
voting rights, the shares held by them shall be voted as therein pro-
vided ••• " 
In the absence of statutory regulation, hov,ever, it is clear thatt 
being a contract,such an agreenent may be concluded orally between the 
shareholders . Certain other reouirenents on the other hand , ~ust be 
fulfilled : 
11 A poolir,,0 agree.:10::.."lt .ust specify its ob~ ecti ves (election or 
corporate control or both) and its irn.: .. ediate aim ( r•: o or r:hat or b'.)-'vh) . 
If the i runedi2.te air1 is not snccified, tl~ere rmst be set forth an 
aereed procedure r:hore under the i I117. ediote aim c2n be deternined, and 
~ade bindinp upon the n~ rties to t~e poolinc orreement 11 • 26 
24 Co: .pany lm·, 3rcl Ed 197 3 5 5 5 
25 0':7eal op cit 
26 :ruger op cit p 560 
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The pooling agreement is described as such because, after the 
agreement has been completed, the total number of votes covered by 
the agreement in respect of the specific matters stipulated are 
" pooled" together and voted as a single unit whereas before the agree-
ment the votes of these shares v1ere not mandated in any particular 
direction . The agreement brings together previously dispersed individ-
ual shareholdings. Thus the pooling aEreement reauires all the votes 
to be voted together and further stipulates how they will be voted on in 
the specific areas covered by the agreement . As the kanitoba Court of 
Appeal explained: 
"In order to constitute a pool , there must be 2.n ' 8,{.,.fTe{'"ation of 
interest or property ' or a throwing of revenue or property into one 
common fund or a sbaring of interest in that fund by all on an eaual 
previously agreed basis 11 • 27 
The legal consequence of this type of agreement is tha t each con-
tracting shareholder has an undivided interest in the casting of the 
votes for the objectives specified in the agreement ; in other words , 
they become joint tenants of all the votes in the pool. 
This device may be contrasted v.rith , for example, the proxy arrange-
ment in which the proxy is the agent of the shareholder to carry out a 
course dictated by that shareholder; in a pooline; aereement , on the 
other hand, no principal/ aeent r el2.tionship orises betneen the share-
holde rs - indeed, if the analocy r,erc to succeed , the shareholder 
\':ould have to be rerarded as the :-',.,.ent o:: the ac;reer:1ent . The st.c:.rehola.er 
in a poolin.rr 2p-ree:-:1ent n:.erely bind O"'"' rmother to vote 2,s ~Ley ir-.i ~i ~2 1y 
~ "'"re c . LL~e,::ise a votL1t; t: :--t ..... rcer.ient. differs co 1cc Jt'J..al-;• ..,nd 
...Jr2 ctic'-lly fro:'.":". o, __ oo::i..::..r-.n- cerce~er..t in -::112.-t in the for:ner the vot::Y1, ,. 
riEht is sepnro..tec.. fro:"! the bcrieficial o\·merchip of.' the dare - the:: 
ri~~t to vote i s tr'"nste~rcd , frr ~ perioj , to t~e t~ stees . In cun-
tract to t:t·.s r esult, ':!'":.J shareholde~~, c:.,fi:;e-r c. per inr 3.,"Teement h'"s 
been concluded , retains '...,o th lecal an<... benefici~i,l ti~le to l:1-s sh'lres : 
27 ne r 3eaubieur J •. l. i"l Canadian Fur .. ~uction ::c-lcs Co. Ltd v Jeely (1S54) 11 .-r·m s p 265 
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his vote is only prescribed in the specific areas laid dovm by the 
agreement . Outside those areas, his freedom to vote remriins .uni -i .... J,\ired 
This is not the case after a voting trust has been executed;no "outside" 
areas can remain . The areas governed by the voting trust then , are 
wider than that of a pooling agreement . 
THE VOTING TRUST 
A voting trust is created v,rhen the voting rights of 
some or all of the shares in a company are settled upon trust : the 
title of their shareholders passes to the trustees . The types of 
trusts created vary considerably : it may include all the shares with 
voting rights or only some of them; the power given to the trustees 
under the trust may be an absolute and"unfettered discretion to act 
or these powers may be restricted . Likev,ise , the objects of the trust 
may be general or confined to certain specific matters . Professor 
Ballantine described the effect of the voting trust as {';i ving " ·what 
is in essence a joint irrevocable proxy for a term of years the ' protec-
tive colouring ' of a trust , so that the trustees may vote as owners 
rather than as their agents" . 28 
Pennington concludes in relation to the English scene 
"It is unusual for contractual arrangements for the exercise of 
voting rights to be carried so far as the participatine members trans-
ferring their shares to trustees ••• such voting trusts are not un-
common in the United States , v,here they are valid at common law, and if 
set up in this country they would appear to be valid by English law11 29 • 
In supnort of this conclusion , it should be noted that a somewhat 
similar plan to a voting trust , whereby trustees v.'cre given the power 
by the articles of a company to appoint the mo.naging director was upheld 
as valid in Nev, Zealand in /oodlands Ltd v Logan . JO The court held 
that a company could, by its articles , ho.nd over the mana,gement of its 
business to a stranger . From this it follows that a voting trust enter e d 
2P Ballantine "Corporations" Rev Ed (1~46) p 184 
29 Op cit 
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into by shareholders supported by appropriate articles , could confer 
on +.he trustee of the trust povrnr to reeulate the company's affairs 
that are regulated in general meeting : clearly these could include 
"management powers". It \'!Ould appear that this trustee, though in. 
effect a cting as a director, may be subject to no fiduciary obligations 
to the company, being the representative of the shareholders. The only 
possible basis on vrhich such a trustee could have fiduciary obligations 
impos ed on hir.i. v:ould be through the str1,tutory definitions of " director" 
contained in certain sections of the Companies Act 1055. 31 Perhaps 
this formula vmuld include. such a trustee : the company must have a t 
least 2 directors , 2.nd though the Articles may empty those positions 
of any real powers , by leaving all matters to be decided in {'"eneral · 
meeting , the involvement of directors at any sta~e in the exercise of 
such powers may render such a trustee "n person in accordance with 
whose directions or instructions the directors of a company are ac cus-
tomed to act . 32 If the trustees, by the Articles , wore able to 
exercise their powers independently, then this formula would appear to 
have been avoided; likewise, "they vrould only be "directors" fo r those 
specified sections of the Co~DPnies Act 1c55 . The submission of a 
resolution by the directors to -L}1( sharcJ.!Olc.lers in r·ta1er8l meet ing 
on which the trustee's powers could be exercised does apne2.r to be 
vVritten in this formula . 
In any event , suer a trustee may be deemed to be a director under 
the general definition of director in the Companies Act : 
"Director includes any person occupying the position of director, 
by what every nmr.e called". 33 
Cle2.rly , therefore, if such a trustee's pov1e rs go beyond me rely 
confir!'1ing or vetoing the exercise of the directors ' DO\"ers , reducing 
t·_e involveMent of these tv.ro for:-nal directors in the exercise of such 
porrnrs to a be.re minimum or to a mere for::1.ali ty , and in reality the 
po\'1ers of management are exercised by the trustee of the shareholders , 
31 Section 130 (7) Co .. prmies . et 1(' 55 
32 Section 2 ~ (' ( c) ( 'l, ) C o:::peni e s _ et 1c55 
33 Section 2 Co ... .t-' 2.r~::.es Act 1~55 
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this fact may render him a "person occupying the position of directo:P, 
and hence subject to the fiduciary duties of directors to their company . 
V/hether such a conclusion is reached deuends it is submitted , on the 
nature, and extent , of powers exercised by the trustee : if in reality 
this trustee is managing the company, bec ause the articles specify that 
such management pov,ers are to be exercised in General r:eeting , th i_s 
appears to be caught by the general definition of director, pit ched as 
it is to the reality, rather than the formality of the person 's position . 
In contrast to the previous shareholder aEreements examined so far, 
the voting trust may be employed equally effectively in companies with 
a large number of shareholders as one with a small number of shareholders. 
Traditionally it has been regarded as a " big business" device. However, 
as O'Neal points out: 
"It is a flexible device and can be exceedingly useful in working 
out control arrangements in a close corporation11 • 34 
Pickering concedes its flexibility but focuses on three situations 
where a voting trust will be found especially useful and they are : 
"Where there is a close association of mer.1bers and directors each 
individually having a comparable status v,ri thin the company the existence 
of independent trustees with por,ers to appoint or su:9ervise the appoint -
ment of directors and managing directors may prevent undesirable inter-
necine strife . Secondly , where a company is incorporated for objects 
r!hich require for their pro9er imnlementation the continued control of 
persons holding certe.in beliefs or opinions , a votin['" trust may be one 
v,ay of achievinp, this . Thirdly , in very large cor.1:ranie s v,here the r.1em-
bership is both great in nUJ11ber and dispersed in orea the interest of 
shareholders m2y be more effectively and continuously safeguarded by 
trustees acting on their behalf than by the efforts of individual mem-
bers in general rr.eeting".35 
34 0', eal op cit 5 . 31 
35 Supra Note 1 p 258 
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This type of shareholder agreement, though very popular in the 
United States is practically non-existent in the United Kingdom or 
Commonwealth jurisdictions . In fact , a device analogous to a voting 
trust , the unit trust, is being employed increasingly frequently in 
these countries. The "unit" is similar to the voting trust certificate 
issued to the beneficiaries of a voting trust in America . The unit 
holders have the beneficial ovmership of shares comprised in the trust 
fund which are vested in the trustees; however , under the trust deed 
powe r to exercise these voting rights invariably is assigned to trust 
managers . Neve rtheles s , the unit trust affords a useful analogy by 
which the problems created by voting trusts may be assessed to the ex-
tent that similar questions of control regarding the management of the 
trust itself, and also in respect of companies of which the trust is a 
member.may arise. 36 
WHY ENTER INTO A SHAREHOLDER AGREEr:ENT? 
Pe rhaps the first question to 
answer is the most obvious one : why do shareholders enter into such 
agreements? Why is a contract between shareholders considered necessary 
in addition to the 11 contract" embodied in the r·:emarandum and Articles 
of Asso ciation to which they are already parties, stipulating their 
rights and obligations by virtue of being shareholders? For as 
Gower points out: 
.. 
"The r.:emorandum 2nd Articles constitute a contract between the 
1 cor.1pany and each member. This has been c alled a contra ct of "the most 
sacred cha racter" since the shareholder advances his money in reliance 
on it ••••• Secondly, the contract under section 20 
2 
is enforceable 
· 3" 37 2mong the members inter se . 
This is the background ar;ainst v.rhich shareholder agreements are 
concluded. At this introductory stage it is p roposed to answer the 
36 For a d€scrintion of the operation of unit trusts, see the jud~ement 
of. cLe~lr .. nd- Jin Australian Fixed Trusts v Clyde Industries (1 9 59) 
59 SR I. S'.'/ 41 - 42 
37 Gor:er : The Irinciple s of r:odcrn C 01:1pany Lav, 3d ( 1 ~6S ) 261 - 2 
citing 1 - IIicl-:.:1. ..... n v Kent or Ror:mey 1-nrsh Sheepbreeders Ass ( 1915) 
1 Ch 8°1 
2 - in :rer, Zetland, Section 34 ( 1) Companies Act 1955 
3 - Rayfield v Hands (1 060 ) Ch 1 
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auestion from "first principles" concentrating on the circumstances 
which lend themselves to the intervention of such an agreement . 
The first point to note is that the shareholder agreement is 
usually created between shareholders in a small private company,or to 
use the American term,in a "close corporation". This is so for two 
reasons: the first is that the problems generoted within a small com-
pany are particularly susceptible to regulation by an agreement taking 
effect outside the company's r.:emorandum or Articles. The second reason 
is that a company with a great number of shareholders is,practically 
speaking , generally an unsuitable arena in which a shareholder agreement 
can operate. This does not mean of course, that a shareholder agreement 
could not be entered into by shareholders in a large public company - and 
indeed , this does happen - though in most cases the initial observation 
holds good . The susceptibility of the small company to a shareholder 
agreement is dealt vrith first , which may in itself indicate its unsuit-
ability in larger companies. 
The small company generally has problems peculiar to itself. 
Typically in a small company, the shareholders , directors and often 
officers of the company will be united in the same persons - or at 
least a close intimacy will exist between these persons . The shareholder 
2~reement here provides the participants with a degree of flexibility 
independently of the 1'.'IemorandUI:1 and Articles - 0 ' Neal explains: 
"The po.rticinants in a close corporation often want to depart 
from the tr2di tional corporate r.1anaP-er10nt frrune\·:ork anci a ree among 
the~selves on how control of the cornorotion will be allo c rted 2nd on 
V'ho r:ill be directors and officers . Al though they vo.lue the li:"'i °t"t:.on 
on person2.l licbili ty that the cor":Jorat ion form furnishes , they v.rant to 
retain all the freedom that partners .. have to deterr.1ine \.rho is to control 
the enterprise and hov, that control is to be exercised. As has often 
been said , shareholders in a close corporation not uncon~only desire to 
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be shareholders to the outside world but partners among themselves 11 • 38 
Here, therefore, the t~emorandum and Articles maintains the in-
cornorated image to the outside world;the shareholder agreement ensures 
that within that corporate structure a more fluid relationship, analo-
gous to that of a partnership, may exist between the participants. The 
agreement in this instance in reality qualifies the impact of the memo-
randum and Articles. 
The agreement serves this purpose therefore, it allows the 
participants in the company to cl< n · 1' their relationship outside the 
"traditional corporate management framework" normally established under 
the lfomorandum and Articles. To this extent, the agreement confers a 
greater degree of flexibility, allowing the participants to enjoy the 
benefits of a partnership between themselves while retaining the shield 
of limited liability from the corporate structure . 39 
The agreement also serves another purpose one which, ironico.lly 
enough, tends to qualify the flexibility conferreu by these agreements . 
Finn explains: 
" \'/hen forming a company the individual corporators v,ill usually 
have some clear understanding of what their roles are to be in the enter-
prise, of v:hat the objectives of the business are to be , and of how 
these are to be achieved . The aRree:ment device can be e:-.1.:.'Jloyed so as to 
ensure f~om the outset that the se understandings are not ldter fr~~t-
rat td in the c ase of any particular corporator by slbsequo~t lispute3 
2nd divisions betr.reen therr. . 1140 
The a[:reement , then, creates rie;-hts as nell as 'Jroviding a rreetcr 
deGree of flexi "oili ty . 'l'o this extent, the shoreholcte:· agreement, and 
particul2.rly the forr.:ation a ';ree::::ent , \'to rks to reeula "e the relation-
ship betv,een the partici:pants in a small co:-:.pany , in elevating a mere 
38 0.9 cit 5.02 
39 The reasons r:hy the terms of ,the agreer.i.ent o.re not incoroorated in the :.eT:1o rn.ndUT.1 or Arti cles, r1hich is oui te possible in licht of the freedom allor,ed under the Co!1''.)ffi1ies Act 1955 the shoreholders to dro.ft r,hatever B.rticles they choose, is deo.l t \'ti th subseouently-
~O ?inn op cit 102;cl csic ex~1ple of such an understanding in a sr.i.all company subsecmently bein{" frustrated is provided by Re 'v'/estbourne G2.lleri0s Ltd (1 973) AC 360;t·~is case is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 
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understanding to a contractual obligation and injecting an element of 
certainty in areas perhaps left uncovered by the Articles or on which 
the Articles stipulate that any decision shall be taken in General 
r.Te eting. In this way , the agreement can supplement or add precision to 
the general mandate of the Articles. Indeed often the agreement will 
constitute a crucial supplement to the operation of the Memorandum or 
Articles , of which the latter, if applied independently or without 
reference to the agreement, could either lead to injustice or bring the 
company to a standstill. This is a unique problem of the small company 
in that the vitality of such companies often depend on the maintenance 
of harmonious relationships between the participants : the rupture of 
this relationship invariably leads to the rupture of the business. The 
strategic importance of the participants in a small company, therefore, 
often results in substantial restrictions being imposed on thn s~1le of 
the company's shares which in small companies has a greater consequence 
than merely dictating the personality of the shareholding. The owner-
ship and management of the small company are often combined in the same 
people . The shareholder - managers are, therefore in constant and intim-
ate contact with each other; decisions are often made with little or no 
attention to their respective shareholding. It is not surprising there-
fore that they should wish to retain the power to choose their future 
associates by imposing a restriction on the transfer of shares . Such a 
restriction may also guard against the purchase of such shares by com-
petitors. 
This restriction on the power~ sell shares 41 is a perfectly 
v2.lid reauirement in itself, but one v,hich lends itself to abuse if 
not controlled in some v,ay because it may de prive the minority share-
holders of their ultimate protection: selling their shares . It is 
indeed one of the classic sources of abuse . Finn outlines that in 
guarding against this possibility, the shareholder agreement has a 
major contribution to make: 
41 H01.v absolute this restriction on the pov.rer to sell shares is may in 
it self prove all i mportant : • see the later discussion at p 1.'l of 
Greenhalgh v r,:allard ( 1943) 2 AlJ ER 234 
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"Such agreements can be used to prevent oppression or the " locking 
in" or "squeezing out" of minority shareholders by , for example , the 
utilization of clauses giving rights (1) to participate in management 
(2) to be bought out and (3) in defined circumstances, to have the 
company put into voluntary liquidation11 • 42 
Where restrictions are placed on the transfer of shares in the 
T,1emorandum or Articles - and often in small companies this is found 
necessary to maintain control , the shareholder agreement confers a degr ee 
of security on the minority shareholder, by giving him membership on 
the board of directors and some voice in the management of the company , 
for instance - that could not , based on the shareholding alone, exist 
due to the ultimate control exercised by the majority . The agreement 
likewise serves the interests of the majority shareholders who may be 
willing to share their control in order to attract into the company 
persons who othervvise would not buy a minority interest in a small com-
pany. 
The attraction of the shareholder agreement is that it allows a 
minority shareholding to be raised to a level of parity , in some res-
pects, rJith that of the majority shareholding : it allov,s the creation 
of rights by fixing them to the shares, thereby taking then out of the 
realm where they would be vulnerable to the pov,er of majority rule . 43 
Where, as is often the case in sr.1all companies, the shareholding 
is evenly balanced, a dispute between the parties may result in deadlock . 
Likev;ise a small company may be based on the clear understanding that 
11 its members will participate actively in the runninG of the business : 
the retiro:10nt of one of its r.1ev .. bers r.w.y conseauently result in serious 
dislocation of its mcn2~c~ent or the death of a menber mi~ht result in ,, " 
the ills of an ir-oct.i vc ohflrc110ldi..,.\r; in the com:9any . These nroblems 
result from the fact t1J.'""i; the shareholders, directors and manaeers are 
42 
43 
Finn on cit 03 . ./ 
The o,c-Tee::1ent remo.ins vulnerable hor:evor, unless the ovmershi n of t}:e slw.res ond the -oersonal 6blip;ation of the other uarties to vote (on r:rich t:r~is "cre...,tion of ri['"hts" nor •.. ally r,ill del')end) are expres-sly tied by contractual nrce : ~~oin , see later discussion of Green-halgh v ~:allard (Supra note 41) at p 29 
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commonly united in the same persons. To overcome this potential vulner-
ability, a shareholder agreement may stipulate independent arbitration 
over a matter in dispute between the members;it may provide for a dis-
senting member to be bought out by the remaining members, which that 
member may enforce , or it may require the company to be put into volun-
tary liquidation . Such problems are unique to the small company . There 
is, however, a practical consideration to be taken into account . Finn 
observes : 
"The potency of the shareholder agreement device is most obviously 
related to the size of a company ' s membership . The possibilites for 
forming and policing an agreement tend to evaporate as membership in-
creases" . 44 
This is certainly a practical reason militating against the use of 
shareholder agreements in a larger company . Kru.~er, on the other hand , 
indicates that certain types of shareholder agreements are not necessar-
ily restricted to companies havi~g a small number of shareholders . 
"Though pooling agreements are thought of in relation to control 
of private companies and of small public companies, pooling agreements 
not so restricted in law or in practicability . A poolin~ ae;reement can 
be effectively used in the larger public companies as well . With scat -
tered holdin~s, and poor attendance at stated and other shareholders 
meetings, a determined minority can exercise effective control as the 
majority or largest .J 1L101:j_ L~r bloc1 r 2rnonp the shareholders or shares 
present and voting. '.,1:otcver the size of company, a pooling agreement 
may be utilised in connection with election of directors and shareholders 
resolutions 11 45 
Thus it is clear, that the shareholder agree~ent is not exclusively 
limited to companies having a sm~ll nwnber of shareholders (the number 
of shares, in this respect is irrelevant to tne practical question of 
44 Finn op cit 102 
45 Kruger op cit 561 
- 25 -
creating and policing an agreement) though it is generally entered into 
between shareholders in these types of companies. Broadly s peaking, the 
effect of a shareholder agreement is twofold: on the one hand, it allows 
a degree of flexibility to be a chieved in the regul ation of the members 
r el ationship outside the "corporate norms", a llowing a greater degree 
individual definition which may be inappropriate if inserted in the 
articles (though there is nothing in fact to prevent the parties from 
inserting "personalised" articles). It also confers flexibility in the 
sense of allowing a group of shareholders , though not all, to enter into 
obligations meant to be relevant only to that smaller group;on the other 
hand, once the redefinition of obligations has been worked out vvi thin 
the flexibility provided , it fixes those obligations with the force of 
contractual law, thereby freezing those redefined positions \'/h at 
these introductory observations do reveal is possibly a recognition of 
the share in the company as potentially the most secure foundation, 
within its limits , on which a member ' s rights may be fixed: consequently 
it is only logical that members should ~eate rights and obligations in 
t heir capacity as sha reholders , because it is only through that share-
holding that the potential exists for "ultimate control" of the canpany . 
Th e creation of rights within t h e corporate structure i mmediately 
i nvolves a comparison with the company's L~ emorandum and Articles of 
Asso cia tion , traditionally regarded a s the company ' s constitution and 
s ource of members ' rights . Th e compari s on will be develope d in the 
cour se of this paper: a t t h is s t a~e , t he main di ffe r enc e t hat s t ands out 
i s t hat t he right s cre at ed f r om t he Articles ar c en joyed by all the mem-
bers , r:he r eas any ric;hts creat ed f r om an ar-reement arc onl y , obviously , 
li1:i ted t o those neobe r s party t o t he o,gr cement . The Artic les , moreover , 
< re very di r ectly l i n1rnd \'!i th the c o.r:)any , v:he r eas the lin{ bc t r:e en a 
shareholder ac;r ec:;ie:::-it and the c o::1pony is r:.o r c indirect - fo r r.:.ally a t 
-Cast , it qtends outside the c o . . ')2ny ; t he Articles , on t he other hond , 
str:ind very !'.'!uch " inside" t he c on_po.ny . At t h is pr cl i mi no.r y st2ee , it is 
appar ent t hat ir_ c ert ain circumstances, it will b e more appropriate to 
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establish rights by an independent contract r ather than incorporating 
them in the company's r:emorandwn or Articles. The first consideration 
is a practical one. O'Neal observes: 
"Some draftsmen prefer to use shareholder agreements rather than 
(or in supplement to) charter or bylaw provisions to cover many matters , 
such as restrictions on the transferability of stock and the allocation 
of control among the various participants ; and in many localities matters 
of that kind are nearly always covered by agreement among the share-
holders rather then by charter or bylaw provision . The principal reasons 
for this are probably the bulkiness of some of the provisions and the 
uncertainty of the draftsmen as to v,hether such matters can properly be 
covered in the charter or bylav,s". 46 
This , then is one practical reason why rie-hts may be incorporated 
in an independent agreement : There is, however , a more substantial 
reason. Where the Lemorandwn and Articles have already been ree-istered, 
those articles v,ill only be able to be altered by S.?4 of the Companies 
Act 19 55 by a special resolution: thus if shareholders v,ish to create 
certain rights, and they are not already included in the company ' s con-
stitution, this v.rill only be able to be ochieved if they are able to 
COT!lI'.1.and a s pecial resolution. Obviously in some cases this will not be 
possible, leaving the shareholder aereement the obvious alternative as 
the basis on which rights can be created. 
The shareholder ar;reement is, independently of this consideration, , 
a superior device as the foundation of a shareholders riEhts compared 
to the ::emor andwn 2.nd Articles : as Gower points out , al though the latter 
can be regarded as a contract: 
"It is a contract with various special characteristics. Section 
2047 expressly nrovidcs that it is subject to the nrovisions of the 
Companies Act . The latter includes the sections which permit of alter-
ations in the objects clause of the memorandwn and in the Articles of 
46 C ' leal Close Corporations 3. 79 
47 S 34 ( 1) Comnanies ~ et 1955 (" Z) 
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Association by means of a special resolution. Thus the shareholder is 
making a contract on terms which are alterable by the other party by a 
special majority voting at a general meeting". 48 
Any minority shareholder holding a quarter or less of the present 
voting power in the company places any "rights" he may enjoy under the 
Articles in very real jeopardy, because these rights can be altered or 
abrogated by the emergence, often present in a small company due to the 
small number of shareholders,of a majority able to pass a special reso-
lution even where this combination has not yet materialized. 49 In 
contrast to this situation, a right enjoyed under a shareholder agreement 
is not subject to this particular statutory vulnerability: however 
much of a minority the shareholder is vis a vis the other members of the 
company, the rights created under that contract, like any other contract, 
cannot be unilaterally altered by the superior shareholder. From this 
elementary viewpoint, the shareholder agreement appears a superior and 
certainly a simpler device by which rights of a minority shareholder may 
be secured. There is, as well, another factor to be taken into account 
in making this comparison, as suggested by O'Neal: 
" Perhap s the fact that a corporate charter is a public document 
tends to discourage the inclusion in it of some optional items for 
example matters the participants would prefer to keep confidential. 1150 
This, then, may be another reason why an agreement will be preferred 
over the Articles as the foundation of certain rights. 
Ar2in looking 2t the co .. .,_Ju ·l.3011 fror.i the preliminary noint of view, 
it would onneu.r that certoin uattcrs 2,re excluded from treatnent by a 
sh2reholder 8,{"reement because their incor)oration in the Company's rTem-
orandurn is corL'Tionded by a statutory nrovision : for exa.'Tiple Section 14 
(1) (a) of the Co:.panies Act 1955 _provides : 
"The mer.10randum of every co1;1pany must state the objects of the com-
pany ." 
4E Go~cr on cit 262 
49 Subject, of course, to fraud on the minority. 
50 o,~ eal op cit 116 
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This would render ineffective an attempt to stipulate the company's 
objects within the framework of a shareholder agreement , even if the 
company's articles provided that such matters were to be regulated by 
General r,:eeting . To this extent, the shareholder agreement is limited 
by the corporate norms created by statute. In fact these limitations 
are not onerous, because the Companies Act 1955 lays down very little 
in the way of substantial provisions on what must be included in the 
company's I.:emorandum and nothing in relation to its Articles~1 It is the 
absence of any substantial requirements) particularly in relation to 
the latter, that allows the shareholder agreement potentially an un-
limited scope of operation. 
The purpose of this introduction has been to indicate the potential 
utility of a shareholder agreement in the corporate structure : the 
essence of its attraction lies in its flexibility. Where it is impossible 
or involves a cumbersome procedure in altering the Articles, the agree-
ent offers a relatively simple alternative by which s4areholders may 
redifine their rights and obligations. 
5 1 Aoart fron the ~inimal rcouire~onts under sections 20 (stinulotine ~hot the re~istration of Articles ~or a conn~ny li~ited ?Y shBres is optionBl) and section 22 Companies Act 1°55, which stipulates that in the absence of any Articles re{"istered, the "reeulations con-tained in Table shall be the regulations of the company, v1hich shall 2pply even in so far as the Articles do not exclude or modify the regulations" of Table A. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE VOTING AGREEr.".ENT AS A CONTRACT : 
The heart of a shareholder agree-
ment lies in the contract created between the parties : it is this 
contra.et that gives the agreement binding force . 1 Whether the share-
holders are contracting among themselves or with outsiders in respect 
of their voting rights, the a,ercement created is governed by the general 
law of contract . As sue;gcsted earlier, however, the validity of the 
voting a,greement as a valid contract seldom poses many problems, because 
its ingredients are , by and laree, not onerous . Certain aspects of the 
agreement as a contract should, nevertheless, be pointed out . 
The most obvious point is that in relation to the consideration 
supporting the contract , a distinction exists between a voting agree-
ment betvreen shareholders and one between a shareholder and an outsider . 
I n the latter situation , independent consideration r1Us t fl o,·: fror1 the 
outsider to support the IJ~oni:-Se; in the forrner ~he 11tu'Lu~tl 1n:ur-·.L-,0s of' 
t ose shareholders are sufficient consideration to support the aeree-
ment. This is an established principle of contract law and applies to 
voting agreements , accepted as they are in England as normal contract-
ual acts . 2 This it is submitted , is the viev: thDt ,·rill be foJ.J.owed in 
Nev, Zealand . 
Being a contract has another important conseauence for the share-
holder agreement - nameJ.y , that the parties r.rill be bound by the express 
t erms of the contract , and perhaps what is more imnortant , any terms 
outside these will seldom be implied . This point is forcefully illus-
t r ated by Greenhalgh v Eallard . 3 Three directors of a company entered 
into a collateral agreement with the :plaintiff , binding them to vote 
with and support him 1giving him effective majority control . The dire -
ctors, however , subseouently sold their share, to rrhich the plaintiff 
allege d : 
1 We leave behind , at this stage , mere "understandings" . 
2 Greenwell v Porter 1002 1 Ch 530 
3 ( 1 9 4 3 ) 2 A 1 1 ER 2 3 4 
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1) breach of their contract with him, by putting it out of their 
power to support him, based on the principle of Stirling v 
J :ai tland ~ 4 
"If a party enters into an arrangement which can only take effect 
by the continuance of an existing state of circumstances, I look on the 
l aw to be that ••• there is an implied ene:agement on his part that he 
shall do nothing of his ovm motion to put 2.n end to thri,t stotc of circum-
stances, under v1hich alone the arrangu11ll!ll°L cai1 be o_pe:J.'uLive."5 
2) That the burden of the contract ran with the shares and later 
purcha.sers vii th notice 1nere bound by its terms. 
The Court rejected both arguments as a matter of the construction 
of the contract, refusing to imply the term argued for under (1);as 
t here was no express restraint on the power oftl1c directors to sell 
t heir shares, held no breach of the contract had occurred: As Greene r::R 
commented : 
"A me re undertaking by the shareholder to vote in a particular vmy 
cannot by implication impose upon him a prohibition against the sale of 
his shares". 6 
The court refused to apply restrictive covenants to person2.l ty. 
Lord Greene T,i:R also held that though an obligation entered into for an 
unlimited duration would be recognised, such recoerii tion v'.rould only 
fo llow pn the strength of explicit words to this effect . An lnstinctive 
weriness against an obligation of unlimited duro:tion pervades the jude; -
ment: the prospect of the aereement being bindin.a- forever was the domin-
ant facto r in the court's refusal to accept as an implied term of a 
voting agreement an obligation not to sell the shares: 
"Any other construction would mean that never could any of them 
sell one single share; there would have been an obligation to keep the 
i ( 1864) 5 B & 5 84 1 
) Surnrnarised by Lort Atkin in 
AC 717. Southern Foundries v Shirlaw (1 940 ) 
) ( 1943) 2 Alf ER 240 
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shares and if the appellant had survived the three directors or any 
of them, it would hcve passed to their legal personal representatives 
... I cannot brinF, myself to see that this docu.~ent can be construed 
as imposing an absolute duty on the ov.ner of the shares not to sell 
them. An obligation of that kind might have unforseeable results. 
If it had been intended, nothing would have been easier than to say 
so".7 
Thus, though an agreement may validly stipulate that the obliga-
tions are to endure forever, the bias of the courts is to construe 
most agreements , in the absence of explicit words to this effect, for 
a more limited duration - which itself affects their interpretation of 
the contract. 
Subsequently, the company implemented a scheme of subdivision of 
one class of its ordinary shares which had the effect of increasing the 
voting strength of that class five times, denying Greenhalgh any degree 
of effective control. In Greenhaleh v Ardene Cinemas Ltd 8 t Greenhalgh 
argued that this action constituted 8. breach of the original voting 
agreement , arguing for an implied tern trnxthe company should be pre-
cluded from acting in any way which jeopardised the voting control 
apparently secured by the aP-reement . The court indicated that it would 
condone such an implied term in a contract in a very exceptional and 
clear case. Lord Greene I'.::R indicated the court's reluctance to do so 
for the following reasons: 
"For a court to imply, in a complicated business agreement , a far 
reaching term is a very sErious matter . There is the pronouncement of 
Scrutton LJ (see Reie-ate v Union Lanufacturing- Co. Ramsbottom) which is 
very frequently referred to, that the clause must be such that an im-
partial onlooker who asked.whether the parties intended it would in 
effect be met vri th the answer "of course we did". For the court to 
say that such an answer would be Fiven , without the assistance of know-
ing all the circumstances is in any case a very serious responsibility119 • 
7 Ibid 239-240 
8 ( 1 9 4 6 ) 1 All ER 3 1 2 
9 Ibid 514 
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In fact reluctance on the part of the courts to read implied terms 
into shareholder agreements is discernible from the first judicial 
pronouncements on such agreements: the agreement involved in Greenwell 
v Porter1 O included the apparently broadly worded provision that: 
"(1) The executors shall tak e all steps and do all things within 
their power which may be re quired for obtaining the election, as dire-
ctors, of ••• The executors shall at all times to the best of their 
ability , by their votes and otherwise support them and each of them in 
their office. Each of them agrees that the provisions of this clause 
shall apply to him or her and to any shares not or at anr1 time hereafter 
held by him or her in his or her ovm personal capacity". 
T:Ir. Greenhalgh would have recoe-nised this type of clause, since 
it was similar to the one he commi ited himself to. The interpretation 
of this clause by the court in Greenwell v Porter 12 should have served 
as ade quate warning to Greenhalgh's advisers, predicting accurately: 
"It 'Nill be observed that the sale of the shares retained by the 
executors is not tied up ••• the executors do not bind themselves not 
to part with the whole of the shares next day 11 • 13 
The executors therefore, could have circumvented the agreement 
simply by selling the shares - and stipulating pe :rhaps an agreement 
with the purchaser that they should retain the r.1anne r of voting the 
shares , which on the strength of Greenhalrrh v Lallard14 , would liberate 
the voting power from the orig inal agreement . 
It is auite cl ear , that the security c onferred on aparty by such 
n aereement involves a little more than merely an initial vote of 
acceptance as a valid contra ct-this indeed may be regarded as the mini-
.un test of security. A variety of threats to the effectiveness of 
such ancgreement remain , once its legal validity has been assured, 
threatening to empty the agreenent of any neaning as effectively as an 
10 (1 902 ) 1 Ch 531 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 535 
1 4 ( 1 9 4 3) 2 A I I ER 2 3 4 
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initial verdict of legal invalidity leaving the valid agreement little more that a burnt out frame. The first and most obvious lesson to be learnt from the Greenhalgh experience, applic2ble generally to all share-holder agreements,relates to the collateral voting agreement involved. The obligation to vote the shares according to an a~reement exists, in the absence of specific words to the contrary contained in either the agreement or the Articles only as long as the parties to the agreement own these shares: clearly, therefore, the agreement itself must rest-rict in some way the ability of the parties to sell those shares or else the obligation will be left haneing in mid 2.ir v,hen the shares 2re sold. The obligation to vote is emptied of all meaning if the parties may with i mnuni ty sell the shares involved in the s,greer.1ent. Furthermore, as the - 1 5 experience of Greenhalgh v r.:all2rd hir:;hlights, the restriction im-posed must not be limited to sales to non-members of the company, but 16 must expressly include any sale. Such a provision \'vOuld be enforce-able despite the provision in the company 's articles stipulating a 
different restriction on transfer. Clearly a minority shareholder com-m2nding less then 25fu of the voting pov:er of the company would be ill-advised from r elying on any restrictions on transfer of·shares as this will be subject to alterations under S 24: the appeal of fixine such a restri ction on the parties shares is that it is not subject to any alt eration . 
But any security conferred by such a restriction in an agreement giving a shareholder or shareholders control of the company is subject as Greenhalr-h v Ardene Cinemas17illustrates , to the power of the company to subdivide the voting power of outstanding shares : obviously the n ber of votes that can be secured by a voting a,ereement only eives control relative to the number of outstanding votes competing with it. T usa shareholder agreement must seek to prevent the company from in-creasing the voting power through subdivision of ~:r.ie outstanding shares, thereby diluting the voting power of the agreement . Such a result may 
be achieved , depending on the relative voting power of the agreement -Orieinally , by including the obligations on its parties to: 
15 Ibid 
16 A suggested precedent for such a restriction is to be found in Appendix I3 . 
17 ( 1946) 1 A 11 ER 51 2 
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1) Alter the Articles (if necessary) to make the voting strength of 
present and future shares a matter to be decided in GeneraJ.. Meet -
ing. 
2) Vote against any alteration of the present Articles. 
3) Vote against any resolution subdividing any shares. 
4) Vote against any resolution which would interfere with the voting 
control of a party to such an agreement . 
These provision, coupled with an effective restriction on the 
power of the parties to sell their shares would have prevented the sub-
division of shares that occurred in Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Ltd. 18 
In light of Greenhalgh's experience, inclusion of such clauses 
vould appear essential to the security enjoyed under an agreement. The 
effect of such an agreement is to freeze the present structure of the 
company's shareholding in that position givin~ him control. Though 
Lord Greene IiIR in Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas 19 denied that this was 
the effect of the agreement in ouestion, this conclusion would appear 
to be more a comment on the inadeouacy of the particular agreement in 
ouestion rather than a denial that the effect argued for could not be 
achieved . In fact, Lord Greene recognised that a shareholder could 
contract to achieve this result: 
"If it had been the intention of the parties that Greenhalgh's 
position should be secured in a manner which vwuld be effective at 
law, there are various devices by which that result could have been 
achieved, but those methods were not incorporated in the bargain which 
the parties made." 
Likewise, Vaisey J at first instance advised that the plaintiff 
"ought to have stipulated from his point of view for some permanence 
18 Op ci t 
19 Ibid 
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of contro1 . 2° Clearly therefore, the courts recognise that a shareholder 
may "by way of various devi c es" secure "some permanence of control". The 
urovisions suggested above are one means , it is submitted of securing 
this permanence of control: the result achieved indeed enjoys express 
judicial support. 
Some aspects of a shareholder agreement may , on whatever basis, 
be held to be unlawful, and hence invalid. The most common ground of 
invalidity of such agreements involving shareholder-directors is that 
they contain an unlawful f etter on the exercise of tle directors' dis-
cretions . The question arises as to whether the whole agreement falls 
because it contains an invalid provision or whether only the invalid 
provisions are struck down . This issue~1 the determination of which is 
obviously of vital concern to the parties of the agreement, since all 
agreements are potentially liable to a charge of invalidity, is the 
last area in whi ch the principles of contract play a leading role: 
"The principles governing the severability of valid from invalid 
provis ions in contra cts generally are applicable to shareholders ' voting 
agreements". 22 
The general rule governing shareholder agreements in this respect 
is that the courts will attempt to give effect to the valid elements 
of a contract containing invalid elements . The Supreme Court of Alberta 
in I'totherwell v Schoor 23 outlined the criterion on which the courts will 
enforce the valid elements of an otherwise invalid agreement . 
"The attempt to bind the directors ••• is in my opinion invalid ••• 
I do not think, hov,ever, that this should be held to be the sole or 
controlling purpose of the pooling agreement so as to invalidate the whole 
20 U 0 45.J 2 All ER 719 
21 
22 
23 
The issue of severance of the obligations undertaken by the J"allard 
directors :pursuant to the collateral agreement ,.vi th Greenhale;h arose 
in the unreported jude;ement of r.:orton J , described by VaiseyJ in 
Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Ltd (1 945 ) 2 ATT ER 71 9 : " One of the points 
wes that the obli~ation •• extended to both directors ' meetinps and to 
shareholders' meetings .• and •. could not be divided •• the collater, 
al a,er eement was construed as binding the signatories as shareholders" 
Ibid 721 . 'the case provide s no criterion on when severance will 
be available to shareholder agreements . 
0 ' real op c:-lt S,'l.S p89 
(1 949 ) 2 1,'/V/R 537 
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.. . the clausesproviding for each object are not dependent upon one 
another but may be separated ••• Those circumscribing the discretion 
of the directors are in addition to the (valid) clauses. ~4 
Thus tvvo factors emerge clearly as decisive in determining whether 
the valid parts of the agreement may be upheld: if the invalid part is 
the "sole or controlling purpose" of the whole agreement, then it is 
likely that the whole agreement , valid and invalid parts, will fall; 
likev,ise , the independence of each clause will influence the court in 
its decision . The operation of the latter factor in action can be 
appreciated by reference to the minority judgement in R,nguet v Bergeson25 
holding that the invalid clause requiring the unanimous vote was not 
separable from the other provisions of the contract. Consequently, the 
minority judgement would have invalidated the whole agreement : 
"It appears equally that each of the parties rmnted to guarantee 
against all contingencies in preventing the realisation of the common 
intention in adopting.the most efficacious measure to ensure the main-
tenance of the obligations taken to this end ••• this clause could not 
be considered as a purely accessory clause and cannot be considered as 
not playing a determinative role in the completion of the contract" 26• 
Vfhere the agreement is entire and indivisible, the invalidity of 
one aspect of it will permeate the whole agreement . The ultimate basis 
on which the purposes of the contract will be judged are the intentions 
of the parties : 
"The intentions of the parties to an ar;reement control whether valid 
provisions will be g iven effect v:he re part of the agreement is held in-
valid . The intention of the parties, it has been said "must be determined 
from the terms end subject matter of the , contract together with any pert-
inent explanatory circumstances." 27 
24 Ibid 
25 (1 960) SCR 672 
26 Ibid p 676-7 
27 0 ' Neal op cit ouoting Equitable Trust Co. v Delaware Trust Co. 30 DCL Ch 118 
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Another element to be considered in the court's refusal to enforce 
other elements of an ari-reement containing invalid elements was suggested 
in r.1otherwell v ~ch_oo~ 28 : the court indicated that the existence of 
"undue pressure" or "undue influence exerted on the party agreeing to 
the agreement vmuld render it void in a court of equity •29 The absence 
of such elements paves the way for upholding the otherwise separable 
valid aspects of it. 
Lastly, it should be pointed out that a,n agreement to agree on a 
particular mode of voting entered into by shareholders, though probably 
not in itself a "shareholder agreement" is, in any event, an unenforce-
able contract as Parker J held in Von Hatzfeldt - Wildenburg v Alex-
ander~O · 
"There is no enforceable contract ••• because the condition is 
unfulfilled or because the law does not recognise a contract to enter 
into a contract" 31. 
The Greenhalgh saga , apart from highlighting the need for tight 
draftsmanship, also illustrated the significance of such agreements 
as contracts. Indeed initially, the Greenhalgh cases remained basically 
v1ithin the realms of contract law. Though this element will from now 
on retire to the background, one should bear in mind that the voting 
agreement as a contract may, as Greenhalgh v r:allard 32 and Greenhalgh 
v Ardene Cinemas Ltd 33 dramatically and rather sadly illustrated, 
come very much to the fore. 
RK.::SDIES FOR BREACH OF A SHAREHOLDER AGREET :ENT : 
"The question of the 
relief to be granted for viol a tion of such an a rrangement raises prob-
lems more vexing difficult and real than ever were to be found ~n the 
Validity side. V/hat is in issue, is the specific performance of an on-
going , intimate personal consensual relation. This is something the 
28 (1 949 ) 2 1.VWR 537 
29 Ibid 
30 (1 9 12) 1 Ch 284 
31 Ibid p 289 
32 (1 94 3) 2 AJ.l ER 234 
33 (1 946) 1 AllER 512 
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Anglo-Americon legal system has - wisely it may be supposed - not lightly 
granted as a matter of course •34 
With this warning in mind, we proceed to examine the possible rem-
edies available where a. shareholder refuses to abide by the terms of a 
valid agreement entered into by him. 
As Finn points out, the shareholder agreement holds one advantage 
over the Articles of Association as the foundation of a shareholder's 
rights: 
"Breach of an agreement will sound in damages - a remedy generally 
regarded as not being available to a shareholder complaining of a breach 
of the 'statutory contract!" 35 
In fact~ it may be doubted whether the possibility of claiming 
danages against a breach of a valid shareholder agreement is a satisfact-
ory form of redress. As O'Neal points out: 
"Although the breach of a ·valid shareholders' voting agreement gives 
rise to an individual right of action for breach of contract, damages 
are usually so speculative that a suit for damages is not a practical 
remedy. Further, whatever injuries result from the breach may in law 
be injuries to the corporate entity and not injuries to the shareholder 
who considers himself aggrieved 36." 
Thus, on its own, the remedy of damages suffers from tv.ro main dis-
advant aees: due to the type of obligations involved, establishing 2ny 
meaningful personal damae e from the breach of that obligation invariably 
proves difficult, but more importantly, it is seldom the redress the 
aggrieved party seeks : thus the damages involved are unlikely to be 
adeauate, but further, damages themselves are unlikely to be an adequate 
remedy. Wright, in setting out the options available arising from the 
34 Chayes: 11 :.:2.dame Wagner and the Close Corporation" 73 Harvard LR 
1535 (1960) 
35 Op cit p 103 
36 0'Neal op cit 192 
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ore ach of a shareholder agreement, discounts the availability of dam-
ages: 
"The p ossible alternatives are in line with traditional contract 
law : d amages for brea ch of contract or s p ecific performance. But the 
uni aueness of the corp ora te status as well as the inadequacy or impos-
si bility of standa rd remedies re quires a lterna tives. One is to i mpress 
a proxy on the recalcitrant shareholder allowing the other to vote his 
shnres;another is the use of arbitration provisions, still another is 
the denial of voting rights of the recalcitrant shareholder". 37 
The same author concludes: 
"The only true relief would be to s pecifically enforce the agreement 
or t o g rant irrevocable p roxies. Both of these remedies fully u phold the 
i nt entions of the parties. An unenforceable agreement, a lthough v a lid 
and b inding, is of little use to anyone - either the participants or the 
cor poration". 38 
0 ' Neal suggests yet another remedy: 
" Parties to a sha reholders voting agre ement h a ve been a ble to obtain 
in adjudic a tion of the ir rights under the agreement by an action for a 
de cla ratory judg ment." 39 
It is cle a r t hat t hB mo s t e f fe ctive remedy for breach of a sha re-
holde r agre ement in t h e con tra ctua l sphe r e is t hat of speci f ic p erform-
ance . Fro m t he out set, it hns be en r e c o~ni sed t hat t h i s r eme dy is g en-
erally a v a ilobl e agai nst t h e b re a ch of a shar eholder voting agreement. 
In Gr eenr,ell v Porter L10, t h e court g r anted a n injunction r e stra ining the 
exe cuto rs to a. voting agreemen t from voting against t h e t erms of an 
ae-r eemen t as t h ey t h r eatened to do. In Puddephatt v I e i t l~ 
4 1
, Sa r gant J 
hel d t hat the courts would be p re pared to g rant a mondatory injunction 
37 
\I 
Shareholder Pooling Ag reements; Ark ansas Law Review Vol. 24 p 517 [t<l,a] 
38 I b id 
39 0' Heal op cit 103 
40 (1 902) 1 Ch 539 
41 (1 9 16) 1 Ch 200 
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to enforce the tenns of an agreement: 
"In as much as there is one definite thing to be done about which 
·the mode of doirip, . there can be no possible doubt, I am of opinion 
that I ought to grant not only the prohibitive but also the mandatory 
injunction." 42 
Clearly, therefore, the remedy of injunctions, analogous to a 
decree of srecific perfonnance, is available under English and New Zealand 
law in enforcing the tenns of a voting agreement. The court appears to 
have accepted counsel's argument. 
"The true test is whether the agreement in question is one within 
the principle of specific perfonnance". 43 
Though in fact, the remedy granted in Pudde phatt v Leith 44 was a 
nandatory injunction against the defendants, it is implicit in the judg 
ment of Sargant J that enforcement of a shareholder agreement by decree 
of specific performance fell outside any of the exceptions to this 
remedy, and hence would be available. It would appear from the grant 
of a mandatory injunction that the remedy of specific performance is 
likewise available - especially considering how blurred the distinction 
between them became in Puddephatt v Leith. 45 
It is clear, therefore, that the"problems more vexing, difficult 
and real" referred to'in the opening quote do not present themselves 
where the obligation, enforcement of which is sought, is one to vote in 
a particular manner; where the a g reement is based on an "one-oine;" intimate 
r elation "it is true that specific perfonnance becomes problematical : 
breach of such an obligation, however, will provide a strong ground on 
\'1hich the company may be wound up under the just and equitable ground 
of Section 217 (f) Companies Act 1955. 46 
42 Ibid p 202 
43 Ibid 
44 Op cit 
45 Ibid 
46 In re Westbourne Galleries ( 197 3) AC 360; the statutory remedies for breach of a shareholder agreement are considered separately in Chapter 7 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SHAREHOLDER AGREEf,iENT IN LAW 
Before embarking on an examination 
of the legal position of the shareholder agreement , it is important 
to bear in mind the immaturity of the topic in New Zealand. For various 
reasons , the shareholder agreement has only seldom been considered by 
English or Commonwealth courts, and to the present writer 's knowledge , 
never by a New Zealand court. By and large, this relative scarcity is 
reflected in the Commonwealth textbooks on company law. Gower for 
example , speaking of the United Kingdom , scarcely touches upon them, 
limiting his comments to a footnote: 
"Voting agreements are not uncommon in this country, although we 
have nothing comparable to the Ameri can voting trust 11 • 1 
2 Though it is accorded a slightly longer glance by Afterman , 
consideration of shareholder agreements is, nevertheless, limited to a 
rather short single paragraph. The point of these observations is to 
show that , to date , the shareholder agreement is a relatively neglected 
topic in academic circles, Commonwealth courts and practice - in sharp 
contrast to the slightly daunting abundance of case lav, , statutory regu-
lation and academic comment on the subject in America. It is obvious 
therefo re, given the immaturity and relatively untried nature of the 
shareholder agreement in the Commonwealth sphere that resort to the 
American experience may validly be made as , after translating these 
lessons into the New Zealand context, a useful guideline of the result 
likely to arise in that context. Though it would be possible from the 
"inside" - by the application of knovm principles that have developed in 
the Cor:imonwealth jurisdiction in the corporate sphere to its basic ingredi-
ents - to ignore the Ameri can experience completely would represent 
~othing short of academic myopia . 
1 
2 
Gower : The Prinoples of ITodern Company Law 3rd Ed 1969 p 562 
Company Directors and Controllers 1970 p 30 
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It is impossible to begin a consideration of the validity or utility of the shareholder a g reement under New Zealand law without initially 
i ndicating the legal framework within which these agreements operate, 
focusing on the place of the shareholder in the scheme of things as 
well as a consideration of the source of that status - the share. On t his preliminary basis, the concept of a shareholder agreement will be tested, providing an indication of their position in law to be kept in mind as their evaluation proeresses. 
THE SHARE: 
Because the foundation of any shareholder agreement by 
de f inition is the share, an examination of its nature is warranted. In 
f act, it is surprisine , considering the strateeic importance of the 
share in the shareholder agreement, how little discussion on the nature of shares is raised in assessing the validity or invalidity of a share-
holder agreement. One would have thoueht that such an evaluation would have frequently returned to the apparently basic auestion "what is a 
share?" In fact this is not so. The validity or otherwise of these 
agreements seldom directly turns on the philosophical or leeal character-i sation of the share, but rather on its relationship to other principles within the general framework of company law, and the conseauences on t hese principles of employing the share in such agreements. It is in 
t his latter context that the rights ofthe shareholder are argued, rather t han in relation to the nature of the type of property he holds - the 
share. The preliminary auestion - whether a sha re can be the object of a contract, like any other chattel, entered into by its ovmer is seldom r a i se d - due in l a r g e part to the favourable answer to this auestion 
delivered by the courts a s e a rly a s 1887. 3 The issue, therefore, was settled e a rly on in the piece, conferring a broad mandate to enter into agr e ements involving shares. I mplicit in this view is the idea that 
whatever else, the rights "in respect of dividends return of capital on 
3 North V/est Transportation v Beatty ( 1887) 12 App Casess89 (PC) 
..: 43 
a winding up, voting and the like" 4 conferred on a shareholder are prop-rietary rights. This certainly is the prevailing view - and yet it is 
quite clear, philisophically speaking, that a different conclusion could 
have been reached on the nature of a share. As Farwell Jin Borland's 
Trustee v Steel5 explained: 
"A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured 
by a sum of money for the purpose of liability in the first place, and 
f . t t · th d 116 o i n eres in e secon ••• 
Thus, a shareholder as well as enjoying rights aga inst the company, 
is also under an obligation to it. Furthermore, the rights of the share-
holder, stipulated in the Articles of Association of the company, v,hile 
conferring on him some sort of proprietary interest in the company, do not 
create purely pereonal rights;they confer no proprietary interest in the 
company's property itself. These f a cts must qualify the extent to which 
a shareholder may be reg arded as "owning " the rights cre a t e d by his shares and y et, an element of proprietary interest does exist : e mph a sis on this 
aspect, coupled with a practical re a ction to the rights created by a 
share inevitably resulted in the trea t ment of the sha re, to all intents 
and pur p oses, as any other p iece of p roperty. Go v.rer outlines the con-
t r ast between the philisophical and p r a ctical positions: 
" While it may be doubtful whether the riehts which a s h are confers 
on i ts h olde r c an be class i f i ed a s " p r opri e t a ry" in t h e u sual sense , 
one thing , a t l east , i s c lear : t he shar e it se l f i s an ob ject of dominion 
of rieht s in r em o.nd no t so to r eear d i t , r1ould be b a rren and a c a demic 
in the extrcr:ie . Fo r 2.11 practi c al pur poses shar es o.r e r e copni scd i n l aw , 
as r;ell i n fac t , as t he object s of proper ty which a r e bou ght, s old, mort-
g2,eed and bequ e athe d . . • t h i s enphas i s on t h e p ropriet a ry and financial 
aspect s of a s h a r eholde r s rights ob s cu r e t h e i mport ant f a ct that his 
shar es c ause him to become a member of an associa tion with the right to 
4 Go\'re r - op ci t 344 
5 ( 1901) 1 Ch 279 
6 I bid p 288 
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t~~e part in its deliberations by attending and voting at general meet-
ings". 7 
The immediate consequence to the present discussion of this atti-
tude to the share - that the rights conferred on its holder-from a 
practical standpoint - are proprietary, or proprietary enough, is the 
generably favourable reception in the English and Commonwealth juris-
dictions of an agreement entered into by shareholders in relation to 
their shares. Indeed, the acceptance of such ar-reements is novt cited 
as the ultimate evidence of the proprietary nature of the rights in 
shares . This attitude had already consolidated when the first sh2-re-
holder agreement c ame to be considered by the court in Greenwell v 
Porter8 • Viewed as proprietary rights, it is obvious that a broad 
general mandate to enter into contracts touching those rights is given 
to the shareholder and this) indeed) is the position. As will be shown 
however , the consequences of this shareholding - that "cause him to 
become a member of an association" indeed results in a qualification 
being placed on their initial general validity: from such membership , 
and all its implications, the agreement may come under fire. As a 
person dealing with its property the agreement is secure;as a shareholder 
being a member of a company , dealing with the nexus between him and the 
company, it is more problematical. This possibility is the type of 
situation envisaged by Gower in reminding us of the consequences of 
such membership, and the folly of simply regarding the above divorced 
from this context as merely another piece of property like a chattel. 
The general proposition stanfu,however: the rights created by a share are 
proprietary rights , and as s.:ch can be subjected, like any other property, 
to a valid contract. In particular, this is true of the most important 
right conferred by that share - the right to vote. As Pickering points 
out: 
7 Gower op ci t 346-7 
8 (1902) 1 Ch 530: though not expressly stated, the rejection of the defendant's argument ( supported by no authority) attac}::ing the valid-ity of the agreement implies acceptance of the plaintiff 's argument that voting rights are proprietary rights 
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"Powers of control conferred by voting rights are perhaps primarily 
important because through their exercise true proprietary rights or rights 
to income and capital may be obtained, modified or denied 11 • 9 
It is no coincidence that it is precisely this right to vote that 
most frequently is the means by which the objectives of a shareholder 
agreement are attained. Indeed it is in the pursuit of a possible 
limitation on this power that Gower runs across the shareholder agreement, 
pausing briefly to offer some observations on the topic -which have 
invariably been accepted by those interested in the subject as establish- · 
ing the validity of the voting agreement in English company law. In 
deference to the significance attached to them, those comments, brief 
as they are merit 1reproduction here: 
"It has been repeatedly laid down that votes are proprietary rights, 
to the same extent as any other incidents of the shares, which the holder 
may exercise in his own selfish interests even ifi:hese are opposed to 
those of the company. He may even bind himself by contract to vote or 
not to vote in a particular way and his contract may be enforced by 
injunction". 1 O 
The proprietary element in the tenure of these shares certainly 
appears at this stage paramount. On acquiring shares in a company, a 
person acquires rights which are proprietary rights. 
The suggestion inherent in the earlier warning however, not to 
concentrate exclusively on the proprietary aspect, is that this member-
ship may affect in some way the otherv,ise unlimited exercise one would 
9 "Shareholders Votint; Rights" Pickering (1 965 ) 81 Law Quarterly Review 248- 9 
10 Gov,e r op cit 562;Foster J in Cl emens v Clemens (1 976 ) 2 A!\ :::m 268 appears to sugEes t a radically different interpretaion of the oblig-ations of a shareholder from that emphasised by Professor Gowe r in the statement quoted above : Foster J's interpretation of " bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole " (Allen v Gold Reefs of West Afri ca (1 900 )1Ch 671) includes the reouir ements that one shareholder in voting, must honestly believe the resolution, v1hen passed , will be for the benefit of another individual shareholder, and specifically, for the benefit of the shareholder complaining to the court - p 281 
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expect of a proprietary right. Be cause the shareholder agreement 
seeks its justification almost exclusively from the proprietary nature 
of the share, this warning cannot be disregarded lightly_. 
THE SHAREHOLDER AGREEI,:ENT AND THE cortPANY : 
Despite the level of 
sophistication achieved in some shareholder agreements which might 
suggest the contrary , it is quite clear that whatever else they purport _ to be, a shareholder agreement at the very least must be precisely that 
- a shareholder agreement. Though some ae;reements are so complex and 
far reaching in their regulation of the company's affairs that, in effect , they appear to compete with , andsometimes even replace,its 
Articles of Association, and incorporate what appears in reality to be 
also a "director's agreement" and perhaps a manae;er ' s agreement too, 
one should not lose sight of the fact that however top heavy the agree-ment may appear , all the rights created are linJced, directly or indirect-ly1and initially limited,to the power of shareholders. It is the fact 
that at least one of the contracting parties is a shareholder that gives the agreement its name. 
It is difficult to proceed with an examination of the validity or 
potential of such agreements without initially establishing the struct-
ural framework within which such agreements operate - indeed, the 
structure of i:his framework results in certain "in built" limitations on 
the agreement . Because one of the parties to such an agreement is con-tracting in his capacity as shareholder, it is proposed to consider 
briefly the structural limitations on any agreement entered into by him depending on that capacity; this will of necessity incorporate a consid-eration of the place of the director in the scheme of things - a happy 
liruc, because often the contracting party to such agreements is both a 
shareholder and a director. A distinction exists between " ( 1) agreements 
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binding shareholder - directors in their capacity both as shareholders 
and as directors and (2) agreements by shareholder purportedly taking 
on some of the functions of the directors 11 ~
1
Discussion of the problems 
created by the combination of functions under (1) relates more to the 
shareholder agreement in action, and is, therefore, left till then: at 
this stage is is proposed to limit the investigation to a definition of 
the limits imposed on any shareholder agreement (where the parties are 
merely shareholders) by the structure of the company, and the balance 
reached therein. Consequently , the approach taken at this stage will be 
more a "static" one, concentrating on the relevant principles operating 
within the company rather than on the agreement , and its impact on that 
structure . This will reveal the scope of a shareholder's power in the 
company, and this, at least initially, represents the limit imposed on 
a shareholder agreement . As has been recognised in America, shareholders II 
may join together and pool their votes in order to accomplish what they 
could as individuals
1112
; this principle is equally true in England and 
New Zealand. The powers of the individual shareholder is the scope, 
initially at least, permitted to a shareholder agreement. 
The source of these limitations is threefold: the Companies Act 
1955, the company's r,Temorandum and Articles of Association and cases on 
shareholders rights. 
The fact that emerges is that there is no area of corporate activity 
that is inherently prohibited from being controlled or exercised by the 
shareholders of the company: this is the result achieved by the Companies 
Act 1955. The only inherent limitation from the Act arises as a result 
of the provisions giving the shareholders certain exclusive powers in the 
company, since these also stipulate the manner in v:hich these powers must 
be exercised;being a statutory standard this cannot be varied. These 
provisions , therefore, represent one 
holder. 
limitation on the freedom of a share-
11 
12 
Tilden P '.'/right II1 "Shareholder Pooling Agreements" Arkansas Law Review vcL ).._lf-- \\~, } So½ 
Smith v San Fransisco & Northern Pacific Ry Co. 115 Cal 584 ( 2 4) p 501 {1 i 91) 
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Considering the Act does not prohibit any area of corporate activity 
from regulation by the shareholders - thereby clearing the way for such 
regulation - it would appear that a high price is paid for this express 
reservation to shareholders - namely, the intrusion of a statutory reauire-
ment that cannot be varied. The fields specifically reserved to the 
shareholders by the Companies Act 1955 are: 
1) Alteration of the company's Articles of Association - Section 24 
2) The formation of the cor1pany - Section 13 
3) The winding up of the Company - Section 217 (a) 
4) Changing the company's objects - Section 18 
5) Appointment of auditors - Section 163 (1) 
6) Appointment and removal of directors - Section 187 (1) 
Regardless, therefore, of the individual articles of association 
involved, a voting agreement by shareholders in relation to these areas 
of corporate activity will be valid, ini ti2.lly at least, because these 
areas are specifically reserved to the hareholders by statute. 
It has been said that potentially, there is no inherent limit on 
the scope of corporate activity which may be regulated by the shareholders 
and consequently, by an agreement entered into by them;the reality of the 
company structure however, stands in sharp contrast to this potential 
freedom. As Gower points out: 
"In practice, the initial constitution of the company will provide 
for the appointment of a board of directors and expressly delegate all 
por,ers of management to them." 13 
It is this practice - not necessarily of appointing a board of 
Directors 14 , but delegation of all powers of management to them, that 
13 Gower op ci t p 1 27 
14 A statutory requirement in any event- S. 180 Companies Act 1955 
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constitutes the most effective limitation on the scope of shareholder 
involvement in the compcmy, and consequently, on the range of activites 
regulated by a shareholder agreement . The reason why delegation of 
management powers to the directors should result in such a limitation 
is due largely to the English Court of Appeal 's decision in Automatic 
Self Cleansing Syndicate Co. v Cunninghame 15 in which it was held that 
where the articles of association vest in the board certain powers , the 
general meeting of shareholders could not interfere with the exercise 
of such powers by the directors. This acts as a very real limitation 
on the scope of shareholder intervention, since invariably, the company'~ 
articles will include Article 80 of Table A of the Third Schedule of the 
Companies Act 1955 which stipulates that
11
the business of the company 
shall be managed by the directors". Greer LJ explained the consequences 
ofsu::h a provision in Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd. v Shaw: 16 
"If powers of management are vested in directors, they and they 
alone can exercise these powers. The only way in which the general body 
of the shareholders can control the exercise of the powers vested by the 
art icles in the directors is by altering the articles or, if opportunity 
arises under t he articles , by refusing to re-elect the directors of whose 
actions they disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the powers which 
by the articles are vested in the directors any more than the directors 
can usurp he powers vested by the articles in the general body of share-
holders" • 17 
The consequences of this interpretation for the shareholder agreemeni 
are fundamental , sine e it takes all the powers of management , if the 
articles stipulate such po\•1ers, beyond the reach of such an agrecr.J.ent : 
the only effective means by which such an agreement could in any event 
affect the exercise of these powers would be through the voting power of 
the parties to it at a general meeting . Such a vote is clearly ineffect-
15 (1 902 ) 2Ch 34 
16 (1935) 2 KB 113 
17 Ibid p 134 
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ive if the exercise of such powers need never be submitted to the general 
neeting - and more impo.rtant, if the exercise of these powers cannot be 
directly impugned by the shareholders through their voting power: on the 
strength of Shaw & Sons (Sa!_ford) __ Lj;d_ v Shav-: 18 such a vote, if taJcen, 
would in any event be a nullity. .'/hether an agreement between shareholders 
purporting to commit them to vote on a "r.ianagement power" would likevlise 
be held to be o null±ty is. a separate quest:lon, independent of its practical 
deficiencies. 
The povrers of management , currently viewed as prerogative powers of 19 . directors are , therefore, 11l'L!1une to a shareholder agreement . The only 
"management power" that could be regulated at this level would be an 
agreement by shareholders binding them to vote in favour of commencing 
legal proceedings on behalf of the company if the directors fail to do 
so. This appears to be the result of I,Iarshall 's Valve Gea!' _COY ~.:8:!111i_!lg, 
Wardle & Co. 20 
Goldbe rg 21 taJces issue with this interpretation of Article 80 (Table) 
arguing persuasively that the literal application of the formula employed 
in that provision "Subject •• to such regulations •• as may be prescribed 
by the company in general meeting" is the correct one : the "regulation" 
referred to here ·can only be a "resolution passed by a simple majority of 
the general meeting" 22 The same writer relies on r:arshall ' s Valve Gear 
Co. Ltd v L1anning '.'lardle & Co. Ltd 23 for explicit judicial support of 
t his interpretation arguing forcefully that the line of judg ments 24 on 
Ylhich it has been concluded that directors, by virtue of Article 80 enjoy 
prerogative powers >do not justify this conclusion,and that, in any event, 
the articles involved in these c ases differed substantially from Article 
80. Goldberg concludes: 
18 (1935) 2 KB 113 
19 Gower op ci t p 131 accepts this interpretation of Article 80 
20 1909 1 Ch 267 
If 21 'Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Act 1948 33· Modern Law Review 1970 177 
22 Ibid p 178 
23 ( 1909) 1 Ch 267 
24 The cases are - Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v Cunnin["hrune (1 906) 2Ch 34; Quinn & Actens v Salmon (1 909) AC 442; Shaw (John) & Sons Salford v Shaw (1 g 35) 2 KB 113;Scott v Scott (1943) 1 AN ER 582 : Sullivan ( Post Note 27) views this case as "Standing in genuine contrast to L:arshall Valve v r,..anning" Ibid 577 
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"Residuary powers of the comp any do reside in the general meeting of shareholders acting by ordinary resolution; it is not true that the 
sh8,r eholders are powerless to act save by s pecial resolution even as regards mat t ers not sp ec ifically delee;ated to the directors" 25 . 
Clearly such an interpretation of Article 80 Table A incre a ses the scope in which a shareholder agreement may operate effectively it 
permits interference by t h e shareh olders in the exercise of " management" powers and secures regulation of the s e powers by ordinary resolution : such powers may , therefore not only be brought directly under the con-trol of an agreement but the proportion of voting pov.,re r needed by the 
agreement to control the exercise of these powers is less (i . e . 51 ~ ) than that required under the alternative interpretation of Article 80 , v:hich only concedes such control indirectly by the passing of a special resolution altering the articles . Even on Goldberg ' s interpretation of Article 80 , however , a limit is imposed on such s..n agreement , it cannot bind its par ties to regulat.e the directors' "day to day control of the business is i n the hands of the directors ••• this cannot be taken away nor interfer ed with by the shareholders without a chang e in the articles ... To have i t otherwise would be not to manag e the business subject to the regulations by the general meeting , but not to manage it at all" . 26 
Su1livan27 agr ees t hat , even a cc epting that directors are delegates and not r epr esent atives of t heir shareholders , a limit is imposed on the extent of shar eholder i nterventi on - and henc e on the effe ctiveness of a shareholder voting agr eement - v1here Arti cle 80 is employed delegating power of management t o directors : 
"If intervent i on i s f r equent and suffic iently det ailed so as to exclude discretion i n t he implementation of policy, it will be unjustif-~ 28 l ed under the terms of the regulation" • 
25 Op ci t 183 
26 I bid 182 : Directors , where Article 80 is employed , must still manage the company . The prohibition on rob ing directors of t h eir day to day control under Article flO is similar to the Anerican prohibition a.gainst "St erilisation of t h e Board of Directors " (Lon[! Par k v Trenton- Nev, Bruns-wick The atres Co . 77 \'/E 2d 633 (1 ° 4n)) Th our;h t h e l atter stems from a statutory provision.they Rrc s i mi l2r to t h e extend t hat both involve a power of manoP"ement . 27 "The rel ation sh i p betv een t he 3oard.o f Directors and the General r .. eeting 28 1in Limited Companies" 93 (1 C1 77) Law Quarterly Review 569 . bid p 578 
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Even accepting this limitation, it is quite clear that the scope 
of a shareholder agreement is greatly expanded by this interpretation 
of Article 80 , in that the alternative interpret2-tion of this provision , 
in giving directors exclusive powers re~resents, in practice , the most 
effective limitation on a shareholder voting agreement . It is import-
~t therefore, to bear in mind that the interpretation of Article 80 
accepted by Professor Gower is not the only one available, and that the 
position is not as settled as might appear from his treatment of the 
topic . An alternative interpretation, from which the shareholder agree-
ment can only gain, does exist . 
Even under the interpretation of Article 80 which views the exercise 
of management as the exclusive right of directors , the shareholder agree-
ment is not totally excluded from the exercise of these powers : auite 
clearly it may be employed to attack indirectly the prerogative powers 
of the directors by an agreement among the shareholders to vote for an 
alteration of the articles, or more simply, to remove the directors from 
office under S.187 of the Companies Act 1955 : the former attacks the 
pov:er , by removing it , the latter attacks the director in a similar 
fashion . In this mo re indirect way, therefore, the shareholder agreement 
may be relevant in relation to management nowers . It should be pointed 
out here that we a re only concerned With the operation of a shareholder 
~reement which does not involve the participation as contracting part ies 
of directors - at least in their capacity as such. The possibility of 
the latter may indeed prove an effective means to pierce the shield 
created for directors by Automatic Self Cleansing Filte r Syndicate Co. 29 v Cunninghame. 
In fact , the stareholder agreement may operate directly, even in 
respect of these r.mnagcment po\'vers in certain circumstances committing 
its contracting parties to vote in a certain way on a power that has been 
delegated to the directors, and this agreement will in fact be effective 
and undoubtedly valid . Gower describes the circumstances in which this 
2S (1906) 2 Ch 34 
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apparently heretical suggestion is valid. 
"It seems that if for some reason the board cannot or vdll not 
exercise the powers vested in them, the general meeting has been held 
effective where there was a deadlock on the board, 
1 
where an effective 
auorum could not be obtained, 2 v1here the directors are disqualified 
;rom voting, 3 or more obviously, where the directors have purported 
to borrow in excess of the amount authorised by the articles" 4 30 
Quite clearly , a shareholder agreement stipulating the manner in 
which the contracting shareholder is to vote will be effective in these 
circumstances, because the shareholder is here exercising a normal 
shareholder function: he will be directly influencing a decision 
normally exclusively within the sphere of management . To this limited 
extent , the shareholder agreement may play a direct role in relation 
to management powers . A problem is raised in relation to its validity 
however , one that has already been touched on. Undoubtedly an agreement 
binding the contracting shareholders to vote in default of the exercise 
of these powers by the directors in spheres that normally would be the 
sole pr·os0rv0 of those directors is, prima facie , valid. The difficulty 
arises where this is not expressly provided . Clearly the practical 
result does not vary, whether the express default power is included or 
not: where no default occurs, any agreement simply cannot be acted on, 
and if acted on, any votes cast are a nullity. In default, the votes 
must be cast according to the terms of the contract. 'Where an agreement 
purports to bind a shareholder in relation to management powers , the 
possibility of those votes actually being exercised validly in default 
circumstances , though the contract remains silent on the matter , would 
appear to militate against regarding the agreement itself as a nullity , 
though the default has not occurred as yet, and may not even be forseeable 
30 Gower op ci t 136 citing 1. Barron v Porte r ( 1914 ) 1 Ch ~5 
2. Foster v Foster (1016) 1 Ch 532 
3. Gro.nt v UK Sr.ritchback Rys ( 1888) HO Ch D135 
4 . Irvine v Union Bank of Australia (1 877 ) 2 App Cas 366 PC 
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Indeed, the exercise of such votes in default circumstances , being the 
onlY occasion when the agreement will be able to be acted on may be 
regarded as an implied term in all such agreements that otherwise would 
not appear to malrn much sense . 
This discussion indicates that , whatever the individual articles 
of asso ciation provide , even in relation to powers delegated exclusively 
to the drectors , the shareholder agreement may nevertheless play an 
effective role . Gower vie,Ns the power of ratification as the c arrier of 
this potentially unlimited scope of action : 
"Although the transaction concerned may relate to ordinary manage-
ment , and , therefore be v.i thin the pmvers of the board , the ratification 
of it vrill always be a matter appropriate for the general meeting , which 
can waive what would otherv,i se be a breach of duty . As a result , the 
activities of general meetings may indirectly extend over the vrhole 
sphere of the c ompany ' s operations ru~d ultimate control revert to the 
shareholders who are free from duties of good faith to which the directors 
are subje c t 11 31 
This being so , a shareholder agreement likev,ise may "extend over 
the \''hole sphere of the company ' s operations" if it stipulates how the 
partie s are to vote in ratifying a breach of the fiduciary duty ov:ed by 
the directors , in addition to the default circumstances . It is debatable 
v:hethe r a shareholder agreement purporting to bind a membe r to vote in a 
certain manner over a mru1ar;cment p ovre r land hence ineffective , though not 
in itself necessarily a nullity] v,ould bind him in voting in relation 
to that same sTJhere in r o.tifying 2. breach of the directors' fiduciary duty . 
Such an extension is unlikely , because the vote relates to the ratific - -
ation of the breach of fiduciary duty , ana. not a purported control on the • exercise of that directors power from which the breach stemmed . But sub-
31 - Gower - Op cit p 563 
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ject to the subsequent investigation it would appear that a shareholder agreement could bind the parties to a predetermined course of action , in ratifying or not ratifying , a breach of duty on the part of the rurectors. In this way again , the agreement may affect all the powers previously excluded to them because they were delegated to the directors in the company's articles. Added to the areas in which shareholder control is reserved by statute, very little remains immune from the shareholder agree-ment - precisely because the shareholder wields ultimate control of the company. 
XHE VALIDITY OF A SHAREHOLDER AGRE:ST =ENT IN NEW ZEALAND: 
The starting point of such an inauiry must be the propos~ion that as a general rule the shareholder agreement per se is valid under New Zealand law. Some undoubtedly will be invalid because of aparticular requirement of law -r.iost likely, a principle of company law : what these threats are , and hov, they may uossibly be avoided will be dealt with independently but the general proposition - that shareholder agreements are valid under :ier, Zealand law serves as an accurate point of departure into the more detailed examination. 
This proposttion can be confidently asserted , despite the absence of judicial comment in this country on shareholder agreements by refer-
ence to the acceptance of such agreements by courts in the United Kingdom and Canada , and partly as a result of the prevailing judicial conception of the company share as conferring on its holder a proprietary right. This viev, of the <Dmpany share as a pro prietary right, established by the 
Privy Council in n orth ,lest Tr_~nsporta~i~n _Company Ltd v Beatt~32 , is the foundation of the validity of the shareholder agreement . From this view-point, it followed naturally that a sl12,reholder could contract to vote or not vote in a particular way , and this indeed was accepted as the law 
32 (1887) 12 App Cas 589 PC 
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by the defendant executors in Greenwell v Porter. 33 The right of a 
shareholder to bind himself to vote in a particular way was accepted 
as interest in the nature of the share in Puddephatt v Leith 34 : 
Sargant J simply commented of this right: 
"In my opinion, therefore, the right of the plaintiff is clear1135 
These cases stand for the proposition that the shareholder has 
a right to enter into contracts specifically in respect of the way he 
will vote at the general meeting , and generally it is implied, all the 
incidents of a share, being proprietary rights,are liable to contractual 
regulation. This, it is submitted will be the starting point of a court 
in New Zealand in determining the validity of an agreement. 
An American view of such agreements - that they represented a 
fraud on the non contracting sharehoiders}6conformed with the view to..l<:en 
originally by the courts in England to such agreements. In Elliot v 
Richardson37 , the court held: 
"A consequence of such an agreement is that the whole body of ••• 
shareholders may be deceived and think when one shareholder gives advice 
, , • that he is exercising his own judgement and sense of· equity." 38 
Clearly this objection could not apply to an open agreement exe-
cuted by all the company's shareholders or, for that matter, one known to 
the other non contracting shareholders . It is interesting, however, 
that even in cases accepted as sunporting the general validity of the 
shareholder agreement , based on the proprietary nature of the share , the 
invalidity of a secret aereement persists . In Goodfellow v Helson Line 
liver·oool Ltd . 39 Parker J commented: 
33 (1902) 1 Ch 535 
34 (1916) 1 Ch 202 
35 Ibid 
36 Odman v Oleson 64 NE 2d 439 (1946) 
37 ( 1870) LR 5 CP 744 
38 Ibid p 751 
39 \1912J2 Ch 333 
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"A secret bargain by one debenture holder for special treatment 
might be considered as corrupt ani in the nature of bribery" 40 
It is inconceivable today, in light of the greater emphasis placed 
on the proprietary aspect of the shares that an otherwise valid agree-
ment would be struck doV'm because the other share or debenture holders 
were not privy to it. 
For reasons closely allied to the fraud argument, it has been held 
in England that a contract in which a shareholder agreed to vote in a 
particular way for some purely personal pecuniary interest was illegal. 41 
This would be unlikely to invalidate an agreement supported by the mutual 
promise s of the shareholders, but the question remains whether the former 
type of contract vmuld likewise be invalidated today. Again, the pre-
vailing view of the share as conferring on its holder proprietary rights 
would appear to exclude, by definition, this ground of invalidity where 
the shareholder contracted for a purely pecuniary benefit. 
A uniauely American objection to some shareholder agreements, 
especially relevant to those entered into by shareholders of a small 
private company, arise when that agreement in effect put the management 
practices of the company on the basis of a partnership. 42 
In fact, this view is on the defensive in America itself. If 
imported into New Zealand it would represent a limitation on the result 
able to be c.hieved by a shareholder agreement because such agreements 
v1ould have to conform to the corporate norm. It is unlikely to succeed 
in Her, Zealand. The philosophy of the Companies Act 1°55 , apart from the 
reauirement tha t a company have at least tv/0 directors 43 ( v,hich, in 
itself,does not exclude the possibility that the company internally be 
40 Ibid The same rule,applies for these 
41 Elliot v Richardson op cit p 751 
42 Jackson v Hooper 76 N.J Eq 592 
43 Section 180 Companies Act 1955 
purposes,to shareholders 
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a partnership : this would depend on the powers these directors exercised, 
and this is left ultimately to the shareholders) as reflected in the 
case law on the subject 44 is that the internal manar;ement is a matter to 
be settled by the Articles of Association, e.nd hence by the members . In 
South Africa , a country operating under the same relevant statutory 
regime as New Zealc:md , the court upheld 8, ' partnership ' agreement enter-
ed int o by the shareholders of a private company: the agreement cons-
idered in ~tewart v Schwab and others45 was described in the judgement: 
"A written aeree:nent was entered into • • • which is stated to be an 
agreement of ' partnership '. The material terms of this agreement are that 
the sol e shareholder of the company shall be the applicant and the first 
and second respondents ••• that the applicant and the first and second 
respondents shall be the directors of the company . . . that notwithstanding 
the disparity in shareholding each director shall have ' equal power ' 
that the partnership shall continue for an indefinite time" . 46 
... 
The court accepted this agreement , putting the management of the 
company on the basis of a partnership , as valid . It is sub~itted that 
the same verdict would be reached in New Zealand . Furthermore, it would 
appear that deviations from the strict corporate norms are recognised as 
valid , by i mplication , in relation to the c a se law on S 217 (f) of the . 
Companies Act 1955 - indeed, not only are these deviations indirectly 
recognised, but would appear to cre ate uni que leeal rights, as indicated 
by the House of Lord ' s judgement in Ebrarimi v .Westbourne GallerieSt Ltd . 47 
44 Automatic Self Cleansine; Filter Syndicate Co . v Cunningh8me (1906) 2 Ch 34 
45 (1 956) 4 S . Af. LR 791 
46 Ibid p 79 2 
47 ( 197 3) AC 360 
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CHAPTER 4 
The potentially unlimited scope of a shareholder 
agreement made possible by the Companies Act 1955 will seldom be fully 
realised because invariably the powers of management of the company will, 
to a lesser or greater extent , be relegated to its directors by Articles 
of Asso ciation. This , then, normally is the framework in which a share-
holder agreement will be entered into. The single most dangerous threat 
to the validity of a shareholder agreement stems from this allocation of 
spheres of a ctivity betvrnen shareholder and director, particularly acute 
in a small company whe re often these roles are combined in the s8me per-
sons and whe re, as already pointed out, control of the board or securing 
a say in management are the plumbs that the parties , by such agreement , 
seek to pic k : this threat is the "fetter" rule. The essence of the rule 
is relatively simple. Finn explains: 
I\ 
The objection to a shareholder - director so binding himself in his 
capacity as director .stems . from the fiduciary nature of that position . 
As a donee of fiduciary powers he is obliged to exercise his discretions 
in what he believes to be the interest of his company and the discharge 
of this obligation usually necessitates that he retains his discretions· 
unfettered in any way for aTiterior contracts or understandinE~· The vice 
in a contract which binds him to 2. particular course of action is that 
it obliges him to act "in a specified monner to be decided by consider-
utions other than his own conscientous judgement at the time as to what 
is best in the interest of (his company)" 1 • 
It is clearly established that a director standing in a fiduciary 
capacity , c annot fetter his discretion in relation to the spheres of 
Finn on cit 100-1 quoting Fletcher :.oulton LJ in Osborne v 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1 909 ) 1 Ch 163 
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activity of the company assi{"ned to him, 2 where Article 80 of Table 
A is included in the Company's Articles of Association (as it invariably 
,..,ill be) this will include all matters "not specifically delegated to 
the directors provided they are not expressly reserved to a general 
r.ieeting by the Act or the articles" 3• From this it follows that a 
shareholder agreement involving a director binding him in that capacity 
over a matter on which the Articles or the Act are silent as to how this 
power will be exercised prima facie constitutes a breach of his fiduciary 
duty. The same prohibition it would appear applies in relation to a 
por,,er subject to the approval of the shareholders in general meeting . 
Any agreement in this situation could only relate to whether the power 
of the directo~is exercised at all - for example, where the power to 
issue new shares is made subject to the approval of the shareholders, 
~ether those new ci1nresare issued in the first place - since the sub-
mission of the resolution obtaining the approval of shareholders is 
mandatory under the company's articles in any event:in relation to the 
original exercise of discretion, the director is under the same fiduciary 
obligation , including obviously a prohibition on fettering his discretion, 
arising from an exclusively management power . 1,'/here under the comprmy' s 
articles , a power is stipulated to be exercised exclusively by the share-
holder, excluding the directors totally, the issue does not arise , since 
the directors here have no discretion to exercise. 
2 Gower op cit 525: The appointment of nominee directors , for examnle , 
creates a very real possibility, through the non inator ' s persisting 
influence,of a breach of the fetter rule . Likewise in theory the appointment of goverrunent directors, could result in a fetter being 
ploced on their duty to o.ct in the best interest of the company due 
to their co-existing duty , as civil servants , to 2ct in the public 
interest . Kyle concludes, hov·ever, in rel ation to covernr,1ent direc -
tors the danper of a fetter bein~ placed on their discretion as 
co·-1:pany directors , due to their loyalty to the public interest is 
Dore a pparent than real. The d8nger in relation to nominee directors, 
horrnver , is very real - Kyle : "The Government Director and his con-
flicting duties" ( 197 3) 7 VUrlLR 75. 
3 Gower Ibid 132 
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The application of the fetter prohibition to shareholder aFree-
;".ents arises where the agreenent binds a shareholder-director in hi_s 
caoaci ty both as a shareholder end director~. One point, hov"ever, is 
clear : there is abundant authority for the proposition that the mere 
fret that a sh2reholder to such an agreement is also a director of the 
co:npany will not , of itself , attract the operation of the fetter rule , 
throup:h infection, v1here thr't contrrictine party enters into oblip-ations 
in his capa.ci t;v c1s <' shurcholcler. Case l2w has consistently maintFined 
the C.istinction in roles , and conseJuently in duties owed , maintaining 
this distinction where the two roles 2re combined in the same person . 5 
1'/here the types of obligations undertaJrnn permit , the cc1.p2ci ti tes of the 
party as shar eholder and director will be treated in isolation from each 
other. This certainly applies where the obligations stipulated in the 
2preement clearly relate only to the parties ' capacity as shareholders . 
Even, however , where the aereer.ient lec1ves it unclear what ca.pa.ci ty an 
obligation extends to , the legal distinction remains decisive in deter-
mining whether the operation of the a~reement extends to the party ' s 
capacity as a director, hecause it necessarily proceeds on the assumpt -
tion that two s eparate roles Bre involved . 
The basic proposition underlying the fetter rule appears relatively 
simple ; the determination of its breach on the other hand , proves more 
d.ifficul t , sue;1:estin1: t hat the original simplicity of the rule mRy be a 
8 little dee epti ve . 
4 If Gov,-er ' s internrete.tion of Article PO Trible A, r>.nd the cri.ses cited 
to SUIJiJort his conclusion is correct ( OD ci t i 132) , the other ty,c 
of 2,['Teer1ents , "cp-reenentr- h:'r sh2reholders "9urportcdJ.:v tri 1rin.n- on some 
of the functions of the directors" (T . 1 . "fripht op ci t 504) \"OUld 
a}pe2r to be ineffective , since shereholaer~ hy their votinp cannot 
intervene in pov·ers of r.r>n['C'1'(' c11t . If, hor·ever, the interpretation 
of Article 30 2r{'"uec1 b:v !fo1clbu ·e ( o 'l ci t : see rr,,,te n Sc ) is 
correct , this la.tter ty'1 o of rip-ree1,ent , f'lindin{'" its parties to vote 
in relation to a "mr-tnapement" lrnv·er, clearly is effective unless hy 
such intervention , the directors rire del)ri ved of' d2;1r to drv ' co1 t;rol . 
T~e '1ossibility of such shareholder intervention c2nnot £lterthe 
a:oplication of the fetter rule on directors or confer on the lBtter 
a mandate to enter into 2.n ap-reenent viith the shareholders , or 8nyone 
for that matter : till the shoreholders intervene , the director must 
exercise his discretion unfettered , because he is in the s2me position 
as n director exercisinf' exclusive rnnnap·ement powers on the view of 
Article PO advanced by Gov1er ( suprc1 ) . After the shareholders have 
intervened , the dtrector has no direction to exercise . There i s , 
therefore no possible twilight zone in relation to fidu ciary powe r s . 
5 forth V/est Trr-1ns1ortetion G . • v Beatty (1P87) 12 App Gas 58? 
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The main pr oblem in applying this prohibition lies in the distinc-
tion between~fetter on that discretion and an exercise of it . Gower 
explains this distinction : 
"(the fetter rule) does not mean that if , in the bone fide exercise 
of their discretion , the directors have entered into a contract on be -
helf of the company , they cannot in that contract validly ap;ree to take 
such further action at board meetings as are necessary to carry out t hat 
contract". 6 
The ~Udf" ment of·the High Court of Australia in Thorby v GoldberiZ 7 
is no~ Bccepted as re presenting the most indulgent approach to an exercise 
of discretion permitted to dire ctors short of being labelled as a fetter 
on that dis cretion8 in that it recognised the validity of a contract 
entered into binding directors to a predetermined course of conduct 
over a period of time . Gower quotes the following extract from the case : 
"There are mcmy kinds of transactions in v1hich the proper time for 
the exercise of the directors ' disctretion is the time of the nerotiation 
of a contract and not the time at which the contract· is to be performed 
. . . If 8.t the former time they are bona fide of opinion that it is in 
the best interests of the compony that the tr1:msoction should be entered 
into and carriea. into effect, I can see no reason in law why they should 
not bind themselves to do whatever under the transaction is to be done by 
.1..1,., 0 ~rl e board 11 :; . 
Gover a,~ears tote ~e this statement of the lnw 2s standinF for the 
; r oposition th8t the fetter rule Pill not be bre2ched - 2nd hence the 
cfr ee;:1ent r.rill be valid - if the co rrJni t ,rients undert2J.::en by the directors 
e.re the product of, or at least can be linked vli th the original exercise 
6 
7 
8 
a 
Gower op cit 525 
(1C64) 112 CLR 597 
Finn goes as far as re&arding it as en exception to the rule-op cit 101 
Gov.rer op ci t 525 emoting Thorby v Goldberg op ci t 605-6 
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of discretion made 'bona fide in the interests of the company'. The full 
t ext of the statement subseouently introduces, or at least suggests, the 
existence of a further reouirement before the validity of the aereement 
8 9 a valid exercise of discretion is assured. The apparent oualificati on 
to the proposition is contained in the line of the jude: ment omitted in 
the quote presented in Gower: 
" Vlhere all the members of a company desire to enter as a group into 
a transaction .•• the transaction being one v1hich reauires a ction by 
the board of directors for its effectuation, it seems to me that the pro-
:9er time for the directors to decide whether this proposed action will be 
in the interests of the company as a whole is the time when the trans-
action is being entered into and not the time when their action under it 
. . d" 10 18 reouire . 
It is i mmediately on the heels of this apparent prereauis~e that 
Kitto J reaches the conclusion quoted in Gower et page 525. The ouestion 
is unclear, however , because the opening sentence of the statement would 
certainly appear to support the wider p roposition a ccepted by Gov•er : 
the reauirement of unanimous participation on the part of the members of 
the company appears out of nowhere. It ma.y be purely illustrative of 
the "many k inds of transa ction" suggested earlier , r a ther than definitive 
of such transactions. Given t his am )i.0 ·1.1:i.t7,r, ~:na. partly because the con-
seouence s of unanimity 2re to be de8.l t with s:i.1o rtly, it is proposed to 
procee d on the b8.sis tha t the wide r cons truction placed on this statement 
by Gowe r is correct. 
From the Tho~12Y v Goldber?, 
1 
interprctf'tion , it follor·s thot P con-
tr2 ct by directors bindinp the· "'elves to y.rursuin{" 8 pn.rticulBr poli cy 
in the future c anno t be regar ded pe r se Gs a fe tt e r on their discretion 
10 (1 964 ) 112 c-q 605 
11 opcitNot-e7 
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or automatically invalid. The relevance of such an interpretation to 
the shareholder aEreement is immediate because it recop-nises as valid, 
under certain circumstEmces, an one-oine obligation underta1rnn by 
directors in regard to future acts , v,i thout it necessarily beinp- le.belled 
as a fetter on that discretion. The exercise of this discretion at one 
point produces 2. r:iomentwr.. taking it a certain distance into the future. 
Clearly the ~o.se is only relevant to shareholder agreements in so 
far as the latter involve parties who are directors as well as share-
holders : as this combination freouently occurs, however , the interpret-
etion is fairly directly relevant to their permitted c,co 9e in nlloning 
the possibility of a director - shareholder lawfully binding· himself' to a 
, articular course of conduct (eg . dividend poli cy) for the future in 
his capacity as a director as well . The precise nature and extent of 
the obligation will determine its actual validity, but the possibility 
~validity remains 8S lone as the obligationfu bona fide in the inter-
ests of the company". . The obligati'ons c011tem )lated may be liio.i ted however 
here the parties to t1e 2~reement are directors as well as shareholders, 
the obligations they undertake in that former capacity will only avoid 
the fetter rule as lonp as they may be regarded as carr;ying into effect 
of their orieinal exercise of discretion ' bona fide in the interests of 
the company ' made in the agreement : this reouireMent tends to limit the 
extent of obligations that may be included in this capacity in such an 
agreement . The type of transactions envis2€ ed by the court itself tended 
to involve short term commitments in order to effectuate a once only 
tre.nsaction - the example gi veh r.ras a "sale of land" . 12 Thus , the case 
recor-nises the validity of the directors bindinp- themselves in an on{"oing 
~ay to a particula r course of action , but it would app ear , this obli~ation 
:::ust necessarily be2r the i ri1p rint of the causotive tr8nsaction , o.nd v,'2.s 
er..vis2p ed as a rela.ti vely short term one . .t'erha) s the case also sue:r-ests 
tho t the transactions causinr- the directors to bind themselves are commer-
cial in nature and may not extend to a purely voting policy for example -
12 Ibid 605 
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tJJlless it can be shovm to be bona fide in the interests of the company. 
Another limitat i on stems from this: if the validity of the obligations 
tJJ1dertaken in their capacity as directors is to hinge on being accepted 
as flowing necessarily from the original exercise of discretion , thereby 
avoiding the fetter rule , it v,ill have to be made clear that the oblig-
ations being undertaken in the agreement ere a caryyine; into effect of 
this original exercise of dscretion made "bona fide in the interests II 
of the company , whether or not that original exercise of d;i.scretion is 
contained in the agreement . It would appear difficult to pass this test 
in an ae;reement which does not made clear the capacity m v1hich the partic-
ular obligations are being accepted by the parties . In effect , therefore , 
to avail themselves of the Thorhy v Goldberg 13 interpretation , the "direc-
tors' aereement " must be set ap2.rt from the shareholder 8,t;reement it 
would not appear to protect an agreement involving an obligation under-
taken . by parties who c1re both directors and shareholders to vote 
for a particular dividend policy where the agreement does not clarify 
,hether the obligation is limited to voting at the GT,: or extends to 
voting at the directors J meetine;s as well because , in light of this ob-
scurity, it is less li1ceJ.y that the latter obligation could be accepted II+ as an exercise of discretion . 
13 
14 
(1 964) 112 CLR 597 
There appears, therefore , no 2.dv2.ntaec in deliberately leavine: 
GJn bipuous the ea )A.City the party is contro.ctinp in, in c1n effort to bind the party in~~ cnpccity as E' director . If this is the intention of the partj_es , they v:ill 2ct 8ccordine· to this ter,. \':hile both ~)8rties are hc9:Jy v:ith the ciri-ree·1ent : it is only when one of thep~rties chnllenees the v~lidity of ~he ~rreement th8t its terns r 1ill be relied on throu{"h 8Ction in court - but this is precisely r1hen the 2.c-ree11ent will be lirni tec1 by judicial pronounce -ment to the c2.p2.city of the pr> rties 2s shareholders , 2nd its ex-tension to their ca Jn cities as directors denied - suh~ect of course to the Thorby v Goldber~ (Sury ra) inter1ret~tion . oreover an element of ambie-uity mc:iy l e<1d the court to f'trike c1ovn the whole Bfreenent:for this reoson , I t ~ould ap,ear wise to specify the cauaci ty the parties o.re contractine in is that of shareholders , especielly in order to derive the benefits of the Thorby v Goldberg interpretation . 
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So far the discussion has proceeded on the assumption that if a 
shareholder agreement involving shareholder-directors does bind a 
party in that latter capacity - beyond a carrying into effect of s.n 
exercise of discretion -this commitment is a fetter on his discretion, 
and hence , invalid. However, a number of cases suggest thet this 
verdict of invalidity need not always follow or 
I 
more accur::1.tely , that 
the normal conseouences of such an invalid contract need not necessarily 
be applicable . This subsisting possibility of validity lies in a 
distinction that has found legislative acceptance in America nnd Cc=mada 15 
between a shareholder agreement involving all the members of the company 
and one involving only some of its members . The latter, by 2.nd large, 
stands or falls according to its success or failure in avoidine the 
"fetter" p rohibition. It is possible that the validity of the former 
type of agreement may survive a breach of the fetter rule. Dicta 
supporting this suggestion do exist. At the very least, cma. indirectly 
touching on the question of validity in general , it appears that if a 
voting agreement provides that all the parties shall vote toeether at 
general meetings or directors meetings , the p arties to that agreement 
v:ill be bolmd inter se if the a,greement is entered into by all the 
members and directors : the followine statement of r enzies Jin !horby v 
Goldberg
16 
stands as authority for this proposition : 
"I have not in this case found any eround for objection to the 
directo rs of the compo.ny com.miliinf" ther:1selves c1s I think they did to act 
as set out in the a£!reement . All the shoreholders v,ere party to the 
8.{:reement, and vvhat the directors undertook to do was all the shareholders 
cor.irnitted ther.1selves to ensure that they did . 1117 
Thus if v·ould apl)ec>r , th2.t the director may be bound inter se nhere 
all the shareholders are parties to the aFreement . l enzies J was at pains 
ho ·,ever, "to guard against being understood as deciding that a director 
of a company, can in an ordinary case bind himself to exercise his power 
1
5 Section 140 ( 2 ) Canada Business Corporation Act 1975 
16 ( 1 9 6 4 ) 1 1 2 C LR 5 9 7 
17 Ibid 605-606 
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as a director in a particular way" . 18 The possibility that such an 
agreement involving all the members is bindine inter se remains ; however , 
perhaps it is implied nlso in this last statement that in some extra-
ordinary cases - such as the involvement of ell the members or perhaps 
independent of the effect ofthe C"'.{J'reencnt inter se , a directo r may so 
bind himself . \That t he c ase does appear to sue;gest is that such an 
t . 11 t 1 t b b. d. . t 1 g G th t ~ reemen w1 , a eas , e 1n 1ng 1n er se . ower aerees a 
such an agreement , even if binding inter se would be liable to attack 
as invalid by subsequent members of the company v,ho ·were not parties to it.: 
only therefo r e ,'' i f othe r members or directors existed who v,ere not part -
1, 20 ies to the agreement c ould it be attacked . The conclusion - that the 
agreement is binding inter se may , however , be more important than its 
limited sphe r e of v al i dity because the most freouent attacks on an agree -
ment, on the basis of a fetter on the directors discretion having occur-
red, is made by a party to the agreement attempting to "welch" on his 
commitment . I n such a situation , obviously the case is highly pertinent . 
Gower claims that dicta of the minoriLy ~udpement of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in !li.!?-[.Ue_t v ]3e~ceson21 suppo rt the proposition that the 
participation of all the members may render the agreement valid inter se . 
"The minority held i t extended also to directors meetings and was 
void, but they conceded that the position might have been different ·had 
18 Ibid 616 
1? This derives further suu'Jort fron Gront v Gr2nt ( 1 °50 ) 82 CLR 1 
where the court eppears to hnve acce1)tcd thot unonir.10us p8rtici-
pation of the members prevented an act bein{'" challenged : 
"A departure from the articles is alwoys urimn fecie chf'.llenf"eable 
unless nll the mer1be rs of the cor1oo.ny have agreed to the depf'rture 
and the trans2ction is not otherwi"'e open to objection" per Fullager 
J at p 48 . ( =: :,_phasis 11ine) 
20 on ci t 525 : gu.ardinfl" against attac1cs by subscnuent r.iembcrs m2y be 
achieved by stipul2tinp on the share certificate , and new ones issued , 
thc1t the share is talcen subject to the agreenent; e;uordine; against 
attack by a new board is more problematical , and against a liouid-
ator , well nigh impossible . 
21 (1960 ) SCR 672 . 
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ell the members originally been parties to the agreement 
~77" 22. 
see at 
Standing on its own, this statement could be taken to suggest that 
the participation of all the members to the agreement could render the 
agreement valid inter se and against the whole vrnrld . The context in 
which this footnote appes,rs in Gmver militates against this : it would 
appear that the suggestion is limited to the issue of the validity of 
the agreement inter se . The problem is that, on the present writer 's 
interpretation of that minority judr,. 111ent . 8, reference to the consequ-
ences of a unanimous agreement does not appear , let alone a "concession" 
that such participation could have resulted in a different verdict being 
entered on its validity. In any event, this suggestion does not appear 
to have found a cceptance in the common law. 23 Three years after it was 
sue;gested , a r.~anitoba Court in Atlas Develonment_Co Ltd. v Caj_..9f & 
Gold24 held that even an agreement to which all the company's share-
holders and directors were parties is subject to the fetter rule: par-e>. ll 
ticipation ofAthe shareholders in the agreement, or that of the directors 
for that matter carried little weight : the full rigour of the fetter 
rule applied regardless. 
The comrnon law position appears unsettled, therefore, on the 
effect of unanimous participation of the shareholders and directors on 
the validity of the agreement inter se. In no case is the suggestion 
made clearly that such participation will render the agreement generally 
valid .. t his r-.t ln<',st , can he st:1tP-o vii th sufficient cert2inty . The 
parb.ciri::i.t:i on of 811 thP n'embers of a co11t1Jany: n :, ,,<..1 tinf" Be-reement c0uld 
only va,lidate an a.gree·<1ent other\-.·ise struc1 llmm ,•s friJ linr; foy.l of 
the "fetter ru.le" in relBtion to tl: e uorties ·to the aprec :n cnt ie. inter 
se; hence , a new Boerd , a later ' P' ' 1ier, or the .liauidator could attack 
it. Furthermore , it wouldappear that such participation will not exclude 
22 Gov,er op ci t 5 25 
23 The common law position differs from the Canadian Statutory provision 
in that the fomer reouires 1 it would appear,unanimous participation, 
to be v2lid in the 9resent , on the part of the shareholders and 
directors . The latter (supra note 15) requires only unanimous 
shareholder parti~ipation. 
24 ( 1 9 6 3) 4 1 W1 ill 5 7 5 
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the operation of the rule in relation to such an agreement, but rather 
that those members participating in the agreement will not be entitled -to 
comolain by invok ·ing it : its operation, therefore, appears ~uspended 
aue to that participation in an aereement . If, hor:ever , the common 
_21·: position does support the proposition of ·valicli~Ly il:iter se it will 
apply between the_ members of the aereement whether it includes all the 
shareholders and directors or not : if present shc=ireholders or directors 
choose not to attack it, the validity of the agreement . stands betw en 
those parties to it. The unanimous participation of all the sh2reholdcrs 
and directors cannot be reGarded as a pre-requisite of the validity of 
the agreement inter se. 1.'/hether the coffiI'1.on lav: position does support 
the proposit ion of validity inter se, as alre2.dy inl?dDted , is unsettled. 
'rhere is a strone suggestion in Thorby v GulQberg tho.t this is so. 
The possibility is implicitly rejected in Atlas Develop~cnt Co. Ltd. 
v ·calof and Gold . 
26 
Gower himself remains undecided , opting subseouentl; 
it would appear , more in favour of the possibility than ar;ainst i t 27 -
though, as indicated, on doubtful authority. The general rule remains 
that an agreement which results in a fetter beine placed on the company's 
directors , apart from the position of the members inter se, is in general 
terms invalid : this clearly is the verdict of ihe common lav:28 , and it 
is submitted , the result which a Ifow Zeal ,'net court I ovld rec1 ch . Whether 
or not this is the appro8.ch n court sl101il d r c' o 1.d:; , howevur, i s :1:rrnther 
ic "'lll' . Tb ere c. re~ .._ ,(' Y'suri s i V<: · rt,vn ent s in favour of recognising an 
2.greement between all the shareholders of the company as valid despite 
the fact that it results in a "fetter" being placed on the discretion 
of the directors . The Canadian reaction to the common law position in 
Validating such agreements was that it was "unnecessarily rigid" 29 and 
acting on this, r;,r:ive statutory recoenition to such ~""reements . Y"cCarthy, 
ex~anding on this criticism of unnecessary rigidity,arrues forcefully 
<' ains t the common law position : 
2 5 ( 1 9 6 2 ) 1 1 2 C LR 5 9 7 
26 1 a 6 3 4 1 WWR 5 7 5 
27 op ci t Footnote 64 
2
8 Atlas Development Co. Ltd v Calof & Gold (1 963 ) 41 WWR 575 
2
9 Commentary: Proposo..ls for a Irev.r Business Corporations Law Paragraph 
299 
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"\/hy should n director be permi ttcd to ir;nore such r striction~ on 
the ground that he owe his fiduciary duty to the compr,ny, not to the 
hc>rcholders? ... Indeed , the di "tinction betv:een the c om:pci.ny , on the one 
hri.nd, and the sho.reholders net in~ unanimously , on the other, hns little 
real meo.ninc; . Yet , under our present last , that distinction must appar-
ently be made". 30 
Conceptunlly , the criticism thnt t he distinction between the 
"company" and all its '""hnreholdcrs is an n.rtificin1 one hn"" some force . 31 
Its onplicntion to chnreholdcr ngrccmentc in New Zealm1d ir; more doubt-
ful however : if all the compnny ' s shareholders arc nereed upon n re tric-
tion beinp, placed on ·their directors , the implc expedient of nl tcrin<; 
the company ' c Articles under Section 2 4 of the Corm)n.nics Act 1055,, nd 
rccl nirninc; the power orir-in, ,lly deler,.ritcd to the clircctorr; nnd eotipulntine 
thnt this power be exercised in the Gcncrnl J. ,e ctin{; (i . e . by the ... lw.rc-
holderG) i nvnilnblc to them . Thi'"" p o'""r,ibili ty (unavrii1nb1e in Crinn.dn 
bcccmce of the statutory rir;ht of dir ctorr. to mnnn.{';c the company) pro-
vides a prncticnl solution to mrmy of the v:orst con'"'e u nc ,.,. flowin{'; 
fro m the dictinction between ri "coI'lpn.ny" nnd , 11 i t 0 .-.}wr holders; it 
dilutes much of the force behind the nr{'"l,l ment thn.t '"'uch , n nr.;rccrncnt 
"hould be rcco{';nised n.n vo,lid , nnd corres.i:1 ondinr;J.y , r;u nport r; the view 
that in the o.rcri s de Jc{';, :Led to the director::, , the cxerci r;c of th ir 
powers r,m"t rcmnin unfett red . rrhi 0 lnttcr view , it in submitted , 
l'lould be that tnk en by ri court in New ZcL J.n.ncl if fnccd by nn ri('."rccm nt 
bch1cen th director.,.. of n. c ornpnny n.nd nll its '"'hrircholdcrs thnt resul tcd 
in n fetter beinc; plnced on the former ' .., direr tion . 
30 
31 
"Slwrcholder i\p;re ement "'" 1 ·ere di th T.. cmorinl Lecture'"' 1 °75 p 46~ l\1cGill 
Uni . Subject , however , to the ,rowjnr; recognition of theinterests of employee , creditor"' , nnd concumerG . 
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CHAPTER 5 
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON SHAREHOLDER AGREET":ENTS: 
The regime 
established by the Companies Act 1955 is particularly susceptible to 
the operation of a shareholder agreement in that it imposes no inherent 
limitation on the areas of corporate activity that may be regulated by 
its shareholders , and hence, by an agreement ent ered into by them. In 
the American context, 0 ' Neal observed: 
"Attacks on shareholder agreements are often based on a claim 
that they violate a statute , usually one or more sections of the corpor-
2tion act •.• The most frequently used statute is the widely prevalent 
section whi ch provides that the business of the corporation shall be 
r:iane-e-ed by its board of directors . Other statutes on v1hich attack s on 
shar eholder aereement s may be grounded include those with provisions 
so:::ewhe,t to the following effect : . • • specified kinds of shareholder 
action (e.g. that reouired for charter 2mendment or dissolution) shall 
1 be passed by stated percentages of the stock vote" 
Translated into the New Zealand context, it is clear that the first 
comment is inapplicable because no statutory requirement exists that the 
busi ness of t he corporation be managed by the directors : this is only 
inserted at the company ' s option in Article 80 of Table A, but this can 
hardly be considered e ouivalent to the American statutory provisions . 
The only relevant statutory reauirement in relation to directors is Sec-
tion 180
2
, stipulating that every company shall have 8 le a st two directors . 
It is nccepted however , that the extent of the powers exercised by these 
dir ectors is a matter to be settled by the Articles of Association, and 
hence , by the sha reholders of the company . 3 From the CoMpanies Act 1955 
e.lone , indep endently of any Articles of Association, it appears oui te 
IJ
0ssi ble to establish a company in which every facet of the company's 
activities , includine those traditionally regarded as "management powers" 
0 ' IT e al op c it p 1 8 
2 Companies Act 1~55 
Aut omatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v Cunninghame 
( 1 S06) 2 Ch 34 . 
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is regulated by the company in general meeting: i.e. the shareholders. 
Fron this, it follows that a shareholder agreement, ree;ulating the 
voting of its parties on all issues, could dictate the activities of 
the company if the agreement contained a majority of the shareholding . 
To be effective, obviously the division of powers would have to be 
supported by appropriate articles of association. In such a situation , 
it is clear that the shareholder agreement is,in effect , the decisive 
constitution of the c ompany . Kruger , speaking in the English context , 
argues : 
"A pooling agreement may not be used to supersede the directors ' 
statutory right to manage the company" . 4 
The same writer cites as authority for this Article 80 Part 1 
Table A Schedule 1 of the English Companies Act 1948 , equating this pro-
vision vri th the American .statutory provisions on company management . 
The prohibition Kruger viev/S as arising under English company law is 
identical to the American prohibition against "Sterilisation of the 
Board of Directors" . 5 The foregoing discussion reveals that the position 
in Few Zealand is different. It is submitted that the conclusion arrived 
at by Kruger in relation to English company l aw is likewise incorrect 
Arti cle 80 is not a "statutory" p rovision of the Companies Act 1 °48 : it 
applies , as in New Zealand, only in the absence of an alternative pro-
vision being inserted in the Articles, and may , in any event, be altered 
by special resolution . 6 Under English c=md Nev, Zealand company law , 
there is , therefore , no such thing as a "st a tutory rie-ht to manage the 
cor.ipany 11 • Subseauent comments by the same wri tcr indic a te that p erhaps 
the reference to "statutory rif'ht" r12y ncan little mo re than the fact 
that Article 80 is included in the Companies Act 1948 , applicable in the 
absence of alternative arrangements agreed upon by the company : 
"As applicable to English company law it seems that no shareholder 
8.fl'reement may encroach , however slightly , on the boards1 statutory powers . 
Thus , except in instances where the articles provide for shareholder 
approval of certain business •• 117 
4 " PQ oling agreements under English Law" 1978 94 Law Quarterly Review n b6 1 5 tong Park v Trenton Nevt Brunswick Theatres Co . 77 NE 2d 633 ( 1948) 6 Section 24 Companies Act 1955 
7 o-p ci t 563- 4 
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If the above interpretation of "statutory powers" is the one in-
tended by the writer, then strictly speaking, it is a misuse of the 
tem: it implies that such powers are exercised by force of statute, 
and hence , like S. 24 of the Companies Act 1955, may not be altered. In 
relation to Article 80
8
, this is clearly not the case : it only operates 
by force of statute if no alternative arrangements are made , and even 
then, may be altered by special resolution and in any event, if the 
tem is a reference to the position where management powers have been 
delegated to a board of directors, the alleged prohibition on a share-
holder agreement encroaching on those powers is immediately derived 
from case law, 9 not statute. The impression created - wrongly it is 
submitted - by the use of this term is that Article 80 is similar to 
the American provisions, the latter vvhich truly confer "statutory powers" 
on directors to manage the corporation. This limitation on the scope 
permitted to a shareholder agreement, based on the existence of statutory 
powers of management, does not exist in New Zealand or England . 
However, the second ground d..ted by O'Neal on which shareholder 
agreements have been attacked - "specified kinds of shareholder action 
10 shall be passed by stated percentages of the stock vote" - is 
relevant in the New Zealand context. The Companies Act 1955 stipulates 
that certain actions may only be taken with the approval of a specified 
percentage - either a simple majority or a three fourths majority - of 
the votes cast by the shareholders. Section 187 ( 1) stipulates that a 
director may be removed by ordinary resolution;Section 18 (1) provides 
th2.t the objects of the company , expressed or implied in :its memorandum, 
-~ be altered by a special resolution. Section 24 (1) reouires a 
special resolution before the company 's articles may be altered . It is 
Proposed to examine the consequences of these statutory standards on 
shareholde r voting agreements , as grounds on v:hich the latter might 
eithe r be invalidated or their scope limited,in the context of Section 
24 (1) - partly because this section is especially important to shareholder 
2-Freements , and partly because it is a statutory provision on which an 
8 Table A Third Schedule Companies Act 1955 
S Shaw (John) & Sons (S alford) Ltd v Shaw (1 935) 2 KB 113 
10 op ci t 
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extensive body of case law has developed. The answers arrived at in 
relation to Section 24 are applicable ho~ever, to all sections
11 
of the Act involving the statutory fo11nula by vihich the requirements of , 
a str>.ted p ercentage of valid votes bein~ in favour of a resolution 
before the company may do a particular act is imposed. 
THZ SHAREHOLDER AGREELENT AND THE COiiPAl~Y' S ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION : 
The 
shareholder aereement is in larg e part dependent for its validity, scope 
and efficiency on the company 's articles of association: an investiga-
tion into the effectiveness or limitations on such Bn agreement is fre-
ouently driven back to the articles for an answer, ru.ggesting that the 
relationship between the two is especially important. This, indeed is 
the case . 
The discussion so far has investigated the consequences of the 
company 's articles in a particular form on any agreement . The arr;ument 
so far has proceeded on the assumption that, however, the individual 
content of companies ' articles may vary, certain consequences on an ae;ree-
ment can be predicted given a particular content. The most important 
consequences for our discussion are : 
where the company's articles delee;ate manaeer.1.ent p owers to the 
board of directors under Articles 80 Table A, a shareholder agree -
ment touching those powers, follov,inp Automati c Self Cleansin.o-
Syndicate v Qunninp-hnme 12 , and the line of c ases endorsing this 
interpretation of Article 80 , is ineffective and any vote pur-
suant to such an agreement a nullity . 13 
whe re such deleeation has occurred, an agreement involving a 
shareholder- director must not bind the party in his latter capacity 
in order to avoid the fetter rule. 
11 Those sections are : Section 18 (1), 24 (1), 32, 69, 75 (1),187 (1), 
217 (a), 268 (b) 
12 1906) 2 Ch 34 : subject to the internretation of Article 80 argued by Goldberg ( ante p so ) and Sullivan (ante p St ) 
13 Shaw (John) & Sons (Salford) v Shaw (1 9 35) 2 KB 113 
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there is no inherent limitation from the Companies Act 1955 placed 
on the competence of the shareholders in respect of areas of c or-
porate activity . 
In practice , hovrever , both the fetter rule and Article 80 Table A , 
v.•hich is invariably inc orporated in the company ' s Articles of Associa-
tion, exclude the shareholder agreement fron the sphere most coveted by 
such agreements - msnagement . 14 This hiphlights the dependence of t he 
agreement on t he Arti cles . Finn suggests the obvious solution: 
"As the law now stands , the only safe course to talce if it wished 
to have the exerc ise of c ertain powers regulated by the shareholder 
agreement is to provide in the articles that those powers areto be 
exercised by the company in general meeting . So if , for example , the 
~areholders wish to control the composition of the board , dividend 
policy and the t ransfer of profits to reserve , the sale of the company ' s 
undertaking , corporate borrowing or the issue of new shares , then the 
por:ers to appoint directors etc . should be vested in the company in 
general meeting and the voting agreement should stipulate the manner in 
which the shareholders are to vote in their exercise". 15 
An excerpt from the judgement in Re A & BC Che\'ting Gum 16 illus-
trates the dependence of such an agreement on the Articles in action : 
14 Again subject to the interpretation of Article 80 argued by 
Goldberg supra note 12 . 
15 Finn op ci t 191; c1en.rly in relation to the issue of new shares such a sti 1Julation v,ill be rendered unneccssery in En,crlnnd if the nev.r Conpanies Bill 1 S17G becomes lm'l es Clause 13 ( 1) ( a) of that Dill pro-hibits directors from a..lotin,rr securities "unless .• c'luthorised to do 
so by (a) the company in trrene ral mee tinr-" (Comprmies Bill 107r ) unde r this provision , an agreement to vote in a particular way in respect of the issue of new shares ~ill a..~2ys be effective , giving the share-holder a statutory ri~ht of 8.uthorisotion which ma.y override the Articles- Clause 13 (6) . Even under this provision , it may be necess-ary to stipulate in the Articles a ri[l"ht of initistive by shareholders to issue shares if the shareholder 8€reement envisages complete control of the pov,er - r1hich Finn ' s comments indicate is the extent of control secured by the agreement . · 
16 ( 1 9 7 5 ) 1 WLR 5 81 
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"Topps came into the company on the basis •• that though it was 
to be a minority shareholder, it should have eoual control with the 
co~~leys . In order to achieve this position , the company ••• adopted 
a new set of articles , and on the same day , Topps , the Coakley and 
the company siened and sealed a:i. agreement which has been c alled •• the 
shareholde r agreement". 17 
The new articles stipulated that the 19 matters covered in the 
shareholder agreement should be regulated by the general meeting : the 
agreement bound the parties to it "To ensure that the company shall not 
~ru(e decisions on any of the following matters without unanimity of all 
the shareholders". 18 
The a ction of adopting a new set of articles was so fundamental 
to the agreement entered into that the former could almost be viewed 
as part of the transaction culminating in the shareholder agreement . 
If, as is the c ase , the basis of effective shareholder participation 
in the affairs of t he company rests ultimately in the content of the 
company ' s articles , it would appear that a fundamental ingredient of the 
agreement's security i s t hat these articles remain pitched toward support-
ing such regulation by the shareholders : it is this aspect - the 
immutability of the Articles of Association that we consider now. 
The scope of a shareholder agreement is obviously related to the 
powers enjoyed by the shareholders in the company ; the latter , in 
turn, a re mainly determined by the Articles of the company - but , to 
CODplete the circle, the Articles themselves are determined by the share-
holders , under Section 24 of the Cor1panies Act 1955 . Fror1 this last 
element of control stems the foundation of the unlir:i.i ted potential of 
a shareholde r agreement . If it is true that the validity of the share-
holder agreenent lies in part on sympathetic Articles specifically allow-
ing it to operate, it follows that the ~ecurity of that aereement for 
the future depends equally on the resistance of those articles to future 
17 Ibid 583 
18 Ibid 584 
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alteration. A hypothetical example illustrates the apparent vulnerab-
ility of the shareholder agreement to an alteration in articles : 
A shareholder owing 1 Ocfo of the shares enters into an ae;reement vvi th 
anothe r shareholder faction owing 90% of the share~ who include the 
company's directors . The compony ' s Articles stiJmlate that the dividend 
poli cy of the company is to be determined by the directors . The 90% 
shareholder faction contract with the minority shareholder -
1) to alter the a r ticles to provide that the dividend policy of 
the company be determined in general meeting . 
2) that the parties to the agreement v,ill ensure 1 by use of their 
votes , that a particular dividend policy be adopted . 
The contract apparently assures the minority shareholder of a 
certain dividend . Subseouently, however , the maj ority shareholder 
faction , exercising their statutory right under Section 24 of the 
Cor.ip2.nies Act , pass a s pecial resolution altering the Articles once 
again , returning the dividend policy of the company to the directors . 
The agreement has apparently been torpedoed: the minority shareholder 
has be en excluded from the dividend policy of the company . 
This simple exanplc does illustrate the stratee-ic part played by 
the Articles in the security of the shareholder a~reemcnt : if the 
objects of that ae;reement are to be achieved, it is clear tha t the agree-
~ent itself must attempt, as far as possible to puard ae;ainst any alter-
2tion in the Articles by bindinE its controctinp, parties to oppose any 
relevant altera tion in then . The a~ree~ent could bind the parties to 
vote ae;ainst any resolution to alter the articles unless they are all 
8Preed , or bind then to vote against any relevant alterations as long 
as the agreement l asts . 19 As has been re peatedly laid down , the share 
is a pro prietary right , the sh2.reholder " may even bind himself by contract 
'
120 to vote or not vote in a particular way : prima facie , an obligation of 
19 Clearly this v:ould only be effective if the agreement commanded more than 251o of the present shareholding . 
20 Gower op ci t 562 
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voting in a particular way in respect of an alteration of articles is 
no different an obligation from a voting oblieation in any other area, 
and hence valid. The only ground on which alteration of the company's 
articles could differ from any other obligation to vote in a particular 
r:ay stems from Section 24 of the Companies Act 1955 which provides that 
"a company may by special resolution alter or add to its articles" . On 
the basis of this provision , it has been established that a company 
cannot be deprived of its pov,er to alter its articles: in Allen v Gold 
Reefs of i/ . Africa 21 , Lindley LJ held: 
"Be its nature what it may , the company is empowered by the statute 
to alter the reulations contained in its articles from time to time by 
special resolution; and any regulation or article purporting to deprive 
the company of this power is invalid on the grounds that it is contrary 
to statute". 22 
V/hat is certainly prohibited by this statement is the inclusion in 
the company 's Articles of an article that purports to prevent the Art -
icles from being altered in the future. The only way that such an in-
valid article could be included in the first place would be through the 
votes of three fourths of the shareholders; presumably these votes are 
lil:ewise invalid as being contrary to statute . On the same basis it has 
been held that a company cannot contract out of its power to alter its 
articles 23 by it~ directors, for example , entering into an agreement 
that the articles will remain unaltered. Is, therefore, the prohibition 
on the company contracting out of its p ower to alter the articles applic- -
able to an agreement entered into by shareholders bindin~ themselves to 
opposing any alteration in the articles? If the basis of the prohibition 
is that 'the com:9any is empowered .. to alter the regulations, "this 
is a stroY1,r:-- 0::r: · l ll cP c in fnvour of vie·wing such a shareholder aereement 
as subject to the saJnc prohibition when the only way a "company" can 
alter its regulations is through the votes of its shareholders . If 
sh..,reholders may not vote in favour of an a rticle which urevents subse-
auent shareholders from altering the Articles , is it i mpl ied in this pro-
~ibi tion that shareholders may not contract among themselves to oppose an 
alteration in the Articles? 
21 1900 1 Ch 656 
22 Ibid 671 
23 Southern Foundries (1 926) Ltd v Shirlaw (1 940) AC 701 
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V/here the parties to the nr1-reement c01mnand more than 25?~ of the 
share holding of the company, such an aereement effectively prevents 
a resolution being passed altering the Articles and may be viewed as 
akin to the typeof article clearly prohibited . 
The reference to eny "regulation or article" 24 sugo-est -that not 
only is a company not entitled to include an article freezing its 
articles, but extends to any regulation : could this , then , include a 
shareholder acreement , thereby invalidation it? Or is the caselaw pro-
hibition limited to the compony including an article stipulating the 
articles are not to be altered or a contract entered into by the company 
to this effe ct? Prentice accepts that a distinction exists between the 
caselaw prohibition on a cor1pany contracting out of its statutory power 
to alter its articles and a shareholder ac;reement bindin[; its parties to 
vote o.e;ainst such an alteration : the shareholder ac;reement , falling 
outside this established prohibition,is consequently valid: 
"A provision in the Articles of Association attemptin~ to achieve 
this directly v,ould run foul of the principle that a company is unable 
to contract out of the rie;ht to alter the articles of association •. A 
simpler and more efficacious method of guaranteeinc unonimous shnreholder 
approval for any basic change in the corporate constitution is for the 
shareholders to enter into a votinE agreement containing suitable restric -
tions on the ·way in which the parties to the a[!;reement will cast their 
votes". 25 
Returning for the moment to the prohibition on a compnny including 
a.n 2rticle thrd purports to deprive the conpany of this por:er to chan{'"e 
its orticles : this is inve.lid on the c round tha t it is contrc1.ry to 
st2.tute . The only \'l O.Y that <"'UCh an orticle could be inc-ertcd would be 
ttroueh the passin~ of a s pecial resolution by the charchoiders of the 
cor:ipany , therefore , this resolution is likewise invalid . ',/ould an a{'"ree -
~ent binding shareholders to vote for it be likewise invalid as contrary 
t o statute? The answer to this is unclear and not d~rectly relevant to 
24 
25 
Supra Note 21 
op eit p 110 
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the issue of an agreement opposing a resolution to alter thearticles , 
but it does illustrate how the principles developed in respect of the 
prohibition on the company's shareholders voting for such Pn outlawed 
article may be applied to the latter type of ae;reement . Certainly it 
is true that t he established prohibition so far ha.s only concerned it 
self with invalidating articles that purport to prevent the company 
from altering its arti cles or contracts entered into by the company as 
a party , ( as opposed to its shareholders) containing a similar oblig-
ation. Cn these principles be extended ( and it would , on present auth-
ority, be an extension) to prohibiting an agreement by shareholders 
which purport to prevent such an alteration? As has been :indicated , 
references to the 'bompany" mean also the shareholders of the company : 
where the distinction t hus appears to be ignored, there would appear 
to be very sound re asons for extending the prohibition to an agreement 
entered into by enough shareholders - if such a prohibition did not 
already apply. Certainly it would appear to invalidate any agreement 
between a shareholder and the company itself in which the former con-
tracted to vote against any alteration in the company ' s articles , be-
cause this would appear to be squarely within the prohibition on a 
company contracting not to alter its articles . As will be shown , how-
ever , if a shareholder agreement involvine; such an obligation, in the 
absence of any vestiges of participation in it by the com;::iany , is 
outside the established prohibition , it would appear that one involving 
the company as a contracting party may likev1ise be excluded because the 
obligation to vote against an alteration, by definition , can only be 
carried out by the shareholder . The 8.pparent inclusion of this type 
of ae;reement simply on the basis of participation in it by the compsny , 
in the :prohibition on a company contrnctinp- out of its nower to Dlter 
its articles, therefore, is illusory because the company itself , in this 
instance, is not contracting to do this (indeed it cannot) the shareholder 
is. 
Superficially , the extension of the established prohibition to a 
shareholde r agreement as sur:e;ested has some appeal . Its extension does 
raise problems hov,ever .Clearly it could only invalidate an agreement 
to oppose an alteration in articles : an agreement to vote in favour of 
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such a resolution coul d not possibly be regarded as preventing the 
"company" or its shareholders from altering its articles . Is an agree -
ment containing less than 25% of the voting power of the company 
lilcewise prohibited, even though the resolution to alter the articles 
may nevertheless be passed by the statutory ma jority? Does an agreement 
8mong shareholders to vote against any alteration in the articles unless 
they all agree to the alterations fare any better aeainst the prohibition 
on a company being prevented from altering its articles , than one whi ch 
flatly prohibits its parties to aeree to any alteration in the company ' s 
articles . The possibility of a difference result occurrinp from the 
application of the established prohibition in these different circum-
stances is perhaps , an indication that the e xt ension of this prohibition 
to shareholder agreements is founded more on a logically literal defin-
ition of the ~rohibition than on substantial conceptual grounds. 
There a re substantial objection to extending the prohibition on the 
company to an agreement entered into by shareholders , stemming initially 
from the nature of a share and the shareholder . It is a fundamental 
principle of English company l av, that a share is a proprietary right. 26 
The shareholder, as Gower points out'' may even bind himself by contract 
to vote or not to vote in a particula r way1127 • It follows , therefore, 
that pri ma f a cie shareholders may contra ct r1i th each other or with out-
siders to vote against an alterat ion in the a rticles of association : 
such a prima facie right can only be denied because it contravenes a 
superior right - a statutory right as Section 24 for example . It is 
submitted that such an agreenent does not contravene Secti~n 24 . The 
objection to a compEmy including an article prohibi tin{" any alterat ion 
in the comyany ' s 2,rticles is thRt , if allov:ed to stEu1.d , the statutory 
po;•er of al tero.tion of c1.rticles , established under S 24 of the Companies 
~et 1S55 could not be exercised : a s pecial resolution if passed , to 
alte r the articles would othenvise be ineffective. 28 On the other hand 
a sh2 reholder a~reement binding the parties to oppose any alteration of 
articles , though it ensures that the articl es v1ill not be altered if the 
26 North V/est Transport a tion v Beatty 1887 1 2 App Cas 589 
27 Go\•1e r op cit 562 citinrr Greern·rnll v Porter (1 90 2) 1 Ch 530 and Puddephatt v Leith (1 9 16) 1 Ch 200 
28 Unless one a ccepts that t he 2rt icle ,though allo,,,ed to stand, is itself subject to the statutory power of alteration . 
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shareholding commanded by that aereement exce eds 25~ of the voting 
vorier , can be regarded as an exercise of that statutory power . In . 20 
3ushell v Fait h .., the court held valid an article whi ch worked to 
contrive a majority against a resolution proposed under statutory 
po\'/ers. The court a ce epted that this article did not vary the statu-
tory standard. In determining the validity of a weighted votine- claus e 
established in the company 's a rticles, Lord Upjohn commented of the 
English statutory requirement that an ordinary resolution sufficed to 
remove a director: 
"All that Parliament was seeking to do thereby we,s to make an 
ordinary resolution sufficient to remove a director. !lad .1 a rlianent 
desired to g o further and enact that every share entitled to vote should 
be deprived of its special rights under the articles it should have said 
so in plain terms by makine; the vote on a poll one vote one share". 30 
In recognising thc1,t such an a rticle effectively :prevented the 
director fro m being remo ved Bnd yet u pholdin~ it as 21n exercise of that 
~atuto ry power, the court emphasised the freedom of comp2nies to a ttach 
·hatever voting riehts they chose to shares under their Articles . This 
freedom was one major factors influencing the court in their decision that 
~eh an a rticle constituted ultimately an exercise of the statutory 
:)ov·er. Likewise, the freedom to contra ct in the manne r in vthich a share -
holde r will vote stRnds as a factor indicatinF such an a"reement re pre-
sents an exercise of the statutory power. The most telling indic a tion 
of this exercise of st8.tutory powe r is tha t the votes are c ast. A share-
holder a{'Teement is it is subE1itted akin to t he type of arti cle involved 
in )ushell v Fa ith. 31 The court ' s r eaction to the.t ty oe of nrti cle, it 
is subr.:i tted is eou2.lly o::7plicable to such 8n 21.0Teer~ont : it does not 
Purnort to de nrive the company of its statutory po\"er to lter its 
2rticles but rather binds the pe rties to o:9posing 2 resolution nhen that 
statutory power is beine exercised . The fret that the resolution is 
s .bmi tted is indicative tha t the statutory p ov,e r is being exercised . 
29 
30 
31 
·187g AC 1099 
Ibid p 11 09 
op cit 
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section 24 only seeks to achieve the alteration of the company's 
articles if a special resolution is passed to this effect: it does 
not concern itself with the manner in which that special resolution 
is passed or defeated. Thus it is submitted that a voting agreement 
between 26% of the shareholders binding them to vote against an alter-
ation of the company's articles cannot be treated a:ny differently from 
any other shareholder agreement. It represents a legitimate exercise 
of their rights as shareholders, and does not violate section 24. This, 
then, is the principal reason why the prohibition applicable to 
shareholders voting for an article that purports to freeze the Articles 
or to a company contracting out of its statutory right to alter its 
articles should not apply to a shareholder agreement. 
It is obviously crucial to determine whether the shareholders 
can be regarded as the 'company' for these purposes: if they can, then 
clearly the line of cases prohibiting the •company• from contracting 
out of its power tp alter its articles or prohibiting the general 
body of shareholders from voting in favour of a prohibited article 
may apply to shareholder agreements. The Court of Appeal in Baily v 
British Equitable Assurance co32 recognised a distinction : 
"But the case of a contract between an outsider and the company 
is entirely different and even a shareholder must be regarded as an 
outsider in so far as he contracts with the company otherwise than in 
respect of his shares. 33 
Cvrtainly the shareholder in a shareholder agreement is contract-
ing in respect of his shares but not in the sense intended in the 
quote, and not necessarily with the company. There is a fundainental 
distinction between the company and the shareholders for these purposes; 
the prohibition applies only to the former. It is fundamental to the 
conclusion arrived at by Prentice34in the quote referred to earlier 
that a distinction exists between the 'company• and the shareholder 
in relation to the effect of s~4 of the Companies Act 1955. Likewis~ 
the court in Stewart v _Schwab3,5·: in considering the effect of a stat-
utory provision identical to s187(1) of the Companies Act based its 
32 
33 
34 
35 
1904) 10h 374 
ibid 
op cit 
1956 4 S. Afr LR 791 
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decision on the distinction between the company and its shareholders 
and directors: 
"This section should not be interpreted so as to authorise a 
breach of an agreement between shareholders and a director because 
in terms the provision only authorises the disregard of the Company's 
articles and of agreements between the Company and a director36 ·" 
Viewing the shareholders in this context as subject to the 
same prohibition on them from voting in favour of an article that 
freezes the Articles has some appeal because the reality achieved by 
the contract is that the articles will not be altered, which appears 
similar to the effect of an article prohibiting future alteration. 
Lord Reid in ]3usl}_ell v Fai th~7 did concede that the effect of the 
weighted voting clause, whose validity the shareholder agreement)in 
this context, by analogy relies on heavily "makes it impossible in 
the circumstances •••• for any resolution for the removal of any 
director to be passed if that director votes against it" }8 It is 
implicit in the court's acceptance of such a clause that the end 
result achieved is not determinative of whether the statutory prov-
ision has been violated. This applies to a shareholder agreement, 
despite the apparent violence done to Section 24. The mea..~ing of the 
established prohibition appears limited to preventing shareholders 
from inserting an article that purports to freeze the articles, and 
preventing the company itself from entering into a contract whereby. 
it purports to promise that the articles will not be altered: the 
only method by which eu~ a _pFomise could be made good, it transpire~ 
is by fixing this commitment to a shareholding representing more than 
25% of the company voting power. 
THE AVAILABILITY OF AN INJUNCTION: 
It appears to be generally accepted 
that a mandatory, as well as a prohibitive injunction will be granted 
36 ibid p 794 
37 op ci t 
38 ibid 1105 
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to enforce the terms of a voting agreement~ .J'uddephatt v Leith39 stands 
as authority for this proposition. From this it follows that an injunc-
tion would be granted by the courts to enforce a voting agreement to 
oppo se an alteration of the company's articles if the agreement 
stipulated this. Admi~edly, the early cases do not specifically 
establish the availability of an injunction to enforce a contractual 
obli gation to vote against an alteration of articles, but the generality 
of t he obligations undertaken in those agreements held to be enforceable 
by in junction suggests that these two cases are capable of supporting 
thi s conclusion. The agreement in yreenwell v -~~~e~40 held to be 
enforceable by prohibitive injunction stipulated that the executors: 
" shall not ••• take any steps or do any acts to induce or compel 
them or either of them to relinquish their or his office of director, 
but shall at all times to the best of their ability, by their votes 
and otherwise, support them and each of them in their office. u 41 
Presumably this term would extend to obliging the parties to the 
agreement to vote against an alteration of the company's articles if 
by such an alteration the company acquired the power to remove the 
plaintiff from his office as director. 
There appears no reason why a voting agreement including an 
obligation on its parties to oppose any alteration in the company's 
art icles should be treated differently from any other voting agreement 
enforceable by injunction. However, it is equally generally accepted, 
de spite suggestions to the contrary12 that an injunction will never lie 
to prevent a company from altering its articles of association. In ~ v ~_xmo~s~3 the court refused an injunction preventing the passing 
of a resolution because "the company cannot cont rr·ct i ~Gt~·lf out of the 
right to alter its articles. 1144 The problem is that the only way that 
a company's articles can be altered is through the shareholders voting 
for such a resolution, as established by section 24 Companies Act 1955: 
the implication of this case appears to be that the courts will never 
interfere against shareholders voting in favour of a resolution being 
4
39
0 
( 1916) 1 Ch 200 
41 
(1902) 1 Ch 530 
ibid 531 
4Z British Murac Syndicate Ltd v Alperton Rubber Co Ltd 1915 2 Ch 186 43 (1903) 2 Ch 506 
44 ibid 511 
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passed altering the company's articles. This, it is submitted is 
misl eading. It is quite true that'' a company cannot contract itself 
out of the right to alter its articles - but, as already indicated, 
a shareholder may contract to vote against an alteration, as may a 
group of shareholders representing 26~ of the company's voting power. 
(In t his respect, the "company" and its shareholders are necessarily 
separate) • Being a valid agreement, an in·junction enforcing the terms 
of the agreement should certainly lie. A conflict would exist between 
Puddephatt_ v _Leith 45 and Punt_ v _S~On§~6 if the latter supported the 
proposition that an injunction will never prevent shareholder~ regard-
less of their contractual obligations, from approving an alteration 
in the company's articles. The case certainly supports the proposition 
that a company can never be prevented from submitting the resolution 
to a vote - but does it extend to justify a shareholder from voting 
contrary to a bindi n~ agreement? The answe:r; initially, must be no. 
The r eason for this limitation on the case is to be found in the 
court 's reasons for rejecting the inj~ction - because'' a company 
cannot contract itself out of the right to alter its articles17" 
As has been shown, a voting agreement binding the parties to oppose 
an alteration is not analogous to this prohibition but more akin - to 
an exercise of that statutory, and shareholder power: if this distinc-
tion exists, therefore, there is no foundation for refusing an 
injunction to enforce the terms of the agreement at the resolution, 
and being a valid contract, and not contrary to statute, very strong 
reasons for granting one. 
The cases certainly establish the unalienable right of the company 
to alter its articles. In §outhern Foundaries v _Shirla~ 1 
48 it was 
held that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent alteration of 
art i cles. In ~eters American ~elicacy ! td v H~~th19 it was held that 
an i njunction cannot prevent an alteration to articles on the grounds 
that it will result in a breach of contract. Trebilcock concludes 
"It now seems the case that an injunction will never lie to 
to prevent an alteration to articles of association in a way which 
45 Supra Note 39 
46 Supra Note 43 
4
4
7
8 
Supra Note 43 
(1940) A; 741 
49 (1939) 61 CLR 457 
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is inconsistent with a subsisting contract" ?0 
The comment "an injunction will never lie to prevent an alteration 
to articles of association" means, it would appear, that a court will 
never intervene to prevent the company's shareholders from voting 
for a resolution altering the articles despite the fact that doing so 
is " i nconsistent with a subsisting contract". From this it would appear 
that a party to a shareholder's contract may vote inconsistently with 
the obligation undertaken in the agreement to oppose a resolution to 
alt er the articles, and an injunction preventing him from doing this 
will not be granted: the only remedy of his co-contractors, it would 
seem, would be damages. This is so if the case law establishing the 
inalienable right of the company to alter its articles also means the 
inalienable right of its shareholders to vote for such an alteration 
if they BO wish regardless of a contractual obligation to oppose euch 
an alt eration. Logic appears to force this conclusion: there is little 
meaning to the established prohibition on the inalienability of the 
company's right to alter its articles if this does not confer on its 
shareholders the same right because it is they
1
and only they1 who have 
the power to alter these articles. This produces a strange result in 
that despite the fact that such a voting agreement is a valid one, 
an injunction will not lie to enforce its terms: it is a valid contract 
becaus e it breaches no statutory power, (in being an exercise of that 
power) and hence the case law on a company being prohibited from 
contracting out of its power to alter its articles is inapplicable; 
yet in relation to the availability of an injunction, the principles 
developed in refusing an injunction on the basis shown to be inapplic-
able t o agreements by force of logic are particularly compelling in 
relation to enforcing such an agreement by injunction. Such a result 
is compl_etly inconsistent with the fundamental nature of a share as 
a proprietary right, and imposes a limitation on the otherwise 
unrestricted ability of a shareholder to "bind himself by contract 
to vote or not to vote in a particular way and his contract may be 
enforced by injunction" 51 - in respect of contracts to vote against 
an alteration of articles, this would appear not to be so. 
50 
51 
The Effect of Alterations to Articles of Association (1967) 31 The Conveyancer 114 
Gower op cit 562 
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If the line of cases affirming the inalienability of the"company'e" 
right to alter its articles operates also on the micro level of' its 
shareh·olders, rendering an agreement by them to vote against an alter-
ation of articles unenforceable by injunction, this result appears in 
conflict with the two cases52 establishing the availability of pro-
hibitive and mandatory injunctions in the enforcement of shareholder 
agreements. The solution to this conflict may be in the qualification introduced by Sargant Jin -~ddephatt_ v Lei_~~~ 3 in affirming generally 
the availability of such injunctions in enforcing shareholder agreements: 
"Prima facie this court is bound ••• to give effect to a clear 
right by way of mandatory injunction. There are no doubt certain excep-
tions from this rule, as in the case of a contract of service, because 
in such cases it is impossible for the court to make its order effectiv~1 
Many of the cases from which emerged the principle that a company 
cannot be prevented from altering its articles dealt with directors' 
contracts of service. 5~s Sargant J, in referring to cases of a "contract 
of service", intending these cases? I do not think so. The recognition 
of exceptions to the availability of injunctions does recognise a 
limitation on the availability of such a device to enforce a shareholder 
agreement. There is, however, no reason why an agreement to vote 
against an alteration in articles should represent such an exception, 
especially on the criterion cited by Sargant J - that "it is impossible 
for the Court to make its order effective". As Puddeph?,~t v Jiei~t}~~ 
illustrates, it is easy for the court to enforce the terms of a voting 
agreement by prohibitive or mandatory injunction: the Court simply 
orders the shareholder to vote in the manner agreed. The nature of 
this obligation clearly does not render it "impossible for the Court 
to make its order effective". Enforcing an agreement by the company 
on the other hand, not to alter its articles, in light of the statutory 
power of the shareholder to do so under section 24 of the Companies 
Act 1955, is impossible. This, then, is one indication that the effect 
of a statutory power such as S. 24 is limited to the company, and not 
its shareholders, and that this distinction, consistentwith the 
distinction operating in relation to the validity of agreements, applies 
equally to the question of the availability of injunctions, despite 
52 Greenwell v Porter (1902) 1 Ch 530 and Puddephatt v Leith (1916) 1 Ch 200 
5 3 ( 1 91 6 ) 1 Ch 200 
54 Ibid at 202 
55 
~
0
H~t111'1~3gfdEte8LR 8~3i}mru~i1~~6rtR t°C6iaff§~1)A~rff8lt Ltd 56 ( 1 91 6 ) 1 Ch 200 
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the apparently logical application of the case law to shareholder agree-
ments. In light of this distinction, an injunction to enforce such 
an agreement, in line with their availability in general, is available. 
The reference by Sargant J to "exceptions ••• as in the case of a 
contract of service" does not appear to be reference to the managing 
director cases57 from which the established prohibition sprang, nor 
the impossibility of the Court making its order effective a reference 
to the inalienable right of the company to alter its articles, but 
rather a reference to a basic principle of contract law in relation 
to a typical employer-employee situation, which is indeed an established 
exception to the availability of injunctions. As is stated in Cheshire 
and f ifoot: 58 
"It is undesirable, and indeed in most cases impossible to compel 
an unwilling party to maintain continuous personal relations with one 
another ••• it is well established that a contract for personal services 
is not one specifically enforceable at the suit of either party". 59 
This, then, is the "impossible" element referred to by Sargant J. 
As has been shown, a literal application of the established 
prohibition on a company logically could be extended to encompass a 
shareholder agreement. The different circumstances arising from a 
shareholder agreement - quite apart from the fundamental conceptional 
ob jections to the extension of such a prohibition - may prompt the 
courts into reaching the result that the established prohibition on a 
company does not extend to a contract entered into by the shareholders. 
The prohibition developed in the framework of a contract involving 
the company. However, as Trebicock points out: 
"an alteration to articles can never itself constitute a breach 
of contract. The breach is only committed when the company attempts 
to act upon the alteration. n 60 
This is one very good reason why the unavailability of an injunc-
tion to prevent a company from altering its articles should not be 
extended to a shareholder agreement binding the parties to oppose an 
alteration: voting in favour of such an alteration does result in a 
57 Supra Note 55 
58 The Law of Contract 1978 Fifth New Zealand Edition 
59 Ibid 534 • 
60 op cit 
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direct breach of contract - indeed, it is the breach of contract. It 
is submitted that the correct principles governing this latter situation 
correspond more accurately with the position of the company after the 
articles have been altered, on which Trebilcock concludes that an in-
junction should be available to prevent a company from breaching a 
contract: 
"its position vis-a-vis the party contracting with it in relation 
to a contract becomes the same in all respects as that of any other 
person in the same position, and all ordinary contractual considerations 
apply to it"61 • 
It is submitted that the position of a shareholder to an agreement 
opposing an alteration of articles is identical. In considering such 
an agreement, a choice will have to be made between extending the 
established case law prohibiting a company from alienating its rights 
to alter its articles to theshareholder or opting in fa~our of a recog-
nition of the proprietary nature of a share. There are suggestions in 
the cases themselves establishing the prohibition on the company that 
such recognition would follow, and that established prohibition on a 
company limited to situations involving an article or contract to which 
the company is a party. The judgement of Dixon Jin Peter§_ AmeriQan 
Delica9.~ Co. ~td~ v ~e~~h62 is accepted as supporting the prohibition 
on a company alienating its right to alter its articles, and that an 
injunction will not lie to prevent its shareholders from doing this: 
"the better opinion still appears to be that the fact that to 
alter an article involves a breach of contract can be no more than an 
evidenciary consideration and does not in itself make the alteration 
invalid." 6 3 
This apparently supports the proposition - at least the language 
appears wide enough to include it - that a shareholder cannot be 
restrained by injunction from voting in favour of an alteration to 
articles. Dixon J also recognised however, that shareholders 
"vote in respect of their shares, which are property, and the 
right to vote is attached to the share itself as an incident of property 
61 Ibid 115!the writer aclmowledges that no judicial authority supports 
this conclusion, but neither has it been denied • 
62 (1939) 61 CLR 457 
63 Ibid 503 
• 
- C\ \ -
to be enjoyed and exercised for the owner's personal advantage" 64. 
One interpretation of this comment - that "the right to vote -
is •• an incident of property to be enjoyed •• for the owner's personal 
advantage" could be that this right may be exercised despite any 
contractual limitations imposed on the shareholder. This, it is sub-
mitted, is not the correct inference to be drawn. As soon as one 
recognises the proprietary nature of a share - being "property", one 
has to admit 1 prima facie, the right to enter into contractual oblig-
ationsin relation to that property - and equally important, the right 
of that obligation to be enforced by injunction. The quote itself 
specifically cites the right to vote flowing from that property. If 
such a right to contract is recognised in relation to other spheres 
of corporate activity, as undoubtedly it is, there appears no reason 
why voting in respect of an alteration of articles should be regarded 
in any other light and consequently an injunction enforcing the terms 
of this valid contract should be granted. Ultimately, the justification 
for this is identical to the reasons establishing the validity of the 
shareholder agreement: such an agreement is an exercise of the statu-
tory power under s. 24, akin to a weighted voting clause rather than 
an abrogation of that power. Being a valid contract, in contrast to 
an invalid article, its terms should, in accordance with the mainstream 
of judicial opinion on voting agreements in general be enforced either 
by mandatory or prohibitive injunction. Such a result is sanctioned 
by the original attitude of thecourts affirming the availability of an 
injunction to enforce voting agreements. 65 This, it is submitted, 
should be the position adopted today in relation to one including 
an obligation to vote against an alteration inthe company's articles. 
Reference to the court's reaction to shareholder agreements bind-
ing the parties voting in relation to other acts required by statute 
to be approved by a certain percentage of the shareholder votes supports 
this. The court's reaction to a shareholder agreement relating to 
these similar provisions are relevant to the issue of an agreement re-
lating to alteration to articles. In §tewart_ v _Schwab66 , the court had 
64 Ibid 504 
65 Puddephatt v Leit~ (1916) 1 Ch 200 
66 (1956) 4 S. Afr LR 79·1 
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no hesitation in granting an injunction against parties to a shareholder 
agreement who threatened to vote in favour of a resolution, in breach 
of the agreement, to remove the applicant from his office as a director 
despite the fact that an identical statutory power to S.187 of the 
Companies Act 1955 was involved. It is submitted in light of the 
essential similarity for our purposes between S24 and S 187 (i.e. both 
empl oy the statutory formula) that an injunction will be granted to 
prevent parties to a shareholder agreement binding themselves to oppose 
an alteration to articles from breaching that agreement. In fact, if 
anything, S187 provides a better foundation on whichit could be argued 
that such an agreement is invalid in that it contains an explicit man-
date to disregard in this context "anything in its articles or in any 
agreement between it and him". If the company is to be assimilated 
with its shareholders this mandate would appear to furnish a strong 
ground on which such an agreement could be disregarded. The reaction· 
of the court to this provision is, therefore, significant because it 
sheds some much needed light on what can be regarded as the "company" 
under such statutory provisions. The court in Stewart v _Sc4~~b67 held: 
"It seems to me that the words "notwithstanding anything in its 
art i cles or in any agreement between it and him give a clue to the 
intended scope of sub sec (1). In the absence of clear words to that 
effect it seems to me that this section should not be interpreted so 
as t o authorise a breach of an agreement between shareholders and a 
director because in terms the provision only authorises the disregard 
of the company's articles and of agreements between the comPS!?-Y and 
a director". 68 
If, therefore, a distinction exists between "an agreement between 
shareholders and a director" and "agreements between the company and a 
director" - the former lying outside the established prohibition based 
ons . 187 (1), it is clear that, in the context of agreements, a 
crucial distinction exists betwe en the "company" and its shareholders 
- or else, the distinction made in the passage quoted would not be a 
distinction at all. Quite clearly there are limits to this distinction; 
Where the shareholders purport to vote in an Article stipulating that no 
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid p 794 (emphasis mine) 
• 
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further changes will be made to the Articles, the court's invalidation 
of this vote ie based on the assimilation, for these purposes, ofthe 
company and its shareholders. To this extent, "the statutory based 
prohibitions clearly do extend to the actions of shareholders. On the 
other hand, where the company purports to contract out of its statutory 
power to alters its articles, the distinction between the company and 
its shareholders is a sharp one69 • If, however, the distinction drawn 
in pt ewa~~ v Schwab70 is a valid one - and it is submitted it is - in 
the realm of agreements, the company and its shareholders are distinct 
from each other, and ~his applies, if anything, more forcefully to an 
agreement entered into by shareholders amongthemselvesthan one between 
shareholders and a director. An agreement between a company and a 
director ~ipulating that the latter will not be removed from office 
is invalid, because it breaches S187 (1); such an agreement between a sha reh9lde r ~d. n director does not: e..n ap.:re2ment between snareholders .b1nd1ng themse ves to oppose an a.J..teration in the company's 
articles clearly falls in the second category of agreements . Section 24 
I does not, therefore, give the individual shareholder, or all the compa:nys 
shareholders an unalienable right to vote in favour of a resolution 
held under statutory powers regardless of their contractual obligations, 
nor does it qualify their contractual freedom to vote in a particular 
way on such a resolution. If a party to such an agreement threatened 
to vote in favour of the resolution, an injunction, it is submitted, 
would be granted to prevent the breach of agreement as it was granted 
in Stewart v _§ch~ab71 in relation to a similar statutory power: 
section 24, like section 187 ( 1) "should not be interpreted so as to 
72 authorise a breach of an agreement between shareholders ••• " 
69 Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw 1940 AC 701 
70 op cit 
71 Ibid 
72 Ibid 794 
• 
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The result of the preceeding discussion is the proposition 
that the established prohibition on a co~pany contracting out of its 
statutory PO\"er to alter its articles, 73 is not applicable to an agree-
::ent between shareholders by which they bind themselves to vote against 
~~ alteration in the articles of the co~par..y. ne o: the distinctions 
on which the inapplicability of this prohib~tion in relation to a.gree-
::ents rests is that bet'.'.een a "co:::pany" entering into such an obligation 
tecause it breaches S.24 of the Con~anies Act, and a shareholder bind-
ing hi~self to vote against an alteration. A few lines of Lord Greene 
1ffi's judg ment in Greenhalgh v Ardene Cine~a~ Ltd7t however, appear to 
suggest that in fact the distinction may be i~aterial; the conseQuence 
of such an interpretation for the shareholder agree~ent on the other 
h~~d, are nothing short of traumatic. mo appreciate their significance, 
it is proposed to refresh the reader's memory of the original agreecent 
entered into in this series of cases. The headnote of the :irst action 
sumrr:arises that agreement accurately; it reads: 
"the appellant entered into an agree:::ent by v·hich he undertook to 
provide £11,000 in the form of subscriptions for debentures in a private 
co::pany \''hich was in urgent need of that su.:n. The agreement also pro-
vided for the allotment of certain shares to the appellant and to 3 
directors of the company. By a collateral agree~ent :::ade about the 
s~e tirr.e it was provided that the 3 directors should vote v'i th and 
support the appellant, who would thus gain control of sufficient votes 
to enable him to carry an ordinary resolution". 75 
Lord Greene ~:R in that case explained the effect of the agreement: 
"The effect of that agreement, as far as the voting control of 
t hecompa...>1y was concerned, v•ould have been this. The a ppellant would 
:iave been a minority shareholder, and v,·ould not y hi~self have been 
i~ a position to control the corupany, either in respect of an ordinary 
resolution or a fortio1~, in respect of an extraordinary or special 
reso_ution. 
3 y way of collateral agree:::ent, on or about the same date •• the 
Parties attempted to ~ake provision for the voting control That agree-
3 Southern Foundries (1826) Ltd v Shirlaw op cit 
t (1946) 1 Alf 3R 512 
5 (1943) 2 A ER 23 5 
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was made between the 3 directors and the appellant in the following n76 terms ••• 
From this, it would appear that two agreements were entered into: 
the first between Greenhalgh and the company, the former Lending the 
latter £11,000, secured by debentures and also in consideration of 
certain shares being alloted to him; the collateral agreement was 
entered into by the three directors,at the very least,in their capacity 
as shareholders in the company with Greenhalgh. 
Of this agreement, Lord Greene stated in subsequent litigation 
involving the same parties - and the same agreement: 
"it is said that in the original agreement which was signed when 
the appellant first became assoctated with the company, a term is to 
be implied as a result of which the company would be precluded from 
acting in any way which would interfere with the voting control which 
he acquired as a result of that agreement. The agreement to which (it 
is now admitted) the company must be treated as being a party •• " 77 
Lord Greene MR appears to have accepted that the company was a 
party to "the agreement". As already indicated, there were in reality 
two agreements: if this "agreement" is a reference only to the issue 
of shares and debentures receiving the loan of £11,000, then no problem 
is posed: the company would naturally be a party to such an agreement. 
It is more likely, however, that the reference is not so limited. It 
would appear that the agreement to which the company was admitted to 
be a party included the collateral voting agreement - because it was 
this collateral agreement which gave the plaintiff "voting control". 
~The agreement to which (it is now admitted) the company must be treated 
II 
as a party appears therefore, to be a reference to the voting agreemen~ 
because it follows immediately on the heels of the agreement giving 
the plaintiff ."voting contro11178 and because there was never any 
doubt about the company's participation in the agreement securing deb-
entures and issuing shares: the only agreement about which any uncert-
76 Ibid p 237 
77 ( 1946) 1 AU ER 513-4 _ 
78 as Lord Greene MR had observed earlier in Greenhalgh v Mallard (1943) 2 AU ER 237 the effect of the agreement alloting shares was to leave Greenhalgh as a minority shareholder. 
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tainty could have existed which ("it is now admitted") was the voting 
agreement between the 3 directors as shareholders. If the courts are 
prepared to recognise the company as _a party to such a shareholder 
agreement (and there is no doubt that it was this, since it bound the 
parties to vote in a particular way as shareholders - the fact that the 
parties were also directors, and that the agreement was collateral to 
an agreement to which the company was a party
1 is irrelevant) then it 
would appear that the prohibition on the company contracting out of 
its right to alter its articles could apply to a shareholder agreement 
binding its parties to vote against any alteration because the company 
it would appear, will be treated as a party to that agreement. To view 
the company as a party to a shareholder agreement in these circumstances 
is a rather startling proposition; it is nevertheless, the view of 
Pickering:in describing both actions, he states: 
"In G~e_enhE.µ@ v Mallard_ under the terms of a collateral agreement 
three directors of a company had bound themselves to vote with and 
support the plaintiff and so to give him effectively majority control •• 
In later litigation the latter (Greenhalgh) instituted proceedings in 
which he contended (inter alia) that this action (the subdivision of 
one class of its ordinary shares) constituted a breach of the original 
voting agreement because this contained an implied term to the effect 
that the company would be precluded from acting in any way which would 
interfere with the voting control which it conferred." 79 
In a footnote, Pickering observes: 
"It was''admitted" in argu :ment that the company "must be treated 
80 as being a party to the agreement". 
Thus, on this view, the "agreement" to which the company is to be 
treated as a party certainly appears to include the shareholder agree-
ment; certainly this collateral agreement which the passage opens with 
is the shareholder agreement: again, the "original voting agreement" 
appears a direct reference to this shareholder agreement because it 
was the only voting agreement involved; indeed, the topic of this 
part of the article is concerned with shareholder agreements. Through-
out the treatment of this area, Pickering appears to accept that this 
79 op cit 256 (emphasis mine) 
80 Ibid Footnote 35 
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company was "admitted" to be a party to the shareholder agreement, 
raising the spectre of invalidity by the application of the established 
case law on a company contracting out of its ability to alter its 
articles. 
Much of the confusion stems from the apparent ambiguity in the 
statement of Lord Greene ~m "The agreement to which it is now 
admitted the company must be treated as being a party" 81 • 
The court had already pointed out, two agreements had been entered 
into - one alloting shares to Greenhalgh, the collateral agreement 
binding the three shareholders to vote with the latter. The line 
immediately preceeding this statement would appear to indicate that 
"the agreement" referred to is the agreement giving the plaintiff 
"voting control" referred to in the previous line. Which agreement, 
then, gave the plaintiff voting control? The statement made by Lord 
Greene in _Greenhalgh v _Mallard __ 82 that the effect of the agreement 
alloting shares to the plaintiff would have left the plaintiff a 
"minority shareholder1183 , and that it was the collateral agreement 
which gave the plaintiff "voting contro11184 - suggest that "the 
agreementureferred to in Greenhalgh_v ~rde~e Cinemas f~§- 85 giving 
the plaintiff voting control can only be a reference to the collateral 
shareholder agreement. There are, however, other indications that the 
"agreement" giving the plaintiff "voting control" may have been a 
reference merely to the agreementalloting shares to him. The first 
indication of this is the comment on p 514 following shortly after the 
statements giving rise to so much trouble, "the clauses of the agree-
ment" which is the same agreement to which the company is admitted 
to be a party: the point is however, that the clauses then referred 
to belong to the agreement alioting shares, not the collateral voting 
agreement. The possibility that the "agreement" to which the company 
must be treated as a party as the one giving the plaintiff voting 
control is the agreement alloting shares and does not include the 
collateral voting agreement derives further support from the follow-
ing comment: 
81 ( 1946) Al I ER 814 
.I 
82 (1943) 2 A\I ER 234 • 
83 Ibid 237 
84 Ibid 
85 ( 1946) All ER 514 
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"The effect of that transaction, the subdivision and issuing of 
those unissued ordinary shares, was to put the appellant in a position 
in which by force of his own voting power alone, he could prevent the 
passing of a special resolution. He obtained control of a further mea-
sure of voting power by means of a collateral agreement with the other 
principal shareholders86 • 
If, therefore, the reference made by Lord Greene to the agreement 
givi ng the plaintiff "voting control" - to which His Lordship appears 
to have accepted that the company was a party - means no more than 
the ability to block a special resolution, clearly this is only a ref-
erence to the main agreement. It appears, however, that the agreement 
re fe rred to does include the eollateral voting agreement, because "voting · 
cont rol" means naturally, the ability to pass or block an ordinary reso-
lut i on: in his own right, Greenhalgh controlled only 19,213 votes out of 
a t otal of 49,820. It was only through the collateral voting agreement 
that he was able to pass an ordinary resolution i.e. exercise voting 
cont rol. Therefore, it would appear that the company was accepted as 
a party to the voting agreement as well, simply through the particip-
ation of the three Mallard shareholder-directors. If in the Gr~enhaJ..m. 
v Mallard87 situation the company is to be treated as a party to the 
vot i ng agreement, it would appear that an agreement by the parties to 
oppose any alteration in the company's articles breaches the prohibition 
on a company contracting out of its power to alter its articles, because 
the company itself will be treated as a party to it, and the fact that 
the obligations involved in the collateral agreement were limited 
to the parties capacities as shareholders does not alter that conclusion. 
The agreement, therefore, breaches the prohibition. 
86 Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas (1946) 1 AU ER 514 (emphasis mine) 
87 1943 2 All ER 234. • 
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CHAPTER 6 
OTHER LIMITATIONS ON A SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT: 
The discussion so far 
has revealed few grounds on which the validity of a shareholder agree-
ment can be attached. The most important danger appears to be the 
"fetter rule" - but as a ground of invalidity, it could be said to be 
limited more to invalidating "directors' 11 agreements than, strictly 
speaking, the shareholder agreement: if the inclusion of one in the 
latter type of agreement invalidates the agreement in toto, the liabili-
ty being admitted arises from the "directors' agreement", or obligations 
tantamount to this prohibited species, rather than from the shareholder 
agreement. Generally speaking, the rule remains true in New Zealand 
that "shareholders may join together and pool their votes in order to 
accomplish what they could as individual". 1 If a shareholder agreement 
binds the parties to vote in a particular way on a matter that, as 
individuals they could have voted on, it appears clearly beyong the 
reaches of any claims of invalidity stemming from its collective aspect. 
As has been repeatedly recognised, a vote is a proprietary right which 
its holder may exercise as he wishes 2; the shareholder, unlike the 
director, is not a fiduciary under English and New Zealand company law3 
liberating the shareholder agreement from any restriction that would 
be imposed on its operation by virtue of that position. Though this 
is generally true in respect of an individual shareholder, some re-
straint is imposed on majority shareholders in the exercise of their 
votes and
1
a fortiori,on an agreement binding its parties to vote in 
specified way where those parties together constitute a voting majority. 
This restraint is that of "fraud on the minority". Application of the 
principle appears to be limited, initially at least, to an agreement 
regulating the voting power of the majority shareholders1 as opposed 
to an agreement by parties who happen to represent a majority interest 
in the company binding one member to lease land, for example, to the 
company. First, however, it is proposed to deal with the grounds on 
Which a shareholder agreement may be invalidated independently of "fraud 
on the minority". 
1 Smith v San Fransisco & NorthemPacific Railway Company 115 47 p 584 (1897) 
2 North West Transport v Beatty ( 1887) 12 App Cas 589 
3 Gower op 86 2 
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The general limitation to which the shareholder agreements are subject, 
like any other contract is outlined in the Commentary to the Canadian 
Business Corporations Act 1975: 
"The common law rule is generally stated to be subject to the 
qualification that the agreements must be for a lawful purpose"4 
Clearly this requirement applies to any agreement entered into in 
New Zealand: one entered into for an "unlawful" purpose is clearly 
invalid. The application of this criterion may raise minor problems. 
As the commentary points, the most likely instance where such an 
agreement is likely to be held unlawful arises in breach of the "fetter 
rule". There is a distinction however, in that Canada, the breach of this rule entails a breach of staturoty law; in New Zealand, an 
agreement involving a fetter on the directors' discretion could only 
breach the company's articles since no statutory management provision 
exists. Strictly speaking, therefore no breach of statutory law is 
involved. The distinction may be unimportant: where an agreement 
involving a shareholder-director involves a fettering of his discretion 
as a director, the absence of a statutory basis does not dilute, in any 
way, the unlawfulness of such an agreement: it is equally unlawful as 
being in conflict with case law establishing the fiduciary duty and 
hence, the fetter rule~ Such an agreement therefore remains invalid. 
This does suggest, however, that a shareholder agreement binding the 
parties solely in their capacity as shareholders to vote on matters 
delegated in the articles to the company's directors, though ineffective 
and hence in practice not a fetter on the directors' powers, still has 
-for precisely the reason on the prevailing view of Article 
806-an unlawful purpose in binding its parties to do an act that is not 
permitted by law. 7 The general requirement of legality - or more 
pointedly, the avoidance of unlawfulness - has to be satisfied. The 
agreement couldtb..erefore, become subject to attack on unforeseen 
grounds. McCarthy gives such an example 
"An agreement among ••• the shareholders which ••• constitutes a 
combination in restraint of trade, for example, will remain invalid" 8 
4 Para. 299 
5 Clark v Worlanan (1920) 1 tr.R. 197 
6 Gower op cit 132 
7 The opposite conclusion is arrived at on the interpretation of Article 80 argued by Goldb.~r9 op cit ante p 
8 Meredith Memorial lectures op cit 468 
- 10 
At first sight this statement appears correct. The problem is that the prohibition on a shareholder agreement that constitutes a restraint on trade stems ultimately from the application of the principles of public policy.
9 
Statements made by Judson Jin ~1p.~uei v ~ergeson10 , admiliedly in another context, nevertheless appear wide enough to support the inclusion generally of the principles of public order to shareholder agreements: 
"I have the greatest difficulty in seeing how any question of public order can arise in a private arrangement of this kind. The possibility of injury to a minority interest cannot raise it. If this were not so, every arrangement of this kind would involve ~nquiry •• • Minority rights have the protection ofthe law without the necessity of involving public order. This litigation is between shareholders of a cl osely held company ••• No public interest or illegality is involved."
11 
Where however no such "independent" protection is involved, as arising from an agreement that represents an unwarranted restraint of trade, perhaps the application of the principles of public order may be involved. It must be conceded that the opening statement admits the exclusion generally of such principles to such a "private" arrangement. Judson J cannot have intended such a general exclusion of the principles of public policy: the operation of the prohibition could not be excluded merely on the basis that the agreement is a "private arrangement" or else it is difficult to amagine how any contract could be held to be a restraint of trade. As is pointed out in Cheshire and Fifoot 
"The concept of public interest admits of no precise limitation" 12 The emphasis of Judson J's words, it is submitted, was placed on the absence, in the agreement being considered, of any harm to anyone but the partners~hence 'public order' was inapplicable. But an agreement, however "private", that represents an unwarranted restraint of trade, it is submitted, is invalid on public policy grounds because it does, by definition, harm the public. 
9 "The doctrine 
Cheshire and 
10 24 DLR 2d 449 
11 ibid 489-60 
12 op cit 306 
of restraint 
Fifoot: The 
of trade is based upon public policy" -
Law of Contract 1978 5th N.Z. Edition p229 
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An.other limitation is apparently imposed on a shareholder agreement, 
though it has affiliations with the limitations about to be examined • . "anyone, and a fortio11 a dominating shareholder, may be liable if 
he knowingly participates i1J. a breach of trust by the directors" 13 
Thus it would appear clear that a shareholder agreement which purports 
to bind the parties in their voting to releasing the directors of the 
company from their fiduciary duties leading to a breach of trust will 
result in the liability of the contracting parties, and presumably such an agreement would be invalid, likewise independently of fraud on the 
minority, as being contrary to law. Likewise, on the authority of 
~orq_ua:y _Hotel Company Ltd v _Cousi!ls_ 14 , a shareholder agreement 
binding its parties to cause the directors to breach any contractural 
duties which they owe to the company will similarly result in the 
liability of those parties - though it is doubtful whether this would 
constitute a ground of invalidity. 
FRAUD ON THE MINORITY 
There is no doubt that the principle expressed as "Fraud on the 
minority", whatever its ingredients or limitations, represents a 
ground on which votes cast at a general meeting of the company may be 
invalidated. From this, it may appear logical that an agreement 
binding its parties to vote in a manner that will result in a fraud on the minority would likewise suffer the same fate as the votes cast in pursuance of the agreement: indeed the ecistence of an agreement 
binding its parties to vote in such a manner appears to sit squarely 
in the sights of the prohibition precisely because it does bind its parties to vote in such a manner unless, of course, all its parties 
agree not to act on it. If fraud on the minority is a ground for 
invalidating votes which-it certainly is~despite the insistence that a share is a propriety right of the shareholder, the limitation thereby imposed might appear logically to extend to another incident of this 
proprietary right - the power to bind hin1self by contract to vote in 
a particular way. Such an extension it is clear, would represent, potentially, a very real limitation on agreements entered into 
shareholders. It is proposed to offer a brief outline of the areas of 
corporate activity covered by an agreement whose validity may be 
threatened by the application of this rule. 
13 Gower op cit 561 
14 (1969) 2 WLR 289 
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It is clear that if the rule does apply, the agreements affected are 
not simPly those entered into by majority shareholders, nor is it 
limited to "secret" agreements. Gower explains: 
"There need not be an actual deceit ••• "Fraud" here connotes an 
abuse of power analagous to its meaning in a court of equity to 
describe a misuse of fiduciary position. Nor is it necessary that 
those who are injured should be a minority; indeed, the injured 
party will normally be the mmpany itself, though sometimes those 
who have really suffered will be a class, or section of members, not 
necessarily a numerical minority who are outvoted by the 
controllers1115 
Gower proceeds to outline the circumstances in which t11e c.ovrts w,u ·,ntc'-'e"e 
to annul a resolution on the grounds that that resolution perpetrates 
a "fraud on the minority". They are: 
(a) Expropriation of the company's property: the courts will 
intervene to annul a resolution passed by the majority if by 
.. 16 such a resolution the majority "make a present to themselves 
of property that belongs to the company 
(b) Release of directors' duties of good faith. 
"If the directors have acted in their own interests or those 
of a third party rather than in the interests of the company 
or have not directed their minds to the question whether what 
they are doing is in the best interests of the company, a 
resolution of the general meeting will not protect them" 17 
(c) Expropriation of other members' property. 
If the controllers use their voting power to deprive the other 
members of their shares in the company, such action will 
represent a "fraud on the minority" unless it can be shown 
that the resolution was passed in the interests of the company 
as a whole. 
(d) "Bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole": 
It appears that any resolution will be invalidated as a fraud 
on the minority if it can be shown that the object of the 
resolution, as judged by those passing it, is an improper 
18 purpose. 
15 Op cit 864 
16 Cook v Deeks (1916) 1 AC 564 
17 Gower op cit 566 
18 Some sort of objective test, however, does appear to exist -
See Gower op cit 521 
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This obviously is only a brief outline of the ingredients of fraud on 
the minority - brief because there is a strong suggestion that the above 
considerations, are irrelevant in determining the validity of a 
shareholder voting agreement. Clearly the validity of any votes cast at 
a general meeting will depend, for their validity in large part on 
avoiding the above results prohibited by the rule: to this extent, the 
prohibition of "fraud on the minority", on whatever view taken ofthe 
agreement, will speak very directly to the effectiveness of any 
agreement binding its parties to vote in a manner that results in this 
state of affairs. Whether the principle prevents those votes being 
cast in the first place - because by doing so would perpetrate a fraud 
on the minority is a separate, and for present purposes, more important 
question because it threatens the validity of the agreement itself. The 
examination of shareholder agreements so far has suggested that a 
close relationship between the validity of the objects achieved and the 
validity ofthe agreement itself, exists: the latter, it has been shown 
depend in large part upon the validity of the former - subject to the 
principle of severability. From this general approach, it was suggested 
that an agreement which bound the parties to vote in favour of a 
resolution that resulted in a fraud on the minority, as the vehicle of 
such a result, f ll alongside the votes cast. This possibilityst.c.Ms~Ln~ 
introductory qualification to which all shareholder agreements, like any 
other contract, are subject - that of "lawful purpose". If an agreement, 
in binding the parties to vote on a resolution results in a fraud on the 
minority, the link between the latter and the agreement appears intimate 
- intimate enough to be included as a "purpose" offue agreement: to 
accept that the purpose of agreement stops short at the obligation to 
vote, without inquiring intofue effect of that voting, appears at first 
sight unrealistic. This, however, was not the view of the court 
(admittedly obiter) in the only case in the Commonwealth whichfue present 
writer has found dealing with this matter Judson Jin R,rLguet v 
Bergeson19 observed: 
"It is important to distinguish the present action, which is between 
contracting parties to an agreement forthe voting of shares from one 
brought by a minority shareholder demanding a certain standard of 
conduct from directors and majority shareholders. Nothing that can 
arise from this litigation and nothing that can be said about it can 
touch on that problem.The fact that this agreement may potentially 
involve detriment to the minority does not render it illegal and 
contrary to public order. 
19 24 OlR 2 d 449 
- 1v.J -
If there is such injury, there is a remedy available to the minority 
shareholder who alleges a departure from the standards required of the 
majority shareholders and directors. The possibility of such injurious 
effect on the minority is not a ground for illegality. 20 
Certainly such an interpretation encompasses fraud on the minority. 
Thus the effect of the votes cast and the validity of the agreement 
binding the parties to cast their votes, on this view, are separate 
issues: the former it would appear, can never undermine the validity 
of t he agreement itself because the f~cus of attack must be directed 
agai nst the votes cast in fulfilment of the agreement, and not against 
the agreement itself. The terms of an agreement, it follows, will be 
enforced, despite the "possibility"of a fraud on the minority resulting; 
likewise,"ibe probability or certainty of this result occuring would 
appear irrelevant as a consequence of this interpretation, separating 
as i t does the validity of the agreement and its effect. The agreement 
is not infected by subsequent attacks made on the validity of the votes 
cast under the resolution. Likewise, Judson J rejected any possibility 
of t he principles of "public order" as a ground for invalidating a 
shareholder agreement on the basis that it injures minority interests. 21 
This, it is submitted, is the interpretation that would be followed in 
New Zealand. It is not, however, the only view. The American position 
is expressed in Ecclestone and Indiatlantic h'\c. 22 where the court cited 
with approval the following statement: 
"the propositions that it is as legitimate for a majority of 
stockholders to combine as for other people ••• the combination is 
unlawful only if 'the gain was to be at the expense offue corporation 
or in some way was to work a wrong to the other stockholders' are 
generally recognised as sound law." 23 
This view assimilates the validity of the agreement with that of its 
ob jects: if the effect of votes cast in pursuance Jf an agreement 
result in a 'fraud on the minority', the agreement itself would, like 
any votes cast, be invalidated. (t should be pointed out that the origin 
of this view point can be traced back to the uniquely American attitude 
that a controlling shareholder is under some sort of fiduciary duty to 
the other shareholders: it is but a short step from this attitude, to 
20 ibid 459 
21 ibid - see discussion ante p 1c1 
22 29 NW 2 d 619 (1947) 
23 ibid 681 
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invalidating a shareholder agreement that contains an inbuilt fraud on 
the minority. No such foundation for invalidating such an agreement 
exists in New Zealand or England where it is accepted that a shareholder 
is not a fiduciary relation with his fellow shareholders: to ,~ve\ l~ctale 
an agreement on this basis would therefore take a rrruch longer step in 
New Zealand. 
Finn remains undecided on this point 24 ; nevertheless, Kruger indicates 
that under English law, the effect of the votes cast in pursuance of an 
agreement remains a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of 
the agreement. 
"Given no intention on the part ofthe parties _ thereto to oppressive 
or illegal conduct, a pooling agreement properly written ought to be 
enforceable" 25 
If "opprt,ssive conduct (significantly separate from illegal conduct) is 
a pre-requisite to tie agreement's enforceability, it would appear that 
the effect of the votes cast, likewise, must be included before the 
agreement is granted a clean bill of health. 
It is submitted, however, that the view of the court in Ri_aguet v 
Berecson 26 would prevail in New Zealand. The principle of "fraud on the -- ---
minority" acts as one limitation on the power of a shareholder to vote 
as he pleases. 
The limitation is imposed only against the prevailing conception of a 
share being a proprietary right which its holder may otherwise excercise 
as he pleases. In which category, then does a shareholder aereement 
binding its parties to vote in a manner that results in a fraud on the 
minority fit? The''first principle" of such an enquiry must be the 
Proposition that shares are proprietary rights, and, it is submitted, 
this is where the assessment of an agreement will end: 
24 op ci t 100 Footnote 9 
25 op ci t 565 
26 24 DLR 2d 449 
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The possibility of an attack being made on the casting of those votes, 
on the ground that they constitute a fraud on the minority, is 
precisely the reason that consideration of this ground of invalidity 
will be postponed till those votes are cast: 27 In any event, it is the 
votes, and not the agreement, that will become subject to the attack, 
and hence invalidated. The agreement remains in the realms of a 
legitimate exercise of a proprietary right, the recognition of which 
will subsist because its limitation operates independently. 
There is, finally, a practical factor to be taken into consideration. 
As Gower points out: 
"it seems clear that a resolution only impeachable as a fraud on 
the minority is merely voidable and will be invalid until successfully 
attacked" 28 
The foundation for invalidating an agreement binding its parties to 
vote in a particular way is that the fraud on the minority resulting from 
these votes infects tne agreement itself. If however, the votes 
themselves may be valid, however precariously, does this not serve as a 
strong caution against automatically invalidating the agreement binding 
its parties to vote in this way? It would appear strange to invalidate 
the agreement if the votes subsequently cast remained valid because 
they were not attacked, giving added justification forthe courts view 
in J{ingJ:!et __ v Bergeson 29 that • the possibility of such injurious effect 
on the minority is not a ground for illegality' • 30 
27 The distinction argued by Trebilcock (op cit, ante p ) in relation 
to an alteration in the company's articles can be invoked to support 
this conclusion: if an alteration in the company's articles cannot 
be prevented because this act in itself will not breach an existing 
contract, since this will only occur when the company acts on the 
alteration, likewise it can be argued that a voting agreement, even 
one of which it can be predicted with certainty that a fraud on the 
minority will result if the votes sre cast, should not be invalidated 
until it is in fact acted on. The possibility that the company will 
not act on its altered articles, militating against preventing such 
an alteration, applies equally to the shareholder agreement: if all 
the parties to it agree, it too may never be acted on. 
28 op ci t 563 Footnote 18 
29 op ci t 
30 ibid 459 
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It is submitted therefore that although shareholder agreements must be 
for a lawful purpose, the principles invalidating the votes cast in 
pursuance of this agreement as a fraud on the minority do not extend to 
invalidating the agreement itself. 
This interpretation has one further consequence: it disposes of any 
possible attack being made on an agreement on the ground that by such 
an agreement,"control" of the company is being sold. Gower recognises 
that the American doctirne, as expressed in Per~c.\nv ~dmar:m3 1 , that 
a majority shareh~lder, in selling his shares may have to account to the -other shareholders if he receives a larger price for that controlling 
block than they can, on the basis that control of the company is a 
corporate asset, could be introduced into English, and hence New Zealand 
law, under the head of expropriation of company's property. The 
application of this doctrine to shareholder agreements could only arise 
where a shareholder contracts to sell his majority shareholding but 
retains some shares, 31 or where a majority shareholder contracts to vote 
as another person ~i;S\..e.s in respect of shares representing a majority: in 
both cases, there is a shareholder agreement, and in both, effective 
control of the company has been transferred. As Gower points out: 
"the only reason why they get a larger price is because their shares 
enable the holders to appoint a board, and thereby gain control of assets 
which belong not to themselves but to the company as a whole" 33 
An agreement by a majority shareholder to vote in respect of his majority 
shareholding according to the wishes of another likewise may, if the 
price paid reflects an element in consideration of "control" being 
purchased, become subject to an attack on the ground of expropriation of 
the company's property - and hence a fraud on the minority; a voting 
agreement threatened by the "sale of control" principle would necessarily 
have to relate to voting at the General Meeting, which in fact, is no 
real extension of the fraud on the minority principle. However, an 
agreement whereby the majority shareholder sells a block of shares 
giving the purchaser control but retains some shares himself34 could 
become liable to attack on the •sale of control' principle as a fraud on 
the minority . 
31 219F 2d 173 (1955) 
32 if the majority shareholder sold all his shares, tt wouldn't be a 
shareholder agreement. 
33 op cit 578 
34 such an agreement, on Kruger 's definition (op cit 557) is a 
shareholder agreement - ante p 
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It is, however, precisely because of this identification of 'sale of 
control' as a fraud on the minority that "sale of control" could not 
render an agreement invalid - because as has been shown, an agreement 
should not be invalidated through the possibility that when carried out, 
the votes cast will perpetrate a fraud on the minority. Even if the 
agreement, and the effect of votes cast pursuant to it, were assimilated 
in determining its validity, the likelihood of 'sale of control' being 
accepted as a ground of acco.untabili ty as a fraud on the minority is 
slim, and was rejected by Kuper Jin Ynited Trust Pty v s. Afric~ 
Milling_Co, 35 - though however did concede: 
"The action of the majority can only be impeached if they receive a 
larger price at the expense of other shareholders" 36 
Gower interprets this apparent rejection of his suggestion as a 
recognition that the majority may be liable if .the result of the sale 
is to harm the company or the minority. 37 
The sale of control has traditionally been limited to selling a majority 
shareholding. It need not, however, be limited to selling the majority 
shares: if control of the company is the guiding criterion, then this 
may equally be sold by putting the control of voting those shares in 
another's hands, as a typical voting agreement with an outsider 
involving a majority shareholding. Regulating as it does majority voting 
power at the General Meeting however returns us to the sphere where the 
principle of fraud on the minority , therefore, nothing new 
would emerge from the application of the Reil~an v Feldman38 doctrine in 
relation to shareholder agreements. 
35 (1959) 2 SAfrLR 426 
36 ibid 433-4 
37 op cit 579 
38 op cit 
CHAPTER 7 
STATUTORY REMEDIES AGAINST BREACH OF A SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT: 
The ultimate justification for entering into a shareholder agreement 
in a small company is that it minimises many of the problems inherent 
in this structure. One of the fundamental dangers of any involvement 
in such an organisation however stems not so much from the peculiar 
ingredients of its commercial success but rather from the inability of 
a member to withdraw if necessary • . O'Neal describes the problems 
created by this structure: 
"An unhappy shareholder in a close corporation often cannot get 
out of the enterprise without serious loss. All of a large part of 
his assets may be tied up in the business ••• He ordinarily does not 
have a partner's power to dissolve the business unit ••• he cannot 
di spose of his stock easily ••• if there are restrictions on the 
I transferability of the corporations shares ••• i r ritated and obstinate 
associates can prevent a sale" 1 
The same writer isolates the two principal dangers created within such 
a structure: 
"Deadlocks: The distribution of mting shares in a close corporation 
is often such that an eventual impasse is probable ••• persons who are 
to hold minority interests ••• often bargain for md obtain a veto over 
corporate policies and decisions. Veto powers of course greatly 
enhance the risk of eventual corporate paralysis. In the colourful 
language of a Virginia Court, veto ~rangements empower a recalcitrant 
shareholder or director to "embalm his corporation and hold it helpless 
, .• in a state of suspended animation". Squeeze Outs ••• whenever 
control is not evenly divided ••• and minority share holders do not have a veto over corporate decisions, ma jority controllers and the 
directors and officers whom they control often i. ry to squeeze out the 
"Oppugnancy and Oppression in Close Corporations" (1959) 1 Boston 
College Industrial and Commercial Law Review 2 
- 1 I 1 -
minority shareholders ••• A "squeeze out is a manipulative use of corporate control to eliminate minority shareholders from an enterprise, reduce their voting power or claims on corporate earnings and assets or otherwise deprive them of corporate income or advantages. 112 
The forms of squeeze-outs vary considerably. The most common form occurs when the shareholder-director-executives refuse to declare dividends but provide high compensation for themselves in the form of salaries or the perks enjoyed by directors, leaving the minority shareholder who does not hold corporate office with little return on his investment. An example of such a case is provided In ~e Jermyn ~treet T_~l_{:ish_ Bat~s Ltd. 3 A director in a small company died. The only interest that passed to the aruninistrators of the estate was the director's shares in the company. Such an interest, divorced from participation in management, was rendered worthless by the subsequent actions of the two remaining directors - "no dividends were ever declared and ••• P's remuneration from the company was excessive."~ The appeal against the order under s.209 (Companies Act 1055) was allowed . Another frequent form of squeeze out occurs when the shareholder-director.executives cause the company to issue a large number of new shares, which they themselves buy at a grossly inadequate price , thereby increasing their proportionate control. 5 Other forms of s:i_ueeze outs include: 
2 Ibid 3 quoting Kaplen Block 31 SE 2d 896.7 (1944) 3 ( 1971 ) 1 WLR 104 2 
4 Ibid 
5 The reduction of a shareholder's proportionate shareholding, even where the price paid for the new shares is adequate,may be a ground on which the issue of new shares will be invalidated under s.209 Companies Act 1955 under the equitable jurisdiction if it can be shovm that the action was framed so as to put into the hands of the majority shareholder-directors "complete control of the company" and to deprive the minority of his "existing rights as a shareholder" - per Foster Jin Clemens and Clemens Bros Ltd (1976) 2 All ER 268 at p 282. 
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- majority shareholders causing the company to sell its assets 
at an inadequate price to the company they hold an interest 
in and then liquidate the old company 
exhorbitantly high rents may be paid by the company for property 
owned by the shareholders. 
The shareholder agreement can go some way to providing a solution 
to these problems. The most common type of agreement between share-
holders is the one by which they bind themselves to vote for a certain 
person, often themselves, as directors, of the company. Another guard 
against "lo c.kins 11 , 11 deadlocks", or "squeeze outs" is an agreement 
entered into by shareholders compelling one to buy the shares of the 
other, if the reller so wishes. Or a shareholder agreement may provide 
that the parties to it, under certain circumstances will votetb 
have the company put into voluntary liquidation. The existence of a 
shareholder agreement may be relevant in solving the problems 
engendered by the structure of a small company in another context 
namely its relevance under s.217(f) ofihe Companies Act 1955, which 
states that 
"a company may be wound up by the court if ••• the court is of 
the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be 
wound up". 
Two cases 6 stand for the proposition that the repudiation of 
obligations accepted in an agreement entered into by the members of 
a company will constitute strong grounds on which the court will be 
prepared to exercise its discretion to wind up the company. The 
foundation for this prediction is particularly compelling: through 
Lord Wilberforce in Re We~tpourne Galleries Ltd7 discounted the utility 
or desirability of categorizing the circumstances in which this 
discretion will be exercised,the existence of a shareholder agreement was 
specifically cited as a typical element likely to result in the 
application of equitable principles: 
6 Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd (1973) AC 360 and A and BC Chewing Gum 
(1975) 1 WLR 579 
7 ( 197 3) AC 360 
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"The superimposition of equitable considerations requires something 
more which typically may include one, or probably more, of the following 
elements ••• (ii) an agreement, or understanding that all, or some 
(for there may be sleeping members) of the shareholders shall participate 
in the conduct of .thebusiness118 
Thus it appears that the existence of an agreement between shareholders 
stipulating participation in the management of the company will prove 
a strong ground on which the court will exercise its discretion if 
that obligation is broken. If, however, the breach ofa1ch an 
agreement is a persuasive factor in favour of the court's discretion 
being exercise·d, equally the existence of an agreement allowing the 
act compa.ined of will militate against the court's discretion being 
exercised. The essence of Lord \"lilberforce ' s judgment in Re Westbourne 
Galle ries Ltd9 is that in the "quasi partnership" situation, the 
Articles often embody only imperfectly the total relationship of the 
members , and that understandings contributine to this relationship 
existing outside the Articles are to be given effect on the just and 
equitable ground; where, however, the acts complained of by the 
applicant are done in pursuance of an agreement, the existence of such 
an agreement would appear to fill the gap (created by the incomplete 
nature of the Articles alone) on which the intervention of the just 
and equitable ground is based. In this respect, the creation of rights 
and obligations by such an agreement is identical tothe situation that 
would exist if such rights had been contained in the Articles. In this 
situation, it would appear that the just and equitable principle is 
excluded . Nathan and Goldfarb support this view: 
"If a written agreement setting out a code of procedural and 
substantive rights of all shareholders exists in a particular case, we 
believe that the courts would be inhibited in exercising their equitable 
jurisdiction" 10 
8 Ibid 379 
9 op cit 
10''Compulsory Winding Up by qourt" (1978)54 Canadian Bar Review 514. 
The authors argue, however, that a difficult result applies in relat-
ion to oral agreements: 
"','mere the agreement is unwritten and established to the 
satisfaction of the court on oral evidence ••• no such stricture 
exists"(ibid) 
It is difficult to see why the distinction should exist: the 
only ground would appear to be the possible difficulty the _re~pon~ent 
may experience in proving an oral agreement, and yet the dJStinction 
is made precisely after the oral agreement has been "established to 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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Prentice however argues in relation to breach of such an agreement: 
"a shareholder would be able to invoke as gounds for winding 
up his company ••• the failure of the other members of the company 
to observe the tenns of avoting agreement" 11 
Whether the existence of a voting agreement per se, and its breach, 
affords sufficient grounds on which the court's discretionrm.y be 
involved is unclear. The implication of the reference in Prentice's 
quote to "a voting agreement" without any further qualification to 
what type of voting agreement, suggests that this is so. Lord 
Wilberforce subsequently elaborated on this point: 
"The just and equitable provision nevertheless comes to his 
assistance if he can point to, and prove some special underlying 
obligation of his fellow member(s) in good faith or confidence that 
so long as the business continues he shall be entitled to management 
participation, an obligatioL so basic that if broken, the conclusion 
must be that the association must be dissolved1112 
As indicated by the earlier quote, the obligation need not be 
limited to one of "good faith" or "confidence" but includes"an agree-
ment1113. The question remains, however: is the obligation in 
itself sufficient to ~tract the intervention of the equitable principle 
or must the obligation in addition be "so basic that if broken, the 
conclusion must be that the association must be dissolved"? Another 
question of particular relevance to our present inquiry is whether 
the agreement contemplated is limited to a voting agreement securing 
participation in management, or o any voting agreement? 
Vii th respect to the first question, Plowman J In Re A & BC Chewing 
Gum14 considered: 
"There Lord Wilberforce speaks of entitlement to management 
participation as being an obligation so basic that, if broken, the 
· · · t b d. 1 d" 15 conclusion must be that the association mus e isso ve 
the satisfaction of the court": where this is so, in theabsence 
of any peculiarity arising from oralityt the consequences on the availability of the equitable jurisdiction of an oral agreement should be identical to those arising from a written agreement. 
11 "Winding-Up: The Partnership Analogy": 89 Law Quarterly Review 
(1973) 122-3 
12 op cit 380 
13 ibid 379 
14 (1978) WLR 591 
15 ibid p 591 
- 11.) -
The implication of this is ihat any "entitlement" alone to 
management participation is sufficient to attract the court's 
intervention because it involves, necessarily it would appear, 
such a basic obligation. The result reached in that case, where 
no enquiry into the significance of the right to participation in 
management was undertaken reinforces. the view that such an assumption 
was being made. Such an interpretation excludes, it would appear, 
further enquiry into the questionaf how basic the obligation proved 
because its sufficiency flows naturally from the object of entitlement: 
participation in management 16 • If this is the correct interpretation, 
then it follows that a shareholder agreement stipulating participation 
in management will always be a ground on which the company all be 
wound up under section if the agreement is repudiated. 
Perhaps, in any event, if a further test of sufficiency of 
"basic-ness" is being set up by Lord Wilberforce's quotes the reduction 
of it to contractual terms will always fulfil this requirement. It 
is submitted, however, that a further test before the "just and 
equitable discretion" will be exercised is being imposed - that the 
comment "so basic ••• " is expanding on the nature of the obligation 
required rather than necessarily following fromihe nature of any such 
obligation. To accept that the breach of an obligation per se, 
without further inquiry into the significance of this obligation runs 
contrary to the rationale set up initially justifyingfue intervention 
of the court as expressed by 'ord Wilberforce: 
"The foundation of it lies in the words" just and equitable" ••• 
The words are a recognition of the fact that a limited company is 
more than a mere judicial entity with a personality in law of its 
own: that there is room in company law for recognition of the fact 
behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, 
expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily 
submerged in the company structure1117 
16 Support for this conclusion is derived from Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd (op cit) itself and the Canadian case Re Rogers and Agincourt Holdings Limited (1977) 14 OR 2d 489: in both cases, the winding 1;1P application under section 217(f) (equivalent) was successful despite the fact that the respondent majority shareholders could have kept the applicant on the Board with no adverse consequences to themselves - because they controlled the Board; this fact suggests that ihe mere removal of a director is the influential factor in the ~ourt ' s decision. 
17 op cit 379 
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Such a clear mandate to recognise the reality of the company structure 
implies, likewise, that the court will scrutinize carefully the 
reality of an obligation: a contract among shareholders, for example, 
may well not qualify as embodying the required obligation if it 
transpires that its terms had lapsed voluntar~ly, or in some other 
way, the terms of the agreement had never been acted upon and that the 
party seeking the winding up had acquiesced in this state of affairs. 
It may be, wondered, in fact, whether the fact that a shareholder 
agreement securing participation in management has the force of contract 
and hence law behind might not by definition exclude the availability 
of the equitable principle. Certainly the express inclusion of an 
"agreement" as a circumstance likely to result in the exercise of the 
judicial discretion suggests the c·ontrary, and "agreement" appears 
naturally to encompass a contract. Yet there are statements in Lord 
Wilberforce's judgment that suggest that including such a circumstance 
might in fact be inconsistent with the rationale behind intervention 
in the first place: 
"The just and equitable provision does, as equity always does 
enable the court to subject the exercise of legal rights to equitable 
ccmiderations; considerations, that is, of a personal character arising 
between one individual and another which may make it unjust or 
inequitable to insist on legal rights or to exercise them in a 
particular way." 18 
It would appear, however, that the existence of a legal right to 
enforce a contract entered into by shareholders which one\!f.)uld have 
thought excluded the necessity of falling back on equitable principles, 
does not exclude the equitable jurisdiction being invox ed - either 
in conjunction, or in substitution to tha t r emedy. In any event, i he 
agreement entered into by t hat s hareholder may prove deficient in 
some manner, requiring the intervention of equity. The larger question 
remains, however, - namely, the availability of the winding up order 
on the "just and equitable" ground where the respondent is acting 
inconsistently with the applicant's legal rights. The need for the 
intervention of the court arises precisely in order "to subject the 
· t· 1119 h" h exercise of legal rights to equitable considera ions - w ic appears 
18 ibid 
19 ibid 
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to imply that its availability might be limited to situations where the defendant is exercising a legal right. This might appear to cast doubt on the availability of the discretion of the courts to intervene against a defendant in breach of a contractual right stipulated in an agreement entered into by shareholders. However logical such a limitation may appear to be, Plovm1an J Jn ~e_ ~ &_ BC C_hewipg__Qum_20 granted a winding up order under the just and equitable principle precisely on the basis of a breach of a shareholder agreement securing for the plaintiffs participation in management.· The exclusion resulted, therefore, not from the exercise of the defendant's legal rights which the equitable discretion should temper but rather in defiance of the plaintiff's legal rights - specifically his contractual rights - from which foundation theequitable discretion was granted. 
"I have come to the conclusion that I ought to exercise my discretion by making a winding up order. The fact remains that the Coakleys have repudiated the relationship established by the shareholders agreement and the articles. The case, is, in my judgment analogous to the expulsion type of case\\flich the House of Lords was considering in the Westbourne Galleries case, although, as I have said, this is not a mse of one side making use of its legal rights to the prejudice of the other. The Coakleys had no legal right to do what they have done. Lord Wilberforce said at p 380 ••• There Lord Wilberforce speaks of entitlement to management participation as being ancibligation so basic if broken the conclusion must be that the association must be dissolved. In the present case, management participa.tion wa s .secured by Topps' right to appoint and remove an "A" director, and that entitlement hasz been repudiated. I do not read the passage which I have read from Lord Wilberforce's speech as depriving me of a discretion, but in the exercise of that discretion, I propose to make a winding up order21 
Clearly, therefore, the fact that 1he plaintiff has an enforceable legal right, which presumably could be enforced independently of section 217(f) of the Companies Act 1955, and the fact that the defendant is in breach of this legal right will not preclude the court 
20 1975 1 WLR 519 
21 1975 WLR 591 
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from winding up the company on the just and equitable ground. On 
the other hand, Plowman J's statement"I do not read the passage which 
I have read from Lord Wilberforce's speech as depriving me of a 
discretion"
22 
serves as sme recognition of the conceptual inconsistency 
of granting an order on the just and equitable ground where the 
plaintiff is enforcing a legal right and the defendant is in breach 
of this right. This does indicate that the existence of a legal 
right on the applicant's part, arising from the breach of a shareholder 
agreement, will not necessarily strengthen the case of that applicant 
seeking a winding up order on the just and equitable ground. 23 
One thing, however is clear as aresult of tlese two cases: in 
determining whether it is just and equitable that a company should 
be wound up on an application for such an order under section 217(f) 
of the Companies Act 1955, the existence of an agreement between 
the shareholders securing participation in the management of the 
company will be a decisive factor in the success of such an application. 
22 ibid 
23 Could the just and equitable ground be invoked if another 
understanding, independent of the rights created by the company's 
articles and independent of a supplementary agreement entered 
into by the company's shareholders, be pointed to? It is 
doubtful. The existence of an independent agreement between 
the shareholders is likely to be accepted as embodyine the 
limits of any rights existing outside the articles which, in 
equity, ought to be enforced. The only relevance such 
an alleged understanding existing beyond the shareholder 
agreement might have would be possibly as constitutine an implied 
term of that fonner agreement. If such an understanding is to 
be relied on to invoke the just ~d equitable ground, it meets 
the objection that if it was intended to create rights by such 
an understanding, it could have been included intlle shareholder 
agreement. The same argument however is inapplicable in 
relation to the shareholder agreement/Articles comparison, due 
to the special features of thelatter. 
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What is less clear, however, is the significance to be attached to 
a shareholder agreement dealing with matters other than participation 
in management in the determination of whether it is "just and equitable" 
that such an order should be granted. Some statements in Lord 
Wilberforce's judgment indicate that such an agreement would be 
on a par with one dealing with participation in management. 
"It would be impossible, and wholly undesirable, to define the 
circumstances in which these (equitable) considerations may arise. 1124 
This suggests that the existence of an agreement stipulating 
a dividend policy, if breached, might, identically to a breachcf 
an agreement securing participation in management, be a ground of 
winding up. 25 Subsequent statements indicate however that the 
criterion later outlined on which the assessment of a winding up 
order will be made, are orientated principally to the exclusion 
cases . For present purposes, it is especially important that in 
citing the relevance of "an agreement" to the assessment in progress, 
\\ the apparent qualification that ~l or some of the shareholders 
shall participate in the conduct of the business1126 is introduced, 
thereby creating the possibility that an agreement dealing with 
other aspects of corporate activity will not command the immediate 
relevance (if any at all) as one securing participation in 
management. Such a possibility becomes more probable by the undoubted 
categorisation subsequently introduced (but perhaps with retroactive 
effect): "My Lords, this is an expulsion case1127 • This must serve 
as a caution on asswning that an agreement securing a minimum dividend 
policy will be equally relevant as a ground on which the company 
will bewound up. Little justification for this distinction, if there 
is one, exists: the circumstances justifying the court's equitable 
24 
25 
26 
27 
op cit 379 
Support for this view is gained from In Re Rogers & Aqincourt 
Holdings Limited (1976) 12 OR 2d 386: the Divisior:ial Court 
accepted repudiation of an agreement that the applicant should 
be entitled to a shareholding in the company as a ground for 
winding up the company on the just and equitable ground if such 
repudiation showed that the confidence the applicant had in the 
respondent had been destroyed - supra p 396. 
ibid 
ibid 380 
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intervention under section 217(f) as Lord Wilberforce appears 
originally to have recognised - may arise equally from the denial 
of an agreement securing participation in management. Indeed, where 
the Articles subject the dividend policy to the general meeting, and 
an agreement binding the shareholders to vote with a certain party on 
dividends is thwarted by an alteration in the Articles (making the 
dividend policy of the ~mpany the preserve of management) exclusion 
of that party from any influence in that policy because he is not a 
director, appears a prime candidate for the intervention of the courts 
on the just and E!!3.Ui table basis under section 217 ( f) • However the 
distinct orientation toward exclusion of management cases that 
developed in Lord Vilberforce's judgment casts some doubt on the 
availability of the winding up order where the agreement pleaded 
relates to matters other than participation in management. 
There is a strong mggestion in Re Empire Building Limited 28 that 
in certain circumstances, the existence of a shareholder agreement 
will be relevant to an application under section 209 Companies Act 
1c;55. In defining the ingredients of "oppressive conduct", Turner P 
observed 
"I much doubt whether a decision by a majority vote of shareholders not to alter the Articles of Association •.• can ever, in any 
circumstances amount to conduct ••• in a manner oppressive to those 
sponsoring the proposal. Certainly it cannot amount to oppressive 
conduct unless there is shown some undertaking, express or implied, 
on the part of the majority that they would a,gree to such an al terationrf~ 
Clearly, therefore, the existence of a shareholder aereement 
containing a coiruuitment by the majority of shareholders to a~ree to 
an alteration in the CQmpany\Jarticles may, if breached, constitute "01Jpressive conduct'' on the part of the majority, and hence justify 
an order under s.209 of the Companies Act 1955. Furthermore, Turner 
P•s comments indicate that the refusal per se of the majority to alter 
the articles in breach of the "undertaking, expresss or implied" may of itself fulfil the criterion of oppression advanced by Buckley LJ in 
Re Jermyn Street Turkish Bat~s Ltd: 30 on this new, such refusal will 
2 8 ( 1 9 7 j 1 NZ LR 21 4 
29 ibid 229 
30 (1971)1 WLR 1942 
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itself result in the minority being "constrained to submit to some-thing which is unfair to them1131 : such refusal is the "overbearing act or Ettitude on the IB,rt of the oppressor. 1132 The alternative interpretation of Turner P's comments is that other circumstances must also exist - such as the division of proceeds of a sale of the company's assets on the basis of the nominal value of the shares, resulting in an inequitable distribution - which render the refusal of the majority not to alter the articles oppressive but that there may be circumstances when a refusal to do so, though in breach of an undertaking will not automatically be construed as "oppressive conduct". This, it is submitted isi:he better approach: lt does not necessarily follow that a refusal on the part of the majority to alter the articles, though in breach of an undertaking, will be "unfair" to the minority or that such refusal is "some overbearing act". The context of Turner P's comments does lend support to the stricter approach however, in that His Honour was considering specifically the possibility of viewing as "oppressive conduct", the refusal of a majority to alter the articles in isolation: it is in this context that the proviso"unless there is shown some undertaking, express or implied ••• " appears. It could be concluded from thisthat the refusal, if such an undertaking exists, would constitute oppressive conduct; the better interpretation of Turner P's comments, in light of the whole case, is that~s a general rule, the refusal of a majority to alter the company's articles will never constitute oppressive conduct, but the existence of an undertaking by that majority to alter the articles when breached may render such refusal oppressive: the breach of the undertaking, therefore, creates the possibility of $lCh a refusal being oppressive conduct, which will be judged by the court in light of all the relevant circumstances of the case, but that the breach of such an agreement or the refusal per se will not necessarily render the majority's refusal oppressive conduct. 
A further point is raised by Turner P's comments in Re Empire Bu~lding LtdT~ the undertaking envisaged is an "expresss implied" one that the majority "would agree fu such an alteration". 1t would 
31 ibid 1060 
32 ibid 
33 op cit 
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appear therefore that where a shareholder agreement has as oneQf 
its implied terms an undertaking by the majority to alter the 
articles,. breach of this implied term will be a elevant factor in 
the court's assessment of whether the efusal of the majority is 
oppressive. Could therefore an agreement by majority shareholders 
securing participation of a minority shareholder as a director 
give rise to such an implied term if, in their present form, the 
articles make this impossible, and hence, to fulfil the principal 
obligation, the majority must alter the g-ticles? Logically, such 
a term would appear to be implied by the agreement. Against this 
however, is the established reluctance of the courts to read any 
implied terms into shareholder contracts. 3~ It is doubtful therefore 
whether such an undertaking will be accepted as existing by implication 
in relation to a shareholder agreement. If it is implied however, 
clearly it is relevant to an application under s.209 Companies Act 
if breached. This reluctance casts some doubt on whether such a term 
will be implied in a shareholder agreement, though clearly such a 
possibility was envisaged by North P. 
3 t+. Greenhalgh v i,Tallard ( 1943) 2 AIIER 234: see discussion at P 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE SHAREHOLDER AGREET:ENT AS Ai"{ ESTATE PLANNING DEVICE 
Perhaps one of the most effective uses of the shareholder agree-
ment lies in the po13ntial as an estate planning device, especially 
in the context of small private companies. Before appreciating its 
potential in this sphere, it is necessary initially, to understand the 
problemsconfronting the small company and its members and dependants 
when one of its members dies. 
The small company is characterised by its shareholding being 
held by relatively few people who are actively involved in its man-
agement. Generally this shareholding will represent the members' 
major asset upon death;while alive, their participation in the company 
will constitute the members' principal means of livelihood. The 
death of a member of such a company, flowing from these characteris-
tics, poses acute problems for the estate and heirs of the deceased 
as well as for the eorporation;more over the problem is compou.rl.ed 
by the divergence of interest between the esta~ of the deceased 
and the sur· ing members resulting from the death of that member. 
The interests of both camps are briefly exrunined independently. 
The interest of the estate, family or heirs of the deceased is 
dominated , initially, by a need for cash to pay for funeral and 
probate costs, estate taxes and~ebts: since the principal asset of 
the deceased lay in his shareholding in the company, resort will 
inevitably be had to this asset in order to pay these cost~~ some of 
these shares will have to be sold in order to produce the required 
cash; in a private company however, this is no simple procedure. 
The company's articles may establish a restriction on sales; even in 
the absence of such restrictions, shares in a private corn pany comm-
and no ready market, since buyers will seldom be interested in any-
thing less than a controlling interest. Thus, the only real market 
for these shares lies in the remaining members of the company; if 
if the deceased held a minority shareholding, however, the 
remaining shareholders will still be able to maintain control ind 
Pendently of this shareholding: there will consequently be little 
incentive for them to buy out this remaining shareholding. 
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And yet, independently of the need for ready cash, it is clear that 
the interests of the estate lie in selling the shares. The first 
reason is peculiar to a small company: usually its shareholders 
taketheir profits from the company in salaries, rather than dividends: 
this makes the shares a particularly una~tractive investment for 
the estate and heirs, their interest naturally lies in a high div-
idend policy which a small company will seldom pursue - normally 
they will not benefit at all from payment in salaries because they 
will seldom be managers. The death of the member usually cuts off all 
revenue and income for his family. In addition, keeping the shares 
renders the estate's security dependent on the fortunes of a small 
business which 1without the participation of the member now deceased) 
may not be an attractive proposition. 
The position of the surviving shareholders is likewise jeopar-
dised by the death of a memQer. As ha.s already been pointed out, 
continuous harmony and mutual confidence are crucial to the success 
of such an operation. The tension generated by the estate retaining 
the shares,resulting in an unwanted associate or an "inactive share-
holding" is detrrimental to the success of the operFtion, dependent 
as it is on harmony. Identical results may o<c.u("l,.)"'-eit 1~ ~eMhe.rs 6'.ul'\, o... 
minority interest: they may be completely at the mercy of this 
unknown nev,comer, represented by the estate, or an outsider to whom 
the estate has sold its shareholding: the survivors may find them-
selves with a frozen investment. 
The death of a key shareholder in the comp8ny may also be detri-
mental to the company itself: its credit position may be affected, 
or ernployee morale may be harmed. 
The foregoing is sufficient to indicate that all parties concerned 
have an interest in finding a scneme whereby the shareholding of the 
deceased sharenolder in the company can be transferred smoothly to 
the surviving members of the company . It will come as no surprise 
to the reader, to learn that that scheme is the shareholder agree-
ment . 
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Huberman explains: 
"The most satisfactory solution will be to provide, through an 
appropriate ~reement entered suring the lifetime of the parties 
for the controlled liquidation, through purchase and sale, of the 
shares of each shareholder upon death ••• The only effective solution 
therefore would seem to be a mutually binding agreement under which, 
upon the death of the decedent the estate is bound to sell and the 
survivors are bound to purchase all the shares of the decedent at a 
specified or future determinable price." 1 
An example of such an agreement is to found in Gasparini v 
Gaspar_.gii 2 described in the judgement; 
~ "an agreement ma:ie between the late Dante Gaspa.rmi and his four 
surviving brothers... the five brothers signed an agreement 
which provided that upon the death of one of the parties, the survivors 
would purchase from the personal_ representatives of the deceased 
party all his shares in the corporation at a price equal to the 
value of such shares as set out in schedule A" 3 
The appeal of such a scheme to the estate is that it assures them 
a market - often the only market for the deceased's shareholding, 
guarLnteeing a fair price for that interest, and removing the element 
of uncertainty or delay that might otherwise arise if an outside 
buyer had to be found. To guard against the worst consequences of 
delay in the implementation of such a scheme, the agreement may stip-
uJ.ate that an income be paid to the estate in the interim period till 
the cash in received from the sale of the shares. Again we turn to 
Gasparini v Gasparini 4 as the example: 
"The agreement contained the following provision: until -the bal-
ance of the purchase price of the shares of the deceased party to 
this Agreement ••• is paid, the widow of the deceased pary to this 
Agreement shall receive from the Company, and the surviving parties 
to this agreement shall cause the Company to pay to the widow of the MS deceased party to this Agreement a salary •••• 
1• "Buy and Sell Agreements for Canadian Close Corporations" 
Canadian Bar Review 1963 VOL XLI 543 
2. ( 197 8) 20 OR 113 
3. ibid 114 
4. Op cit 
S · il.-,q,. 11 4-
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The court held that in her capacity as executrix and trustee 
of the estate of her husband the widow could sue on the agreement. 
The case illustrates the advantage of fixing such an obligation on 
to the shareholding of the company: 6 if fixed to the company itsel½ 
it could be attacked as being ultra vires and not "bona fide in 
the interests of the company".7 Being held to be a valid agreement, 
however, it assures the surviving members of the company full owner-
ship of the company and freedom from interference from outsiders, 
removing the dangers of unwarranted associates or an inactive share-
holding, thereby reducing the possibility of future conflict fatal to 
a small company. The agreement likewise confers on the company con-
tinuity and stability through ensuring harmonious and familiar manag-
ement , and the prospect of security and certainty in the future 
achieved by the agreement could enhance - at least maintain - the 
company's present credit rating. Indeed the execution of such an 
agreement is likely to result in a similar element of security 
enjoyed by the parties to the agreement while alive in charting a 
certain course in an area otherwise only viewed with uncertainty 
in addition to fixing a value on the interest of the shareholder 
that his family will receive. 
Validity of the Agreement in New Zealand! 
The validity of such an agreement, in line with shareholder 
agreements in general, appears assured in New Zealand. The power of 
disposition of a share, inherent in the nature of a share as a 
proprietary right 8 is fundamental. Such an agreement is no different 
from any other contract having present effect but postponed enjoyment. 
6. Quaere: how could the brothers "cause" the company to fulfill the 
obligation? If the obligation is in the management sphere, absent 
an alteration of articles, they could not direct the directors to 
pay out, and they themselves cannot contract as directors, due 
to the prohibition on directors' agreements due to the fetter rule. 
At some stage would not such a gratuitous payment be ruled ultra vires 
or expropriation of the company's property? 
1 - Po-,~e. \J 't>a..ily Ne wr:;. 
8. North West Transport Co. v Beatty 1887 12 App Cas 589 
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As a contract, it is supported by mutual consideration. Though not 
considered to be testamentary, it wouJa appear wise to include in the 
v1ill of the parties a specific reference to the agreement . From 
~asparini v _gasEarini 1 9 it would appear that the heirs of deceasgd 
estate cannot enforce the agreement in their personal capacity since 
they are not parties to the agreement;the executor or the trustee of 
the deceased's estate,however, will be entitled to enforce the agree-
ment, and may be granted specific perfonnance of the agreement. 
More problems arise however in relation to obligations contained 
in such agreements undertaken by the shareholders of the company 
causing the company to perform an act: it is one thing to allow a 
non-party to enforce an agreement under which he is entitled to a 
benefit, it is another to hold a non-party to a contract to be subject 
to the burden of that contract - and the company in such agreements 
is seldom a party. The court in Gasparini v yasparini 10 found no 
difficulty with this problem , and was even prepared to grant specific 
performance of the obligation on the company. It held: 
"It is our view that this principle does not preclude the order ••• 
where the real interests of no persons other than the contracting part-
ies are affected by the order. The corporate defendo.nt "the third party" 
is nothing more than the instrument by which the five brothers carried 
on business. No one else had any interest in it and therefore, no one 
else but the shareholders can be affected by any practical burden or 
liabilities imposed on it 11 ~ 1 
It should be painted out that imposing the burden of buyinB the 
deceased's shares on the shareholders of the company in New Zealand 
has another practical advantage in that the only alternative purchaser 
of these shares - if the same advantages of such a scheme are to be 
reaped - would be the company itself; such a possibility does not 
exists in New Zealand as a company is prohibited from buying its 
own shares. 12 Through lack of any valid alternative, the shareholder 
agreement may prove the only device by which the problems arising 
from the death of a member inherent in the small company itself, may 
be minimized. This leaves however, one major problem: how to finance 
the purchase of the deceased's shares. If convenience and security 
are the ultimate benefits of such a scheme to all the parties involved> 
clearly the ability of the survivors to purchase the deceased's share~ 
9. op cit 
10 . op cit 
11. ibid 116 
12. Trevor v Whitworth 1887 12 AC 409 
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once the contractual obligation to do so has been entered into, plays 
a key role in achieving these goals: it is indeed "the flesh which 
covers and gives life to the skeleton" 13 ie the legal structure of the 
agreement. The most effective guarantee of adequate finance being 
available when it is needed is that of business life insurance. 
Huberman explains: 
"The purchase of business life insurance is usually found to be 
the most satisfactory method of funding the buy and sell agreement, for 
the disaster which will create the need for the cash can also be util-
ized to provide that cash. The main advantage of life insurance is that 
it creates, at moderate cost, a special kind of sinking fund which 
guarantees that a definite amount will be available at an uncertain 
time in the future, that is, the death of one of the parties. 1114 
In view of the prohibition in New Zealand on a company purchasing 
its own shares, such a scheme must necessarily be limited to the 
participation of the shareholders. Such schemes are labelled "cross 
purchase" schemes under which each shareholder insures the lives of his 
fellow shareholders, naming himself as beneficiary of each policy. 
Again, Qa;_s_I?arini v _Gasr,arini 15 provides an example of such a scheme: 
"the five brothers, the only shareholders of the defendent 
corporation, took out insurance policies on each other's lives in the 
~1.mow:it of t100 ,ooo. 1116 
Outside the field of fan1ily companies, a problem may arise because 
normally the relationship existing between shareholders is insufficient 
to support an insurable interest. In relation to a small company, 
however, its dependence on the personal participation of its members 
woulq appear to confer upon each shareholder a pecuniary interest, and 
hence insurable interest, in the lives of his fellow shareholders: 
clearly the death of one of them will cause financial loss to the 
company and hence, to the surviving shareholders. It would appear 
unlikely however whether such an interest arises in relation to a 
"sleeping" member - though he, of course, would have a financial interest 
in the lives of the active members . 
The effectiveness of a buy and sell agreement will depend, initiall~ 
on its validity under the law; being an agreement, this will tend to 
be mainly the principles of the law of contract. Once its validity has 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
~ 
Lawthers:Business 
op cit 
op cit 
ibid p 114 
" Purchase Agreements 1950 p3 
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been sanctioned as a valid contract however, the effectiveness of the 
agreement, as with any other contract, will then depend upon the precise 
provisions of the agreement being enforced. Beacause most buy and sell 
agreements are entered into for similar reasons in the{estate context) 
inclusion of the followine provisions is suggested as necessary 
ingredients of a water tight agreement that will be appropriate in 
most cases: 
1. The names of the parties to the agreement 
2. A description of the parties' shareholding in the company 
3. The preamble - stating the purpose of the Aereeinent 
4. The obligation on the parties to purchase the required life insurance 
policies 
5. The obligation to maintain payment of the premiwns on such policies 
6. A restriction on the exercise of ownership rights in these policies 
till the death of a party to the Agreement 
7. - The commitment on the parties, their heirs, executors, administrat, 
ors and assigns to sell those shares 
8. - Inclusion of a formula by which the shares are valued 
9. Stipulation that the insurance proceeds of the survivors are to be 
used solely for the purchase of the deceased's shares 
10.- -Restrictions on inter vivos sale or transfer 
11.- Provision for the amendment, revocation or termination of the 
Agreement with the mutual consent of all its parties, and 
automatic termination of the agreement upon the: 
- bankruptcy, receivership or dissolution of the Company 
death of both shareholders within a short space of time 
- at the option of any insured upon the failure of the owner of any 
policy to pay the premiums, or if the owner assiens, surrenders or 
borrows against the policy 
12. - Binding the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the 
parties t9 the Agreement. 
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Appendix A 
"Each party hereto respectively covenants to exercise all the 
voting and other rights vested in him as holder of the said shares 
in the Company to ensure as far as each are able so to do the due 
fulfilment by the Company of any act or thing necessary to implement 
this Agreement(
1
). and oppose any act done by the Company likely to 
frustrate or hamper the voting control of the Company held by AB" 
Appendix B 
"Neither party hereto shall at any time sell or attempt to 
sell or otherwise dispose of any shares in the Company beneficially 
owned by him and registered in his name or in the name of his nom-
inee unless he shall first offer to sell such shares to the other 
II 
party to this Agreement. 
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